PERMANENT COUNCIL OF THE
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES
COMMITTEE ON HEMISPHERIC SECURITY |
OEA/Ser. G
CP/CSH-332/00
17 November 2000
Original: English |
SPECIAL MEETING OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HEMISPHERIC SECURITY “NEW APPROACHES TO HEMISPHERIC
SECURITY” [AG/RES. 1744 (XXX-O/00)] - REPORT BY THE CHAIR
EXPLANATORY NOTE
The purpose of this
document is to provide information that is as comprehensive as
possible about the proceedings and outcome of the Special Meeting of
the Committee on Hemispheric Security, held from November 13-14, 2000.
Included herewith, accordingly, are an Executive Summary of the Chair,
the Report of the Rapporteur, and a document on discussions at that
meeting, prepared by the Secretariat. Attached thereto are the
statements made at the opening session, as well as written
presentations submitted by member state delegations.
REPORT BY THE CHAIR
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Committee on
Hemispheric Security (the Committee) held a special meeting from
November 13-14, 2000 to continue consideration of two of the mandates
emanating from the Second Summit of the Americas:
1. To evaluate and
identify ways of revitalizing and strengthening agencies of the
inter-American system related to the various aspects of security, and
2. To analyze the most appropriate common approaches used to address
the various aspects of international security in the Hemisphere.
The Committee designated
Ambassador Luis Lauredo, Permanent Representative of the United States
and Vice Chair of the Committee as Rapporteur of the meeting /. The
Secretary General and the Chair of the Committee spoke during the
installation of the Meeting. Ambassador Valter Pecly Moreira,
Permanent Representative of Brazil, made a statement about the Fourth
Conference of Ministers of Defense of the Americas, held in Manaus,
from October 17 through 21,2000 /. There was vigorous participation by
the delegations many of which submitted their position papers and
contributions in writing /. The Chair of the Inter-American Defense
Board, Major General Carl H. Freeman, was invited to give a
presentation before the Committee /. At the request of several
delegations, the Secretariat of the Committee prepared a summary of
the proceedings, which is appended hereto /.
1. Evaluation and
identification of ways to revitalize and strengthen the agencies of
the inter-American system that relate to the various aspects of
security
There was significant
agreement among delegations as to the limitations of instruments such
as the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance and the pact of
Bogota, especially with regard to their universality and their
applicability to new circumstances in the Hemisphere, in direct
contrast to the continuing force and effect of the OAS Charter.
On this occasion, the
subject of the Inter-American Defense Board was discussed in greater
detail, with specific reference being made to the limited
participation of OAS member states in it and the need to decide on and
clarify its formal linkage to the Organization. During a lengthy
exchange of views about the IADB’s activities, various assessments
were forthcoming about its participation in mine-clearing programs,
the preparation of inventories on confidence-building measures, the
organization of disaster relief and the academic curricula of the
Inter-American Defense College. Various questions were also asked, and
views were expressed regarding the possibility of rotating the
chairmanship of the Board.
There was also a more
lengthy discussion than had taken place on previous occasions
regarding the importance and relevance of the Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance. While there was on the whole acknowledgement
that the application of treaty mechanisms had been limited in recent
decades --and there was no sign of any increased future recourse to
these mechanisms--, no common position emerged as to what would be an
appropriate approach to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance as part of an effort to renew security system mechanisms.
It can therefore be said that this topic will have to be discussed
further and in greater detail. In that respect, various proposals were
made to study in-depth points raised with regard to the treaty, and
once a statement was forthcoming as to what new hemispheric
commitments would be in the area of security, these commitments would
supersede those contained in the Rio Treaty.
The meeting reflected the
existing agreement on the complementary nature of subregional
cooperation mechanisms in matters of security and the hemispheric
system. It has been said that these mechanisms reflect common
realities that are specific to countries in different parts of the
Hemisphere and that they should be enhanced by renewed hemispheric
mechanisms that are in turn supported by subregional processes. This
was the basis of the proposal to explore the possibility of
establishing a specific mechanism for the southern part of the
Hemisphere, a mechanism that would be added to those existing for
Central America and the Caribbean.
Emphasis was placed on the
agreement that existed, namely, that the Committee should be the place
for dialogue and negotiation in the Hemisphere in matters of security.
It was the only permanent hemispheric forum that could generate
political negotiations and agreements that go beyond an exchange of
views.
In the same line of
thinking, the Committee brought to the attention of the meeting the
commonality of the agendas of the Committee and the meetings of
Ministers of Defense. There should be a parallel approach to common
topics, one that articulated and consolidated linkages, instead of
waiting for one process to absorb the other. Rather, ties between the
two should be closer and should be consolidated. One concrete way of
doing this would be for the Ministers to extend a standing invitation
to the Secretary General and to the Chair of the Committee and for the
host country to report to the Permanent Council on the outcome of
those meetings.
With regard to any
mechanisms to underpin possible commitments based on the new concepts
and the architecture of hemispheric security, the Committee raised the
possibility of adopting a future declaration. While this proposal was
not ruled out, it was noted that it should be viewed with caution, and
discussion should be resumed once there was a sign of significant
progress based on the necessary consensus.
2. Analysis of the most
appropriate common approaches used to address the various aspects of
international security in the Hemisphere
On efforts in the area of
common approaches to security, the Committee noted a movement, from
previous meetings, towards widespread acceptance of a broad,
multifaceted concept. On this occasion, the Committee went on to
consider in greater detail what the approach should encompass and the
principles that should underpin it. It was thus explained that, on the
one hand, the concept could not be so broad that there might be a risk
of it losing its meaning, nor could it be so narrow that it would
exclude the specific concerns of member states. There was broad
acknowledgement that any approach to security should adhere strictly
to the principles of inter-American relations as contained basically
in the OAS Charter. The Committee noted that the subordination of the
armed forces to civilian authority was an example of democracy at work
in the area of security.
The Committee also noted a
shared concern with regard to some of the implications of adopting a
broad security concept. It was emphasized that each state had the
power to use the means best suited to its own legal system to face new
and nontraditional threats. In this respect, specific gains? Had been
achieved with regard to the role of the armed forces in containing
organized crime and drug trafficking.
Finally, on the matter of
the Special Conference on Security in the Hemisphere, the Committee
acknowledged that completion of the preliminary and preparatory work
was essential to the success of that meeting. Accordingly, the
decision was to prepare a questionnaire the results of which should be
the subject of study at a meeting of the Committee during February.
APPENDIX I
SUMMARY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
SUMMARY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Several delegations
presented general statements on their respective country positions
with respect to both agenda items Apart from these general statements,
delegations also intervened during the discussion of each item. The
following is a summary of that dialogue prepared by the Secretariat. .
Agenda Item 1. Evaluation
and identification of ways to revitalize and strengthen the
institutions of the inter-American system involved in the various
aspects of security
Under Agenda item 1, the
Committee exchanged ideas on the Inter-American Treaty on Reciprocal
Assistance (TIAR), the American Treaty of Pacific Settlement of
Disputes (Pact of Bogota), the Inter-American Defense Board, the
Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas, the Charters of the
OAS and the United Nations, and the OAS itself, including the
Committee on Hemispheric Security. In order to evaluate and identify
ways to revitalize and strengthen these institutions, the discussion
was focused on three broad questions: their relevance in the context
of the current realities of the Hemisphere and its needs with respect
to security; their universality; and what would be the most
appropriate forum and mechanism for dealing with security issues at
the hemispheric level.
a. Inter-American Defense
Board (IADB)
With respect to the IADB,
the Chairman, Major General Carl Freeman, made a brief presentation
and responded to queries from delegations on several issues. In this
context, the Chairman stated that the Board could offer the Committee
a wide range of expertise and that a closer working relationship
between the two institutions was both desirable and attainable.
On the subject of
representation, the Chairman recalled that the membership in the IADB
is open to all OAS Member States and he underscored the high quality
of the officers appointed by Member States.
With respect to the
democratic nature and functioning of the Board, the Chairman noted
that the members of the Board are appointed by the States through a
civilian Minister of Defense, are sworn to obey the head of their
respective armed forces, that each member has one vote, that
activities conducted under the explicit mandates of the OAS, and that
those activities cover civilian and military issues, such as
civil-military education, demining and natural disasters. Also in this
context, he emphasized that at the individual, organizational and
institutional levels the Board is accountable at the civilian level,
to the OAS Secretary General and the Foreign Ministers of the Member
States.
The Chairman urged that
more States appoint staff officers and other representatives to the
Board, and that the Committee consider funding a chair for a former
ambassador to sit on the faculty.
With respect to the
Inter-American Defense College (IADC), the Chairman highlighted its
external relations with such institutions as the Lester B. Pearson
Peacekeeping Center and the United States Department of Defense.
The Chairman also
explained the budgetary sources and allocations with respect to the
Board and the College, pointing out that they have always operated
within budget, that the majority of the US$2m provided by the OAS goes
to the College, and that efforts are underway to find alternative
funding sources to finance additional academic programs.
In response to questions
from Canada on its demining activities, the Chairman reported that
there has been considerable progress in Honduras and Costa Rica, and
that the program in Nicaragua is being expanded. The Chairman also
pointed out that the Board continues to work closely with the OAS Unit
for the Promotion of Democracy (UPD) to find funds to finance these
operations.
The delegation of Antigua
and Barbuda suggested that with the appropriate enlargement of
functions, the Board could assist Caribbean countries, including the
continental countries that have a Caribbean coastline, with their
counter-drug trafficking efforts, in particular, with respect to
information-sharing. That Delegation also addressed the issue of
land-use information and suggested that the Board could assist States
in obtaining this information.
In response to these
suggestions, and to a question as to the process for altering the
current leadership of the Board, the Secretariat for Legal Affairs
representative explained that the decision taken at the third meeting
of the Board was never incorporated into the decisions of the OAS and
that the OAS Charter does not clearly establish the Board as a
permanent organ of the OAS, despite having been established by a
Meeting of Consultation. He suggested that the functions and juridical
nature of the Board have to be determined as a first step in the
evaluation of the Board and prior to identifying ways in which it
could be strengthened and revitalized.
The delegation of Costa
Rica expressed its view that the Board could be very useful to the
OAS, but is currently under-utilized, and suggested that it should be
modified in order to allow participation by more Member States which
would in turn serve to strengthen it. This delegation illustrated the
Board’s usefulness making reference to a 1979 study conducted on
border evaluation by the Board at the request of the Costa Rican
government.
The delegation of Mexico
was of the view that, at the invitation of respective Member States,
the Board has made a substantial contribution to education for peace
efforts and has assisted the OAS Unit for the Promotion of Democracy
in the demining operations underway Central America. However, this
delegation emphasized that, based on the General Assembly resolution
AG/RES. 1240 (XXIII-O/93), the Board is not vested with tasks of a
operational nature, which therefore limits its function and makes this
delegation doubt that the Board could expand to encompass all the
roles indicated by the Chairman, such as peacekeeping and
environmental security. With respect to the Inter-American Defense
College (IADC), the delegation of Mexico suggested that it should be
modernized, changing its focus from a Cold War perspective to address
the new security issues, and increasing the number of professors. On
the subject of reforming the Board, this delegation suggested that the
OAS Charter provides for such reform and that any reform should be
carried out with the participation of all the Member States and be
adopted by consensus, and ensure universality, full representation and
democratic functioning.
The delegation of Chile
addressed the issue of the universality of the Board, noting that 25
OAS Member States are also members of the Board but that only 19 of
these are active participants, and suggested that the extent to which
the Board can achieve universality would help the Committee on
Hemispheric Security in its analysis and assessment of the Board and
reduce budget-related questions.
The delegation of
Argentina expressed the view that the Board plays a vital role in the
Hemisphere in the areas under its competence.
The delegation of El
Salvador expressed its appreciation for the work being carried out by
the Board, underscoring its relevance to the Hemisphere. This
delegation also noted that the Board works with different centers for
strategic studies, and enquired as to efforts by the Board to
stimulate greater participation.
In response to the points
raised by these delegations, the Chairman of the Board stated as
follows: CSBMs: the Board compiles only CSBMs of a military nature
in accordance with the mandates from the OAS General Assembly and the
Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas and that the
compilation has received the commendation of the defense ministers;
natural disasters: the Board has an active role with the Committee on
Disaster Preparedness and the Pan American Health Organization, and
has coordinated and elicited support in the wake of natural disasters
in Central America, particularly after Hurricane Mitch, in
collaboration with the UPD; IADC: the curriculum of the IADC is
constantly under review to make it more relevant to current realities
which includes active cooperation with the Center for Hemispheric
Studies; efforts are being made to expand the small permanent faculty;
students are increasingly involved in practical exercises; Arms
control: the Board has expertise in small arms and works in this
aspect of arms control; Environmental security: the Board helps to
clean up in post-disaster situations and helps with environmental
contamination; Universality/Participation: several states have
financial limitations which hinder their ability to have military
attachés in Washington, D.C., and that membership can be easily
reactivated by letter.
The delegation of Canada
expressed its view that the Board should be fully integrated into the
OAS to allow for the fullest participation by all OAS Member States.
This delegation also suggested that the Board could be the permanent
secretariat for the Conference of Defense Ministers, and that budget
issues and the possibility of a rotating chair should be considered.
The delegation of Colombia
stated that the security-related hemispheric institutions and
mechanisms have to respond to the current security realities, and that
in order to achieve this, new functions should be assigned to the
Board within the norms of the OAS Charter, the Board’s juridical link
with the OAS should be clarified, and the Board’s membership should
include all OAS Member States.
The delegation of Brazil
referred to its position paper, previously circulated, in which it
stated that the Board’s consultative and advisory function reflects
the region’s cooperative efforts toward peace and security,
principally when it promotes the exchange of information and
understanding among armed forces of the Hemisphere. This delegation
expressed its willingness to join discussions on transforming the
Board into a specialized organ of the OAS, but stated that it would
not support the introduction of a military establishment in the
inter-American system.
The delegation of Jamaica
stated that it was imperative that the Board continue taking steps to
streamline its activities and that it should focus on the College,
collaborate with the OAS and others, and should seek to involve all
OAS Member States in its programs. This delegation also expressed the
view that unless the Board becomes relevant to all Member States then
efforts to make the College more inclusive would be futile.
The delegation of the
United States proposed that the Board should be expanded and
restructured to allow it a clearer advisory role to the CSH, to help
advance civil-military relations and contribute to dialogue and
cooperation on non-traditional security concerns, and to respond the
special security concerns of small island states.
b. The OAS Charter, the
Inter-American Treaty on Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR) and the American
Treaty of Pacific Settlement of Disputes (Pact of Bogota)
The delegation of Jamaica
stated that the OAS Charter is the main pillar of the hemispheric
system anchored by the TIAR and the Pact of Bogota, but that while
these two are of historical significance, they do not enjoy universal
adherence, have had limited use in the past and are not active today.
This delegation proposed that they must therefore either be expunged
from the OAS legal framework, updated or recognized as of historical
value. The Jamaican was shared by the delegation of Mexico, which
added that the OAS Charter is the best instrument for reciprocal
assistance and that the TIAR became and remains inoperative since the
adoption of the OAS Charter in 1948. The delegation of Antigua and
Barbuda also agreed, stating that the TIAR is no longer relevant and
cannot be invoked in the current hemispheric security environment.
Declaring the TIAR the
only hemispheric instrument on collective security, the delegation of
Costa Rica proposed that the TIAR and the Pact of Bogota should be
carefully reviewed and reformed taking into account the new security
realities in order to make them more relevant and applicable to all
OAS Member States. The delegations of Argentina and Bolivia shared
this opinion. The delegation of Argentina went further, supporting the
idea of reviewing both these instruments in a CSH working group as
suggested by the delegation of Canada. The delegation of Canada agreed
that the TIAR should be reviewed in the context of a reformed
hemispheric security framework and effective ways to reflect new
security threats, and suggested that the TIAR might be superceded by a
declaration of principles adopted at the anticipated Special
Conference on Security.
The United States agreed
that a review of these instruments is necessary, stressing the
importance of inclusiveness and relevance, and posed the following
questions to be borne in mind during such a review: 1. Does Article 3
of the TIAR apply to conflicts between states of the Hemisphere? 2.
Does the TIAR apply to internal conflicts within states? 3. Would
transnational threats be covered by Article 6, which concerns “any
other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of the Americas?
The delegation of
Argentina also recalled that the Committee on Juridical and Political
Affairs is at present considering whether the OAS Charter should be
revised.
c. Committee on
Hemispheric Security (CSH)
Several delegations stated
that, given its universality, permanence and structure, the
Organization of American States, through its Committee on Hemispheric
Security is the appropriate forum for the consideration, negotiation
and coordination of all issues related to hemispheric security. In
support of this position, many delegations recalled the statements
made at the Fourth Conference of Defense Ministers (Manaus, Brazil,
October 2000) to the effect that the OAS is the only possible forum
for an inclusive dialogue that would allow for the consensus necessary
to determine future policy and course of action on hemispheric
security. The delegation of Brazil pointed out that the conclusions
arrived at by these Conferences are not binding and that the CSH is
the only political forum that could convert those ideas into an
hemispheric political agenda. Similarly, the broad review mandate
given to the CSH by the Summit of the Americas was cited as indicative
that the CSH has received the highest recognition as the body best
suited to deal with security issues at the hemispheric level.
It was also suggested that
in order to make this role an effective reality, the Committee itself
would have to be strengthened and its relationship with other regional
and sub-regional institutions, processes, and arrangements would have
to be reinforced.
d. Conference of Defense
Ministers of the Americas (DMA)
The delegation of Canada
stated that while the Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas
is outside the scope of the OAS, it is a valuable confidence-building
venue for discussion and exchange of views on all security issues, and
that it would therefore be beneficial to the OAS to participate in its
sessions. That delegation proposed that this could be achieved through
standing invitations to the OAS Secretary General and the CSH Chair.
The delegation of Chile supported this view, adding that the OAS and
the DMA have parallel agendas dealing with both military and political
aspects of security. Several delegations supported strengthening the
relationship between the CSH and the DMA.
e. Other institutions,
regional arrangements, processes and agreements
Several delegations made
reference to the sub-regional arrangements and agreements, such as the
Regional Security System of the Eastern Caribbean countries and the
Framework Treaty of Democratic Security in Central America, the
Declaration of Mercosur, Bolivia and Chile, noting these as instances
of cooperation and transparency that address specific security
concerns of groups of states. It was suggested that contact between
these and the CSH was necessary for a truly coordinated hemispheric
security system.
The delegation of Antigua
and Barbuda proposed that the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) be
considered within the context of institutions within the
inter-American system related to security since its policies and
practices directly affect the development of small island states in
the Caribbean. This delegation proposed specifically that there should
be immediate universal membership of the IDB which would extend to
each of the member states of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean
States.
Agenda Item 2. Analysis of
the most appropriate common approaches used to address the various
aspects of international security in the Hemisphere
There was general
consensus among delegations present that the security environment and
realities of the countries of the Americas has changed in light of
hemispheric political developments, increasing confidence-building
efforts among the countries of the Hemisphere, and new international
relations. It was also generally accepted that the traditional threat
of military aggression against states of the Hemisphere while still
relevant, was no longer the primary nor most immediate challenge to
the peace and security of the states of this Hemisphere, but rather
that a number of new non-military threats had emerged and
significantly altered the hemispheric security reality. These new
threats were identified as including the special concerns of some
states with respect to narco-trafficking and related criminal
activity, natural disasters, transnational organized crime, forced
migration, limited access to capital, human rights violations,
internal political instability, and terrorism.
In the light of these new
realities, it was the common position that a new concept of
hemispheric security had to be defined and new approaches to dealing
with security issues had to be developed. Given the disparity and
complexity of the nature and applicability of the security concerns,
it was stated by several delegations that any such concept and
approaches would necessarily have to be all-encompassing, taking into
account all aspects of security, the differences among Member States,
and the various security-related instruments, including the OAS
Charter. It was also stated that multi-faceted responses, involving
joint efforts by civilian actors, military forces and international
bodies, were necessary to adequately address such a diverse range of
concerns.
The delegation of Brazil
drew special attention to the fact that this Hemisphere has a
comparatively low level of armed conflict among states and that in
effect the continent is peaceful, and proposed that this must be
considered when formulating a definition of security.
The delegations of Mexico
and the United States, while recognizing the unique concerns of
smaller states, cautioned against broadening the definition of
security to include phenomena which are not so much security issues
but rather stem from a country’s economic or social situation.
The delegations of Brazil,
Jamaica and Mexico made specific reference to the value of diplomatic
negotiation and cooperation as an effective means for resolving
differences between nations affecting their security, proposing that
this is an approach to be increasingly utilized, including through the
CSH.
The delegations of Canada
and the Unites States called for the development of a declaration of
security principles to guide the future treatment of hemispheric
security.
In discussing this agenda
item, delegations also mentioned the Special Conference on Security
mandated by the General Assembly based on the decision of the Heads of
State and Government at the Second Summit of the Americas, and which
should be held at the beginning of the first decade of the 21st
century. The delegation of Canada suggested that the Conference could
clearly set the hemispheric security agenda by adopting the
abovementioned declaration of security principles. The delegation of
Mexico expressed the view that the CSH still had much to accomplish
before that Conference could be convened.
After considering
discussing several proposals as to how it should proceed with respect
to the mandates emanating from the Second Summit of the Americas, the
Committee agreed to prepare a questionnaire in order to obtain
statements from Member States on their positions with respect to these
agenda items.
APPENDIX II
PERMANENT COUNCIL OF THE
OEA/Ser. G ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES CP/CSH-332/00 17 November
2000 COMMITTEE ON HEMISPHERIC SECURITY Original: English
SPECIAL MEETING OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HEMISPHERIC SECURITY: “NEW APPROACHES TO HEMISPHERIC
SECURITY” [AG/RES. 1744 (XXX-O/00)]
RAPPORTEUR’S REPORT
SPECIAL MEETING OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HEMISPHERIC SECURITY: “NEW APPROACHES TO HEMISPHERIC
SECURITY” [AG/RES. 1744 (XXX-O/00)]
RAPPORTEUR’S REPORT
I. INTRODUCTION
The Committee on
Hemispheric Security held the Special meeting to discuss new
approaches to hemispheric security, pursuant to mandates emanating
from the Second Summit of the Americas and endorsed by the OAS General
Assembly in AG/RES. 1566 (XXVIII-O/98), as follows:
Paragraph 15: “To instruct
the Permanent Council, working through the Committee on Hemispheric
Security, to:
a. Follow up on and expand
topics related to the strengthening of confidence-and
security-building measures;
b. Analyze the meaning,
scope, and implications of international security concepts in the
Hemisphere, with a view to developing the most appropriate common
approaches by which to manage their various aspects, including
disarmament and arms control; and
c. Identify ways to
revitalize and strengthen agencies of the inter-American system
related to the various aspects of hemispheric security.”
Paragraph 16: “To hold the
Special Conference on Security once the tasks envisaged in the
previous paragraph have been completed.”
These mandates have been
reiterated in subsequent General Assembly resolutions, and the
Committee has been instructed to hold special meetings to deal with
these issues, as is stated in the General Assembly resolution AG/RES.
1744 (XXX-O/00):
Paragraph 3: “To request
the Permanent Council to hold, through the Committee on hemispheric
Security, a special meeting with the participation of experts from
member states to continue discussing the most appropriate common
approaches with which to manage the various aspects of international
security in the Hemisphere.”
The Committee accordingly
held two such special meetings –one in April 1999 and one in March
2000, and decided to hold a third on November 13 and 14, 2000. The
Committee therefore prepared the draft Agenda (CP/CSH-321/00 rev. 2)
and government experts were invited to participate. The Chair also
prepared an Annotated Agenda (CP/CSH-328/00).
II. PROCEEDINGS
The opening session was
held from 3:15 p.m. to 4:30 p.m. on Monday, November 13th. The First
Vice-Chair of the Committee, Ambassador Luis Lauredo, Permanent
Representative of the United States was elected Rapporteur of the
special meeting.
The OAS Secretary General,
Dr. Cesar Gaviria, delivered a statement covering the wide range of
security-related issues confronting the Hemisphere and the work done
by the OAS and the Committee on Hemispheric Security to address these
in accordance with the General Assembly mandates.
The Committee Chair,
Ambassador Marcelo Ostria Trigo, Permanent Representative of Bolivia
to the OAS, explained the methodology to be followed in this meeting,
noting in particular the presence of the Chairman of the
Inter-American Defense Board (IADB), Major General Carl Freeman and
the representative of the Secretariat for Legal Affairs, Dr. Luis
Jimenez, to assist the Committee during these deliberations. The Chair
gave an overview of the topic, recalling the origin of the mandates to
be discussed during this meeting and offering some reflections on the
work entrusted to the Committee. In this context, the Chair noted that
the Committee has held two special meetings to date in furtherance of
these mandates –in April 1999 and March 2000 –and that in these
meetings Member States have put forward in general terms ideas with
respect to the new perceptions of security.
Ambassador Walter Pecly
Moreira, Permanent Representative of Brazil delivered a statement on
the topics discussed at the Fourth Conference of Defense Ministers of
the Americas, held in Manaus, Brazil in October 2000, making specific
reference to the recognition given during that Conference to the OAS
and the Committee on Hemispheric Security.
Also attending this
opening session were the Assistant Secretary General, Ambassador Luigi
Einaudi, and the Chairman of the Inter-American Defense Board, Major
General Carl Freeman.
The delegations of the
Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, El Salvador, Mexico and the United
States commented on the presentations and delivered general
statements. The delegation of Canada circulated a paper on aspects of
hemispheric security. The delegation of the United States also made
available two books related to confidence- and security-building
measures and world military expenditures and arms transfers. On the
following day, the position paper of the delegation of Brazil was also
circulated.
On November 14th, the
special meeting opened at 10:00 a.m. to consider the items on the
agenda:
1. Evaluation and
identification of ways to revitalize and strengthen the institutions
of the inter-American system involved in the various aspects of
security; and
2. Analysis of the most
appropriate common approaches used to address the various aspects of
international security in the Hemisphere.
The delegations of Antigua
and Barbuda, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Jamaica, Mexico, United States, and
Venezuela made statements with respect to item two and also commented
on the following institutions and mechanisms: IADB, Inter-American
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR), the American Treaty of Pacific
Settlement of Disputes (Pact of Bogota), the Conference of Defense
Ministers of the Americas, the Charters of the OAS and the United
Nations, and the OAS itself, including the Committee on Hemispheric
Security. The delegation of Antigua and Barbuda also put forward a
proposal that the Inter-American Development Bank be included in this
discussion. A wide range of proposals was put forward with respect to
both agenda items.
The Chairman of the IADB
delivered a brief statement on the Board’s role in the new security
environment and suggested that it could be revitalized to make its
membership more inclusive and its functions more relevant to members’
needs. During the discussions that followed, Major General Freeman and
Dr. Jimenez responded to a number of questions from delegations.
Comments by delegations on
the IADB touched on membership, relevance and modernization.
Comments by delegations
with respect to the TIAR and the Pact of Bogota similarly addressed
their relevance and membership.
Comments by delegations
with respect to the OAS and the CSH touched on the authority and
capacity of these bodies to deal with the hemispheric security agenda.
The Committee considered
next steps, and decided to develop a questionnaire to solicit Member
States’ views on issues related to hemispheric security and the future
Special Conference on Security. The delegations of Brazil, Canada,
Mexico and the United States intervened on this point.
The Committee Chair
requested that delegations make available copies of their
interventions for the record of the meeting.
November 14, 2000
Ambassador Luis J. Lauredo
Rapporteur
APPENDIX III
STATEMENTS DELIVERED AT
THE OPENING SESSION
1. Secretary General of
the Organization of American States, Dr. César Gaviria 2. Chair of the
Committee on Hemispheric Security, Ambassador Marcelo Ostria Trigo 3.
Permanent Representative of Brazil to the OAS, Ambassador Valter Pecly
Moreira
STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY
GENERAL OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, CESAR GAVIRIA, AT THE
INSTALLATION OF THE SPECIAL MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE ON HEMISPHERIC
SECURITY, “NEW APPROACHES TO HEMISPHERIC SECURITY” Washington, D.C.,
November 13, 2000
It is for me a pleasure to
be with you at this special meeting of the Committee on Hemispheric
Security. I wish to thank the Chair of the Committee, Ambassador
Marcelo Ostria Trigo of Bolivia, for the opportunity to extend a
welcome to all the experts who have come from the capital cities
across the Americas to represent their governments.
This meeting is especially
important within the context of the tasks entrusted to us by the Heads
of State and Government. At issue is the proposal and analysis of
reforms to strengthen and renew the principles and instruments
enabling us to give full validity to one of the pillars of the
Organization: the strengthening of peace and security in the
Hemisphere.
Since establishment of the
Special Committee on Security in 1992, and its consolidation in 1995,
we have made notable strides, thanks to the will of member states to
create a cooperative security system –a system of instruments for
confidence-building, transparency and cooperation in the area of
security. We are thereby standing up to common threats and forging
ahead towards a climate of peace, confidence, and security.
There have been
significant milestones along the way: the regional conferences on
confidence- and security-building measures in Santiago, Chile in 1995,
and in San Salvador, El Salvador in 1998; the high-level meeting on
the special concerns of small island states; and, more recently,
adoption of the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in
Conventional Weapons Acquisitions and the Inter-American Convention
against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms,
Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials.
By building on these
developments, the Committee, in accordance with the direct mandates of
the Santiago Summit, has fostered an exchange of views and opinions as
it seeks to address the matter of the components of this renewed
security system in the Hemisphere. This preliminary work is necessary
and demands a serious and disciplined approach. We must draw on all
the lessons of the past, review the present with an eye to the future,
and be sure that we consider all contributions and all positions. An
effective system for strenthening peace and security requires the
support of all states and the legitimate concerns of each one must
find an effective response in the hemispheric architecure.
At the same time, I
believe we must quicken the pace of the work of the Committee to
trigger discussion and participation by all states and thereby fulfill
the Santiago mandates, within a reasonable time frame, before the
Quebec Summit.
A renewed security system
requires values and guiding principles, an agenda, and fora for
discussing it and tools for action.
The values are those that
sustain the American identity: democracy and respect for the rule of
law. They are what makes it possible to reconcile and harmonize the
multidimensional, and at times apparently divergent, character of the
security concerns of each state in the region. The principles, on the
other hand, derive from the OAS Charter: respect for sovereignty and
territorial integrity, the right to self-determination, the juridical
equality of states, noninterference in internal affairs, the peaceful
settlement of disputes and the disallowance of the use of force or of
the threat of it to settle disputes. To this should be added the basis
of our multilateral action, which is collective action based on
cooperation.
On the matter of the
agenda, those aspects that tie in with the military and strategic
dimension of security contine to be fundamental. The purpose must be
to consolidate a climate of confidence and respect that is the result
of credibility, transparency, timely information and shared knowledge
about defense policies, the size of the military and its apparatus and
equipment.
For this, we must continue
to work to consolidate and intensify the confidence- and
security-building measures adopted in Santiago and San Salvador. Each
of these measures should be the focus of future effort to promote and
extend their application. The OAS Committee on Hemispheric Security
must continue its work and become the main instrument both for
ensuring compliance with the decisions of states on agreed measures
and for considering future developments.
The vigorous application
of confidence- and security-building measures should facilitate the
logical next step, that is to say, the beginning of consultations in
matters of arms limitation and control, including disarmament,
particularly offensive weapons systems. This topic would be more
appropriately addressed at subregional level. Understandably, such a
process cannot be brought to fruition if there is an adverse effect on
the need of military forces to maintain an appropriate level of
preparedness and discipline in their troops, in accordance with modern
standards, and on their chance to modernize and periodically renew a
part of their equipment. A step in this direction would undoubtedly
make it possible to allocate increased resources for the social
development of the American peoples.
The agenda items are not
limited to the territorial integrity of the region as a whole in the
face of external military threats. There are additional risk factors
in regional security: drug trafficking, terrorism, illegal trafficking
in arms, organized crime, natural disasters, environmental degradation
and even problems such as poverty and the fragility of smaller
economies in the face of the challenges of globalization.
Clearly, given each
country’s specific circumstances, it is difficult to debate the
validity of one argument over the other when defining what constitutes
a real threat to a nation’s security. As a forum for political
discussion, the OAS must respond to all of these concerns.
The solution does not lie
in merely drawing up an exhaustive list of threats to security, but
rather in defining the most suitable fora and instruments for dealing
with them. We must, in accordance with our values and principles, give
ourselves effective institutions and tools for addressing these
problems. Security for all of the American and Caribbean societies
will not materialize by building a monolithic structure that seeks to
encompass all topics.
The region must move ahead
advance with the support of bi-national and subregional schemes and
mechanisms, on the one hand, and it must strengthen specific
instruments in specific areas, on the other. The political decisions
expressed in the declaration of Mercosur, Chile and Bolivia, the
Framework Treaty on Democratic Security in Central America, and the
Regional Security System in the Caribbean constitute concurrent blocs
that should converge and find support in the hemispheric design and,
at the same time, sustain it.
The Committee on
Hemispheric Security is the appropriate forum for dialogue, an
exchange of views and the negotiation of cooperation instruments. It
must be open to ideas and proposals put forward in the various
political and academic fora, within and outside the region. Even more
important, it must be capable of integrating and coordinating the work
and contributions of specialized fora in the Hemisphere, particularly
the Conference of Ministers of Defense whose time has come for
inclusion in the process of hemispheric summits of heads of state and
government.
Something similar is
happening with the Inter-American Defense Board. Its legal and
institutional linkage to the Organization should be clarified since it
is imperative that the Board and all other components of the system be
integrated and affiliated under the political direction of the
governments, through the Organization. The aim here is to comply with
the decision of the presidents, which is to have a renewed and
strengthened security system that brings together all countries of the
Hemisphere.
For certain specific
topics, we must continue to develop specific tools. In the area of the
struggle against drug trafficking, CICAD had amply demonstrated its
ability not only to generate cooperative and balanced policy
proposals, but also to assist member states in their national and
subregional efforts. It has also developed a particularly useful body
of knowledge on topics related to drug trafficking, such as money
laundering and illicit arms trafficking. The Committee on Hemispheric
Security is, and must continue, drawing on this experience.
In the face of terrorism,
the creation of the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE)
is a major step. I do believe, however, that this body requires and
deserves more attention from member states. I also believe that this
Committee should serve to facilitate, pave the way for, and assist
national authorities in charge of this area to render their
participation in CICTE as productive as possible.
Natural disasters can also
turn into threats, as has been recognized in discussions of threats to
the security of small island states. But all facets of this problem
must be addressed, from development plans and reducing vulnerability
to humanitarian emergency aid and subsequent reconstruction. For this,
it will be necessary to intensify the activities of the Inter-American
Committee on Natural Disaster Reduction.
By giving these examples,
I wish to emphasize that we must have tools and mechanisms that are
attuned to each topic. We must recognize and make use of the existing
interaction among all of them and this will result in more complete
and comprehensive treatment of the global security agenda.
Not only must all of these
fora be closely coordinated among one another, but also, and
especially, they must respond in coordinated fashion to any policy
decisions and guidelines that the highest representatives of member
states adopt.
Finally, your
deliberations should be geared towards a study of concrete proposals
aimed at reviewing openly and directly the legal tools available in
the Hemisphere in these matters. I am thinking chiefly of the
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, or the Rio Treaty, as
well as the Pact of Bogota on the peaceful settlement of disputes.
Clearly, these instruments have gaps and flaws, the main one being,
perhaps, their lack of universality. These instruments should,
therefore, be revised, updated, or replaced, so that they may
encompass all states of the region.
Mr. Chairman, Delegates,
Experts:
The responsibility vested
in you by our highest political leaders is immense. The work you have
been doing so far is commendable. But the road ahead is long and will
require commitment, dedication and effort on the part of all member
countries of the Organization. Your responsibility is to start with
shared values and principles, to set about designing and defining a
system and instruments to meet common challenges and threats facing
our peoples and our nations so as to guarantee democracy, peace,
security and progress for all peoples of the Americas.
I wish you success.
Thank you very much.
COMMITTEE ON HEMISPHERIC
SECURITY
SPECIAL MEETING: “NEW
APPROACHES TO HEMISPHERIC SECURITY”
November 13 and 14, 2000
INTRODUCTION TO THE TOPIC
BY THE CHAIR OF THE COMMITTEE, AMBASSADOR MARCELO OSTRIA TRIGO,
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BOLIVIA TO THE OAS
Delegates:
As Chair of this
Committee, allow me to make a few introductory remarks on the
background, purposes, and general topics of this meeting. I would also
like to comment on how the work entrusted to us might continue.
As the delegates know—and
this appears on the agenda—the Summit of the Americas held in
Santiago, Chile, entrusted the Committee on Hemispheric Security with
some specific tasks within its purview. These tasks were then
converted into mandates by the General Assembly, as reflected in
resolutions AG/RES. 1566 (XXVIII-O/98), AG/RES. 1623 (XXIX-O/99),
AG/RES. 1624 (XXIX-O/99), and AG/RES. 1744 (XXX-O/00).
At this meeting, we will
concentrate on two aspects of these mandates. The first is related to
the development of common approaches to hemispheric security and
concepts thereof and the second, to the renewal and strengthening of
institutions and instruments pertaining to these topics.
Work in the area of common
approaches was considered at two meetings of the Committee on
Hemispheric Security: in April 1999 and in March 2000.
The documents distributed
to the delegations show that it has been possible, with patience and
perseverance, to move toward a consensus on a multifaceted approach to
our analysis of the various components of hemispheric security today.
This conceptual
convergence of views seems to stem from the opinions expressed by
delegations to the effect that nontraditional threats have been
gaining in importance in the concerns of many countries, owing to the
appearance of new, important factors to be considered.
Although impatience about
the conclusion of broad agreements on various topics related to
hemispheric security is often justified, we should recognize that we
are confronting an area that leads to special sensitivity in many of
our countries and among domestic public opinion. The reason is that
the conception of security, for a long time, was limited to the
domestic sphere of each country, like a matter to be dealt with in a
restricted, exclusive way.
But the new
perceptions—the product of the obvious changes that have taken place
in the regional and global spheres—are now widespread. This means that
approaches and concepts vary, which also calls for changes in the
attitudes of national actors toward a new integrated regional
conception.
Taking into account the
complex and sensitive nature of this matter, it seems appropriate to
say that some progress has been made at earlier meetings, despite the
aforementioned impatience to increase the pace of our activities. This
program may be viewed as the common approach to the need for a
multilateral response to combating drug trafficking, transnational
crime, and illicit arms trafficking, as well as the action required in
the event of natural disasters.
It has also been
recognized—as delegations have said repeatedly at past meetings—that
this overall effort to define common concepts of hemispheric security
should be made in accordance with the fundamental principles of the
OAS as well as peaceful coexistence; the equality, sovereignty, and
autonomy of states; and, especially, nonintervention.
As for the instruments of
the inter-American system in the area of security, it is the will of
the states to renew them.
At the same time, the
process leading to the adoption of confidence- and security-building
measures has been set in motion in various difficult situations.
Indeed, as the delegations are aware, the OAS has made great efforts
in these areas, on the basis of the guidelines of our political bodies
and the presidential summits.
There is also a
convergence of views that this Committee should be the forum for
hemispheric dialogue and negotiation on security. Examples of this
convergence are the opinions expressed at the Fourth Defense
Ministerial of the Americas, held in Manaos, which assumes—and this is
of particular importance—a recognition that, in the area of
hemispheric security, there is a common agenda for the Americas as a
whole.
It is worth mentioning
that the Summit of the Americas held in Santiago, Chile, has charged
us with preparing the Special Security Conference and that the General
Assembly has issued resolutions along the same lines containing
mandates for the Committee on Hemispheric Security. Of course this
means that we must work and take action so as to focus in on specific
agreements as the only means of guaranteeing the success of the
planned Conference. Accordingly, the special and regular meetings of
the Committee on Hemispheric Security will have to find concrete
mechanisms for carrying out any necessary preparatory work.
It should be recalled that
this will be the last meeting of the Committee before the report on
the status of our work is sent to the Special Committee on
Inter-American Summits Management. Consequently, our achievements will
have to be reflected in this report and mention will clearly have to
be made of those areas that enjoy a consensus, especially security
concepts and enhancement of the instruments and mechanisms currently
in force.
Delegates:
The time has come for the
Committee to make even more progress on the mandates of the Summits of
the Americas. It is incumbent on us, after two years of general
discussion, to formulate concrete ideas and proposals based on the
hemispheric agenda, which is of great significance for the common
aspirations of our peoples to consolidate the Hemisphere as an area of
peace and cooperation.
Surely the proposals
presented earlier to this Committee will be borne in mind as possible
means of proceeding in the enhancement and renewal of hemispheric
instruments and in the formulation of possible definitions of
hemispheric security. It is well known that time is drawing near for
agreements to be reached on these topics and on others that may arise
at the special meeting, with reference at the same time to the courses
of action to be followed by the Committee.
At stake is the shared
future of the peoples of the Americas. We have been charged with this
task on the understanding that we have the capacity and the competence
to fulfill it. It is therefore incumbent on us to prove that we can
rise to the occasion and carry out the mandates.
Thank you for your kind
attention.
ADDRESS BY AMBASSADOR
VALTER PECLY MOREIRA PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BRAZIL AT THE SPECIAL
MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE ON HEMISPHERIC SECURITY REGARDING THE IV
DEFENSE MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE OF THE AMERICAS Washington, November
13-14, 2000.
Mr. Chairman,
Congratulations on having
organized this Special Meeting of the Committee on Hemispheric
Security.
As the Permanent
Representative of Brazil, I would like to make a brief statement
regarding the IV Defense Ministerial Conference of the Americas, held
in Manaus on October 17-21, 2000, which brought together
representatives of 27 countries in the Hemisphere.
I already had an
opportunity to comment on the Manaus Conference during the meeting of
the Permanent Council on November 8, following your own verbal report.
On that occasion, I referred to the inauguration speech given by
President Cardoso and the reasons for the choice of the capital of
Amazonas as the venue for that event.
For this meeting, the
Brazilian Delegation requested the Secretariat of the Committee to
distribute among delegations the following documents related to the IV
Ministerial: the “The Declaration of Manaus” and the conclusions of
the three working groups, namely “Hemispheric Security at the
Beginning of the 21st Century”, “Mutual Confidence in the Americas:
The Current Situation and Projections for the Next Decade” and
“Defense and Development: Possibilities for Regional Cooperation”.
Mr. Chairman,
The IV Defense Ministerial
Conference of the Americas provided a unique opportunity to discuss
proposals that might contribute to the debate over identifying new
strategic parameters for the modernization of the national defense
structures in the Hemisphere. Those responsible for defense policy in
the countries of the region were able to discuss, in the frank and
open spirit that characterizes these conferences, several complex --
and often sensitive – issues relating to hemispheric security and
defense. As the Declaration of Manaus adopted at the conclusion of the
meeting succinctly pointed out, the sole objective of the Defense
Ministerial Conference of the Americas was to enable the ministers
concerned to get to know each other and exchange ideas in the field of
defense and security.
During the Plenary
Session, the Brazilian Defense Minister, Geraldo Quintão, stressed
among other points the major issues addressed in the previous three
conferences, including the consolidation of democracy as a
prerequisite for development and political and economic stability, and
the participation of both civilians and military in matters related to
defense.
A matter that was
particularly important for our Organization, and which bears
emphasizing, was the participation of the OAS in the work of the
conference, an aspect that the Brazilian government sought to
encourage and support. The Secretary General, Dr. César Gaviria, gave
an address in the session reserved for speeches by defense ministers
and delegation heads, and the Chair of the Committee on Hemispheric
Security, Ambassador Marcelo Ostria Trigo, addressed the working group
on “Hemispheric security at the beginning of the 21st century.”
In his presentation, the
Secretary General of the OAS underscored the fact that the conference
agenda showed that the defense ministers' priorities broadly coincided
with OAS concerns. He also touched on three areas in which the OAS is
seeking consensual responses to current threats: from drugs, terrorism
and natural disasters.
Also notable in Dr.
Gaviria's presentation was the affirmation that the consolidation of
democracy had provided the hemisphere with an historical opportunity
to renew and strengthen its deep commitment and vocation for peace by
creating a new security paradigm. He added that for such matters the
Organization of American States had provided a privileged forum for
frank and constructive debate and negotiation.
For his part, our Chairman
Ambassador Marcelo Ostria Trigo was able to stress the following key
points to the working group that I mentioned: the evolution of
concepts of security in an historical perspective; the work being done
by the Committee in this sphere, especially in fulfillment of the
mandates emanating from the Santiago Summit and the OAS General
Assembly; and the need for close and fluid coordination between the
Defense Ministerials of the Americas and the OAS Committee on
Hemispheric Security
In the same working group,
it fell to the Brazilian delegation - through a representative of the
Defense Ministry - to give a presentation on the theme 'The
Political-Strategic Framework in the Global and Regional Context: New
Threats and Peace Operations'. It focused on the following points:
analysis of the global and regional contexts for security and defense,
with special reference to South America; adverse scenarios and new
threats; and Brazilian policy and legislation with respect to peace
operations.
This work group also
covered such sub-themes as “The Current System of Hemispheric
Security: Evaluation and Improvement” (for which the Venezuelan
delegation acted as rapporteur) and “Concepts of Security and Defense”
-- the subject of our Special Meeting today— for which the Argentine
delegation was rapporteur).
Given that they are useful
for our work, I would like to highlight the conclusions that our
countries arrived at in the Manaus Conference with respect to the
question of “Concepts of Security and Defense”.
1. It is important to
reconcile concepts of security and defense in order to build a common
doctrine among the countries of the Hemisphere. 2. A broad definition
of hemispheric security should be sought that lends itself to
incorporating the specific conditions of each region whilst not losing
sight of the principal objective of peace and development in the
Hemisphere. 3. The uncertainties that characterize the current global
situation require that defense continues to be a government priority.
To this end, the military apparatus remains of fundamental importance
to the survival of states. 4. It is important for states to encourage
the training of civilians in defense matters, as well as greater
integration between civilians and military officers in discussion
related to security and defense. 5. The security and defense of each
country is a responsibility for society as a whole, not just for the
military. 6. Concerns over national sovereignty lend support to the
idea of building mechanisms for cooperating in peace keeping and
security at the international level, as well as making common cause to
deal with transnational threats and humanitarian crises.
The conclusions of the
three working groups are reflected in the Declaration of Manaus
document, adopted in the closing session on the afternoon of November
19.
Amongst other relevant
matters, the defense ministers recognized in the Declaration of Manaus
that:
• Democracy and democratic
institutions constitute essential elements for hemispheric security;
• The work of the Defense
Ministerial Conference requires continuity, and to this end
coordination and cooperation between countries is a necessity;
• Participation by those
responsible for the defense of the countries of the Americas in
bilateral, sub-regional and regional meetings and events is important
and should be encouraged;
• Differences between
various sub-regions do not constitute a barrier to cooperation and
exchange, but should be respected and acknowledged within a balanced
security scheme that recognizes the specific strategic contexts of the
three Americas; and
• For the countries
participating, the main concerns are: hemispheric security,
confidence- building measures, regional cooperation in defense and
development, and the role of the armed forces in a democracy.
In the closing session, it
was announced that Chile had offered to host the next Defense
Ministerial Conference in 2002.
It is fair to say, Mr.
Chairman, that the IV Defense Ministerial Conference of the Americas
fully met its objectives. On the one hand, it approved a balanced
document of recommendations that reflected the positions of the
countries with respect to questions of hemispheric defense and
security. On the other, by bringing together leaders responsible for
defense policy in the countries of the region, it made possible a
broad exchange of experiences, an analysis of the global and regional
situation, and frank and open discussion on defense issues, pointing
toward specific opportunities for both bilateral and multilateral
cooperation. In themselves, these outcomes help generate mutual
confidence and transparency. Finally, it was firmly established that
the Committee on Hemispheric Security of the OAS has a fundamental
role to play in taking these issues forward. Thank you.
Washington 13/11/00
APPENDIX IV
STATEMENTS DELIVERED BY
MEMBER STATES /
1. Antigua and Barbuda 2.
Brazil 3. Canada 4. Colombia 5. El Salvador 6. Jamaica 7. Mexico 8.
United States 9. Venezuela
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PRESENTATION BY THE
DELEGATION OF COLOMBIA
Analysis of the most
appropriate common approaches with which to address the various
aspects of international security in the Hemisphere
The Delegation of Colombia
wishes, first and foremost, to pay tribute to the work being done by
the Committee on Hemispheric Security and to the coordinated efforts
of all the countries in the Hemisphere. Thanks to them, progress has
been achieved with regard to confidence and security-building measures
and to the examination, development, and implementation of those
measures that will soon enable us all to confront the new threats to
security in the Hemisphere and to consolidate peace.
We should stress that, in
the Americas, security issues are predicated upon a comprehensive
notion of the various different dimensions involved in social life
that contribute to the well-being of individuals and of human groups
in general. Traditionally, the commitments worked out and implemented
in the Hemisphere relate to military matters, such as the
establishment of a reasonable balance of power and the fostering of
measures to boost mutual confidence, while addressing new threats to
security such as those posed by drug trafficking, international crime,
arms trafficking, and terrorism.
The quest for forums in
which to reflect on post-Cold War phenomena responded to a deeply-felt
need of our countries and crystallized in the creation of the
Committee on Hemispheric Security. The Committee has led to major
improvements in diagnostic assessments of threats to security and in
the development of mechanisms with which to respond to the challenges
and opportunities for cooperation in defense and protection.
This organization must
forge, as indeed it has been doing, a common structural framework for
a set of guiding principles governing the actions of member states in
defense of our Hemisphere.
As member states and
active partners, we must continue our efforts to identify
complementary principles and tenets with respect to hemispheric
security that accurately reflect actual circumstances in member states
and at the same time safeguard respect for international law, the
sovereignty of states, peaceful settlement of disputes,
non-interference in domestic affairs, and partnership for development.
We reaffirm, too, that the OAS is the appropriate forum for
coordination and verification of compliance with these principles and
commitments.
Colombia is conscious of
the importance of maintaining effective mechanisms of cooperation on
security matters with neighboring countries. Such coordination has
become particularly important given the current situation in Colombia.
It has also proved effective in the comprehensive struggle against all
types of criminal behavior.
Recognition of the great
progress achieved in forging peace and international security in our
Hemisphere presents policy-makers with an important framework of
cooperation with respect to confidence-building measures, that enables
them to weigh each country’s circumstances and gauge the level of
threats to security among member states.
A prerequisite for
defining the new concept of security is the existence of appropriate
tools with which to analyze developments in critical situations that
could turn into potential threats to hemispheric security.
Recent studies attempt to
devise and develop contact mechanisms at three security levels: human
security, state security, and international security. Recent
transnational developments have not yet been diagnosed as strategic
threats, even though they trigger military responses by some states.
Students of these new
ideas typically focus on a non-military dimension of transnational
actions in which the key instruments are cooperation and a quest for
consensus.
PERMANENT MISSION OF EL
SALVADOR TO THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES
SPEECH BY THE DELEGATION
OF EL SALVADOR Meeting of the Committee on Hemispheric Security
November 13-14, 2000
General Considerations
Mr. Chairman:
As we know, at the Second
Summit of the Americas, the Heads of State and Government entrusted us
with the task of analyzing “the meaning, scope, and implications of
international security concepts in the Hemisphere, with a view to
developing the most appropriate common approaches by which to manage
their various aspects.”
In the course of its
discussions in recent years, the Committee on Hemispheric Security has
been become aware of the complexity of this task, which we are
following up on today as mandated by resolution 1566 of the
twenty-eighth regular session of the General Assembly, ratified in
resolution 1744 of the thirtieth regular session.
• It has become clear that
the complexity of the challenge stems not just from the historical
antecedents involved and the positions held by the States that have
seen fit to expound them, but also from the long-term ramifications of
an eventual consensus or dissent. We cannot afford “short cuts.” Too
much is at stake.
• The reference to
“security concepts” in the plural is not just rhetorical, because they
refer not only to subregional factors but impinge to varying degrees
on a wider –hemispheric – context, in which the development and
shortcomings of those concepts are gauged in terms of tasks still
pending with respect to hemispheric instruments and the institutions
supporting them.
• Along these same lines,
we also know that the prerequisite for achieving an effective system
of international security is that all States submit to universal,
equal, and binding rules.
• That is why this meeting
is intent upon developing more appropriate common approaches with
which to handle the various aspects and concepts of security in the
Hemisphere.
• If a decision is made to
change the rules of the game or its baseline scenarios, the fact is we
already know that they will remain universal, equal, and binding and
founded upon that which strengthens peaceful coexistence among States.
• Member states have
participated in several attempts [to make headway in this area], which
in the end helped strengthen Hemispheric Security. More is now known
about the causes of the threats to national or collective security in
the Americas. There is greater awareness that the nature of the
threats to security is changing and that we member states are called
upon to deepen and manage these areas of consensus and engrave these
perceptions on the inter-American agenda.
• There are still,
evidently, lessons to be learnt and there is no way we can press the
pieces of the jigsaw puzzle artificially into place. There is no
forcing this process, which needs the political boost that will surely
come from the Third Summit of the Americas.
• We have no option but to
work with an open mind, since this topic is not yet ripe and much more
thought is needed. Other actors have stepped onto the stage and
progress needs to be guided; the agenda has to be harmonized, though
the stress may vary. Nothing is achieved with steps in opposite
directions.
• For all these reasons,
the role of this Committee is vital in channeling the process and
agreeing on realistic courses of action, because it is not a question
of creating a new security setup for the sake of innovation.
• Preparation of the
Special Conference on Security is thus about establishing goals with
realistic deadlines. And that is what we are bent on doing today.
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ADDRESS BY AMBASSADOR
CLAUDE HELLER, PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF MEXICO TO THE OAS AT THE
SPECIAL MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE ON HEMISPHERIC SECURITY Washington
D.C. November 13, 2000
Mr. Chairman,
Since the General Assembly
adopted (through resolution 1566) the mandate of the Second Summit of
the Americas, this is the third time that the Committee on Hemispheric
Security has analyzed the different aspects of international security
in the Hemisphere and - in that context - evaluated the institutions
that form part of the inter-American system.
Mexico’s stance on these
issues has been evinced in the contributions made by my delegation
(reproduced in documents CP/CSH/SA.68/99/add.3 and CP/CSH-301/00,
respectively). It is not my intention here to repeat these arguments,
but rather to delve deeper into those aspects that may help us to
identify common approaches and to comment on the positions put forward
by other delegations in the debate held on March 20-21 of this year.
1. The global framework
for international security
Hemispheric security forms
part of a wider political and strategic framework. The global détente
that resulted from the end of the Cold War has not been accompanied by
significant progress in bilateral and multilateral negotiations on
disarmament.
The emphasis placed at the
global level on the challenges posed by the excessive accumulation and
trafficking in small arms and light weapons should not deflect
priority away from the obligation, described by the International
Court of Justice in its historic advisory opinion of July 8, 1996, “
to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading
to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects”.
It is for this reason that
Mexico and Brazil, along with six other countries, have sought to
generate in the United Nations the consensus required to adopt a new
agenda in the field of nuclear disarmament and to give a fresh impulse
to discussion of this fundamental issue.
2. Hemispheric security:
new approaches and new threats.
In the Americas, the
consolidation of the regime enshrined in the Tlatelolco Treaty and a
general climate of cooperation at the regional and sub-regional levels
have helped overcome situations which for a long time placed regional
stability in jeopardy. In this context, there have been processes
involving confidence-building measures, the gradual elimination of
anti-personnel landmines, and new commitments to fight both the
manufacture of and illicit trafficking in firearms through the
firearms (CIFTA) Convention and its Consultative Committee.
In the fight against
drugs, the Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism under CICAD (whose Group
of Experts is currently meeting) will shortly conclude the first
evaluation of this kind, which should help promote cooperation between
all the states of the region.
Above all else, our region
- unlike others - has known how to channel and resolve through
international law those disputes, mainly territorial, that jeopardized
peace and coexistence between states. Only a few days ago, the
Permanent Council bore witness to the signature of an important
memorandum of understanding on confidence-building measures between
Belize and Guatemala that should help resolve that territorial dispute
through negotiation.
Mr. Chairman,
In recent years, compared
with the rather narrower view common in the past, there has been an
undeniable broadening of the concept of threats to peace and
international security. This has given rise to unprecedented levels of
activity within the collective security system established under the
United Nations Charter, as evidenced in the proliferation of
peacekeeping operations and the diversification of their roles.
Phenomena with such
transnational repercussions as drug trafficking, illicit arms dealing,
organized crime and terrorism, as well as humanitarian emergencies,
can easily pose new threats to international peace and security. In
this respect, Mexico has expressed the view in the United Nations that
the organized international community should provide itself with the
political structures needed to confront these threats, so long as
these respect international law.
However, it should be made
very clear that the perfecting of international institutions, both
globally and regionally, will take time, since time is needed to build
genuine consensus. Therefore, until such time as another course is
adopted, we should continue to be guided by wholehearted respect for
the instruments governing system of collective security created by the
San Francisco and Bogotá charters.
On this, it has been a
longstanding position of the Mexican Government to respect the
exclusive powers of the United Nations Security Council to adopt
collective measures of whatever kind, in compliance with the
overriding responsibility for the maintenance of peace and
international security that we member states conferred upon that
international body. There can be no doubt that the Organization of
American States is subordinate to the Security Council in this field,
pursuant to Articles 52 and 53 of the UN Charter and Article 131 of
the Charter of the OAS.
The constitution of any
force for peacekeeping, peace monitoring, or preventive deployment
corresponds exclusively to the United Nations Security Council, and
its decisions should not be prejudiced by initiatives from regional
organizations.
Examples of international
cooperation, like that which is beginning to emerge within the
framework of the CIFTA Convention's Consultative Committee,
demonstrate that, even if there is no common concept of security, we
have the ability to face up to new transnational tensions when we are
convinced that they pose a threat to overall hemispheric security. We
call on those states that have yet to do so to give utmost priority to
the ratification of this important juridical instrument.
However, as we have said
before, the search for new approaches to security in the region should
begin with recognition of the differences in perceptions of security
between member states, and the legitimacy of these differing points of
view. There are situations that, even though they may not have the
same impact everywhere, affect some countries in the region in
particular. The special security concerns of small island states
provide an example of this and the way in which the OAS has responded
to sub-regional problems.
We cannot accept, however,
that such phenomena as migratory movements are included as one of the
new threats simply because they are transnational in character. This
is tantamount to an extremely dangerous simplification of complex
phenomena that have to do with disparities in levels of economic
development between our countries and the effects of economic
restructuring at the global level. We should not forget that migration
fulfills a significant role both in more developed societies and in
countries of origin. We should therefore avoid superficial judgements
on this and distinguish it from illicit trafficking of people as a
criminal activity. Clearly, under certain circumstances, massive flows
of people at times of political crisis or internal conflict with
transnational repercussions can create emergency situations for
receiving countries.
If we agree that progress
towards democracy and the consolidation of the rule of law provide a
guarantee for regional security, we cannot dodge the fact that
democracy cannot be built on the basis of abject poverty and
ignorance. That being so, it is essential to make headway in
overcoming extreme poverty and in the development of our countries as
a prerequisite for international security in the region.
To sum up, cooperation
will be much more fruitful if it is nurtured by the diversity of our
countries and solutions that are not derived from some pre-established
model. Without wanting to belittle the importance of progressively
building a new conceptual framework given the deficiencies of past
ideological models, we need to be realistic. As the Mexican Government
pointed out in the recent Defense Ministerial Conference of the
Americas "it is not a question of inventing a new agenda in a vacuum,
far removed from the concerns of states at the sub-regional,
hemispheric and global levels".
For this reason, in our
view, caution should prevail on proposals to elaborate a declaration
on principles of hemispheric security and rush into convening the
Special Security Conference. As the pertinent resolutions of the
General Assembly lay down, such a conference can only take place once
all the issues that bring us together have been revised and a
consensus reached. These are the minimal requirements for the success
of such a conference.
3. Evaluation of the
institutions underpinning hemispheric security
With regard to the
institutions and juridical instruments that formally regulate
hemispheric security, the Government of Mexico reiterates each and
every one of the positions reached in the General Assembly, at our
meetings in April 1999 and March 2000, and more recently in the IV
Defense Ministerial Conference of the Americas, in which Mexico took
part as an observer.
Reform of institutions
like the Inter-American Defense Board should not only reflect a
consensus within the inter-American community but also fulfill the
criteria of universality, representativeness and a democratic modus
operandi appropriate to a society ruled by the principle of the
juridical equality of states.
As opposed to proposals
for limited changes in the working methods of the Board, my delegation
considers that the whole question of its relevance needs to be
discussed.
4. Convergence of forums
In the attempt to breathe
new life into the inter-American security system, there seems to be
agreement on the need to avoid a dispersion of effort and to encourage
greater convergence between the various existing forums.
To this end, in recent
years there have been numerous calls to accord the Organization of
American States a central role as a forum for deliberation and
negotiation on all issues to do with security, including arms control
and disarmament.
The Conferences of
Santiago and El Salvador - which produced declarations on
confidence-building measures and security, the CIFTA convention, and
that on transparency in the acquisition of conventional armaments, all
took place under the aegis of the Organization.
On this point, whilst the
IV Defense Ministerial Conference of the Americas proved once again
useful as a forum for the exchange of information, speakers
underscored the fact that, owing to its permanence and its ability to
represent every state in the hemisphere, the OAS was the only possible
sphere for the inclusive dialogue needed to establish the required
consensus for defining future action.
Thank you.
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TOWARD A NEW APPROACH TO
SECURITY IN THE HEMISPHERE
Statement by the
Delegation of Venezuela
The Government of the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela would like to take this opportunity
to present its compliments to all those participating in this
important meeting and at the same time state our intention of
contributing to the study of the problems and phenomena that mark the
historic space and time in which we live, with regard to hemispheric
security.
We do so, bearing in mind
the conclusions set forth in the Declaration of Manaus, which
underscores the need to revise the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance as a regional security mechanism in an international
context characterized by a new sense of political and strategic
realism. These new circumstances call for far-reaching studies and
delicate decisions designed to guarantee the security of states
through cooperation in a climate of trust born of consensus among
nations.
Our countries are
duty-bound to propose the regional mechanisms we need to prevent and
confront new threats to our Hemisphere. Our goal is to attain a new
system of security, founded upon principles, rules, standards, and
processes that will induce our nations to act within the bounds of
reciprocal trust and respect for the principle of self-determination
and the sovereignty of peoples.
This new security system,
with its political, economic, social, environmental, and military
ramifications, will underpin the consolidation of democracy, economic
development, and the appropriate deployment of the military in the
framework of a cooperative defense policy based on agreement between
the parties involved and such premises as peace and justice.
The existence, in both
Central America and the Caribbean, of subregional security mechanisms
tailored to their geographical and other special circumstances, opens
up, as item 5 in the Declaration of the Fourth Defense Ministerial of
the Americas points out, the possibility that South America, too,
could assume responsibility for its own security within the framework
of a new hemispheric security system. It would be based on the
potential effectiveness of using instruments proper to the area to
confront common threats, given that South American countries share a
number of interests and feel equally exposed to certain risks.
This process implies
overcoming the barriers between us and identifying our values and
purposes. It means celebrating our identity based on the experience of
common problems, on our characteristic social and cultural, political,
economic, and military ties, on the success of several organizations
created to handle our collective issues.
It is our historic
responsibility to pursue well-coordinated initiatives with which to
confront the specific threats we face, by establishing a subregional
security agenda in line with a new system of Hemispheric Security. By
mandate of the Santiago Summit of Heads of State and Government of the
Americas, the design of that system has been entrusted to this OAS
Committee on Hemispheric Security, of which we are proud to be
members.
This new subregional
security agenda, with its multilateral focus, could review such topics
as democratic stability, observance of human rights, protection of the
environment, cooperation in the event of natural disasters, promotion
of development, peace-keeping, energy security, efforts to combat drug
trafficking and international crime, among others.
Setting up a new security
system tailored to today’s new circumstances requires a firm political
will, which includes readiness to sacrifice individual prerogatives
for the sake of common gains in security, whereby security must be
conceived in terms of social well-being and fulfillment of the
aspirations and interests of the citizens in each of our nations.
APPENDIX V
STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN
OF THE INTER-AMERICAN DEFENSE BOARD
only in hard copy