OEA/Ser.G
CP/INF. 4702/02
1 July 2002
Original: English
REPORT
OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY
INTO
THE EVENTS OF DECEMBER 17, 2001, IN HAITI
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION................................................................................................... 1
........... Historical background................................................................................................. 1
Composition of the
Commission of Inquiry.................................................................... 3
Methodology of the
Report.......................................................................................... 4
II. THE FACTS............................................................................................................ 4
A. The armed attack on the National Palace in Port-au-Prince during the early hours of Monday, December 17, 2006............................................................................................... 5
1. Background.............................................................................................. 5
2. The events of
December 17, 2001............................................................. 6
a. The facts............................................................................................. 6
i. .. Penetration of the National Palace................................................. 6
ii. Occupation of the National Palace................................................. 6
iii... Escape and pursuit........................................................................ 7
b. Objectives and
responsibility for the attack on the National Palace.......... 9
i.
The objectives of the attack on the National Palace........................ 9
ii. Responsibility for
the attack........................................................... 9
B.
Ransacking and burning of the headquarters of the political parties of
the Opposition, the private residences of the leaders of the Convergence Démocratique, and of
cultural and academic centers, national or foreign, in Port-au-Prince and in
other cities and localities... 10
1. Background............................................................................................ 10
2. Headquarters of the
political parties of the Opposition............................... 11
a. In
Port-au-Prince.............................................................................. 11
b. In other cities and
towns.................................................................... 13
i.
Area of Gonaïves...................................................................... 13
ii.
Area of Petit Goâve.................................................................. 14
iii.
Area of Cap-Haïtien.................................................................. 14
iv.
Area of Les Cayes.................................................................... 15
3. Private residences of
the leaders of Convergence Démocratique............. 15
a. In
Port-au-Prince.............................................................................. 15
b. In other cities and
towns.................................................................... 16
i.
Area of Gonaïves...................................................................... 16
ii.
Area of Petit Goâve.................................................................. 16
iii.
Area of Cap-Haïtien.................................................................. 17
iv.
Area of Les Cayes.................................................................... 18
v.
Area of Hinche......................................................................... 18
4. Cultural and academic
centers................................................................. 18
C.
Possible links between the incidents mentioned in A and B above, and
violent incidents of July 28, 2001, in Port-au-Prince and in other places in
Haiti.......................................... 19
1. The violent incidents
of July 28, 2001........................................................ 19
a. Introduction...................................................................................... 19
b. In
Port-au-Prince.............................................................................. 21
c. In other cities and
towns.................................................................... 22
i.
Mireblais.................................................................................... 22
ii. Belladère.................................................................................... 23
iii. Hinche....................................................................................... 23
d. Consequences of the
attacks............................................................. 23
i.
Port-au-Prince............................................................................ 23
ii. Mirebalais.................................................................................. 24
iii. Belladère.................................................................................... 24
iv. Hinche....................................................................................... 24
e. Ineffectiveness of the police response................................................ 25
2. Possible links
between the incidents of July 28, 2001, and December 17, 2001 25
D.
The attacks, intimidation and threats against members of the press and
owners of the media on December 17, 2001, and the following days......................................................................... 27
1. Background............................................................................................ 27
2. Attacks, intimidation
and threats against members of the press................... 27
3. Attacks, intimidation
and threats against owners of the media.................... 29
III. CONCLUSIONS.................................................................................................... 29
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS....................................................................................... 32
APPENDICES TO THE
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY INTO
THE EVENTS OF
DECEMBER 17, 2001....................................................................... 37
APPENDICE I................................................................................................................................... 39
APPPENDICE II................................................................................................................ 47
APPENDICE III.................................................................................................................. 53
APPENDICE IV.................................................................................................................. 54
APPENDICE V.................................................................................................................................. 56
APPENDICE VI.................................................................................................................. 67
APPENDICE VII................................................................................................................ 70
APPENDICE VIII............................................................................................................... 72
APPENDICE IX.................................................................................................................. 74
APPENDICE X.................................................................................................................. 77
Report OF THE COMMISSION OF iNQUIRY
INTO THE EVENTS OF
DECEMBER 17, 2001, IN HAITI
Historical background
Although Dr. Francois
Duvalier came to power through elections in 1957, he subsequently presided over
a uniquely vicious authoritarian regime.
With the help of a private militia, political dissent was systematically
and completely eradicated, and all opponents were either jailed or
murdered. After his death in 1971 the
leadership of the country passed to his son Jean-Claude Duvalier, who ruled the
country for the next 15 years in a manner similar to his father’s. During that period political Opposition
continued to grow, especially within the army, and early in 1986, under
sustained opposition from the opposing politicians and the armed forces,
Jean-Claude was forced to flee the country.
A succession of military governments followed before the country began
the transition to civilian rule.
A Constituent Assembly
which had been appointed for the purpose produced a new draft Constitution on
March 10, 1987. The new Constitution
was to be published after it had been approved by a referendum, and it came
into force later that year. The
Constitution provides for a bicameral legislature, consisting of an 83-member
Chamber of Deputies and a 27-member Senate, and for the conduct of legislative
and presidential elections every five years.
The President, who is Head of State, may not succeed himself. He may serve an additional and final term
after an interval of five years. He is
not permitted to run for a third term.
The Constitution provides for presidential elections to be held on the
last Sunday in November in the fifth year of the President’s term. He assumes office on February 7 following
the date of the elections. Presidential elections which were held in
mid-December 1990 under the supervision of the United Nations and the
Organization of American States (OAS) brought to power Mr. Jean Bertrand
Aristide, leader of the Front National
pour le Changement et la Démocratie.
In January 1991, a former Minister of Interior from the Duvaliers’
regime, Mr. Roger Lafontant, attempted an unsuccessful coup d’etat. However, in September 1991 the army chief,
Brigadier-General Raoul Cedras, seized power in a military coup, and President
Aristide went into exile.
In June 1992, the army
installed a civilian government under Prime Minister Marc Bazin, who was one of
the Presidential candidates defeated by President Aristide in the 1990
elections. This army-led government
remained in power until the President was allowed to return to the country in
October 1994 to resume his truncated term of office. General elections were held in December 1995 and the successful
candidate was Mr. Rene Preval, whose government was dogged by violence and
instability throughout its term. In
January 1999, President Preval dissolved Parliament pending Parliamentary
elections which were repeatedly postponed until May 21, 2000. During that period Haiti was without a
working Parliament. Presidential
elections were held in November that year, at which Mr. Aristide of the Fanmi Lavalas party emerged as the
successful candidate.
The results of the
legislative, municipal and local elections which had been held on May 21, 2000,
were publicly disputed and have since then dominated the political
climate. The results were suspended
following objections from the Opposition political parties and the
international community. A rerun of
those elections on July 9 that year produced the same result although a boycott
by the main political parties under the umbrella of the Convergence
Démocratique meant that the victory of Fanmi
Lavalas party was even more decisive.
Two very significant
events followed. On July 28, 2001,
several armed men took over the Police Academy and occupied a number of police
stations, causing death, injury to persons and damage to property. None of those persons was apprehended. In the early hours of December 17, 2001, armed
men entered and occupied the Presidential Palace, also causing death, damage
and injury at the Palace and on their route out of Port-au-Prince. Only one of the perpetrators was
apprehended.
On January 16, 2002,
the Permanent Council of the OAS approved resolution CP/RES. 806 (1303/02),
which called for a thorough independent inquiry into the events related to the
December 17, 2001, to be held. The
Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) at their thirteenth
Inter-Sessional meeting accepted the recommendation of a CARICOM special
mission which had visited Haiti that an independent International Commission of
Inquiry be established to make an evaluation of the events of December 17,
2001.
The tenor of resolution
CP/RES. 806 (1303/02) is the restoration, through a series of decisive measures
by the Government of Haiti, of “a climate of security that is a necessary
condition for resuming OAS-sponsored negotiations....” The Secretary General and the Assistant
Secretary General, through the Special Representative of the Secretary General
in Port-au-Prince, have spearheaded this effort, in collaboration with CARICOM
and with the support of the Group of Friends of Haiti. The resolution places responsibility “on all
political parties, with the support of civil society and other relevant
institutions in Haiti,” to help create those enabling conditions for
negotiations, “with a view to reaching an agreement to resolve the political
crisis.”
In this regard, the new
Prime Minister’s language of openness and his expressed commitment to
negotiations are encouraging and reassuring.
More commendable is the recent arrest of some individuals who have been
implicated in serious criminal activities, to face justice. Having political party operatives submit to
the Rule of Law is a major act of political and moral courage. Such bold gestures will serve as a deterrent
to violations of human rights, inspire confidence in the Government and
contribute immensely to the creation of a climate of security in the country.
On March 15, 2002,
President Aristide appointed Mr. Yvon Neptune, former President of the Senate,
as the new Prime Minister, and a new Council of Ministers has been constituted,
including Mr. Marc L. Bazin as Minister without Portfolio to facilitate
improved conditions for negotiations, and the Government has been showing signs
of its willingness to compromise.
On the basis of
consultations with CARICOM and the Government of Haiti, the Secretary General
of the OAS decided to appoint a Commission of Inquiry of three persons with the
following terms of reference:
“1. Beginning in April 2002, the three
Commissioners shall inquire into the circumstances surrounding the following
events:
c. Any possible links
between the incidents in (a) and (b) above and violent incidents on July 28,
2001 in Port-au-Prince and elsewhere in Haiti.
d. Attacks, intimidation
and threats directed to members of the press and owners of media outlets on
December 17, 2001 and subsequent days.
2. The inquiry shall be
independent and separate from any judicial proceedings in Haiti.
3. On or before June 30,
2002 the three commissioners shall submit their report on the inquiry to the
Government of Haiti and to the OAS Secretary General. It shall contain their findings of fact and recommendations to
the Government of Haiti and shall reflect their independent deliberations and
conclusions based on those findings of facts.”
This Commission is one
of three bodies established by the OAS to provide assistance to Haiti in an
effort to resolve the political crisis which exists in that country. The Advisory Council on Reparations has been
mandated to present recommendations to the Inter-Ministerial Committee formed
by the Government of Haiti for the purpose of registering demands for damages
and proceeding to make reparation. It
is in the process of establishing a general framework which will distinguish
categories of occurrences and damages and recommend expeditious ways and
procedures for assessing each category on its merits. The framework is expected
to be completed soon. All documentation provided to our Commission on material
and physical damage has been sent to the Office of the Representative of the
OAS in Port-au-Prince so that it could be transmitted to the pertinent
authorities in charge of reparations.
Upon receiving documents, the Commission pointed out that interested
parties should address themselves directly to the organizations established
with the specific function of dealing with the reparations.
The OAS has also
appointed a Special Mission for Strengthening Democracy in Haiti. This Mission has already commenced its work
and will be in a good position to assist the Government of Haiti to implement
some of the recommendations made in this Report.
Composition of the
Commission of Inquiry
The Commission
comprises three jurists: Roberto Flores
Bermúdez, former Foreign Minister of Honduras; Alonso Gómez Robledo, a
Professor of International Law from Mexico; and Nicholas Liverpool, a former
Judge of Appeal in the Courts of The Bahamas, Belize, Grenada, and the
Organization of Eastern Caribbean States.
The Executive Secretary of the Commission is Dr. Bertha Santoscoy, on
leave from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR).
Following meetings on
April 5 at OAS headquarters in Washington, D.C., the Commissioners traveled to
Haiti on April 8 to commence their work.
Three visits were paid to Haiti on April 8 to 23, May 13 to 23, and June
11 to 17. During these periods the Commissioners
held hearings in Port-au-Prince and also in the Provinces, specifically in the
towns of Gonaïves, Petit-Goâve, Cap-Haïtien and Les Cayes.
The Commission had
audiences with President Jean Bertrand Aristide, Prime Minister Yvon Neptune
and other Ministers of Government. It
also held meetings with the Group of Friends of Haiti, which is comprised
mainly of the Ambassadors or Representatives of the main donor countries, the
Papal Nuncio and other senior Representatives of the Roman Catholic Church, the
Ambassadors of France and the United States of America, the Resident
Representative of the United Nations Development Programme, and the OAS
Ambassador to Haiti, Mr. Sergio Romero.
The Commission received
evidence from many groups and individuals. A complete list is attached as Appendix I. Several documents and films were presented
to the Commission in support of the evidence adduced. A list of those documents is to be found in Appendix II. The Commission visited many homes and
institutions which were destroyed. A
list of those is contained in Appendix VII.
Throughout its report the Commission refers to acts which have been
committed in breach of the provisions of the Constitution of Haiti and of the
Democratic Charter. The relevant
provisions are reproduced in Appendices V and VIII.*
The Commission received
the support of the President, the Government, public officials and the people
of Haiti in carrying out its mandate.
In particular the Commission received the full support of the Minister
of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Joseph Philippe Antonio, and his staff, who did
everything possible to ensure that the work of the Commission proceeded
smoothly and on time. The Commission
wishes to thank them for their support.
Thanks are also due to
Ambassador Sergio Romero and his staff for their unswerving attention and
courtesy at all times. Finally, the
Commission wishes to thank Dr. Bertha Santoscoy, the Executive Secretary, and
her dedicated staff in Haiti for the support which they have provided during
this three-month period.
Methodology of the Report
This report is the
result of the evidence and documentation received by the Commission on the
violent acts of December 17 in Haiti, and their relationship with the events of
July 28, 2001, which the Commission gathered and received during its visits to
Haiti.
The Commission gave
consideration to the testimony from the Haitian authorities, the
representatives of the Convergence
Démocratique, the victims of the violent events, the media, the representatives
of Civil Society, human rights groups and Popular Organizations. The Commission
took into account the official documents provided by the Government of Haiti.
All the information was analyzed by the Commission and, where pertinent,
incorporated in the present report.
The Commission traveled
to Gonaïves, Petit-Goâve, Cap-Haïtien and Les Cayes to meet with victims,
political party representatives, administrative authorities, and members of the
Police. On its visits, the Commission
also inspected the homes that were damaged or destroyed and the headquarters of
Opposition political parties that were ransacked and burned.
The facts contained
herein are based on all the relevant information received by the Commission
during its hearings and interviews.
Since the restoration
of democracy in Haiti through the elections held on December 16, 1990, the
National Palace, seat of the Presidency of the Republic, has been the object of
armed attacks. According to the Report
of the OAS Electoral Observer Mission in Haiti, 70 acts of violence were
reported consequent to the elections of May 21, 2000, of which seven related to
the deaths of candidates of political parties or their members. The OAS Observer Mission also reported that
immediately after the elections, it observed the arrests and detention of many
leaders of the Opposition. It also
pointed out that it “observed a state of disorganization and lack of
transparency in the compilation of the results and delays in its
communication.” The Report indicated
that the worst irregularity observed by the Mission was in respect of the
calculation of the results of candidates for election to the Senate, as a
result of which 19 candidacies for the Senate were decided on the first round,
18 of which belonged to the Lavalas
Party, when according to the proper procedures eight of those candidates,
should have undergone a second round.
When the results were not recalculated and the second round did not take
place for all of them, the OAS mission arrived at the conclusion that the
highest electoral authority of the country had deliberately violated its own
Constitution and the Electoral Law.
In order to establish a
coalition to protest the results of those elections, a group of political
parties and other coalitions, [among them the Organisation du Peuple en Lutte (OPL) and L’Espace de Concertation (KONAKOM, PANPRA, KID, and Haiti Kapab and
Generation 2004)] established the Convergence
Démocratique.
The Opposition
attempted to carry out peaceful demonstrations and held meetings to support
their dissatisfaction with the results of the elections. Among these demonstrations and meetings were
the following:
·
The organized march for the “Mouvement
Paysan Papaye” (MPP) on March 21, 2001, in Hinche;
·
The day of reflection organized by Convergence
Démocratique on March 21, 2001, in Cayes;
·
The meeting organized by Convergence
Démocratique on May 21, 2001, in Cayes;
·
The meeting organized by Edgar Leblanc on November 18, 2001, in Marigot;
·
The march organized by Convergence
Démocratique on November 29, 2001, in Saint-Marc; and
·
The day of reflection organized by “Initiative
Citoyenne” on December 15, 2001, in Cap-Haïtien.
All those activities
were disturbed by armed groups, with no police intervention. Despite recent advances in participative
democracy in Haiti, many fundamental institutions are still at their initial
stage. Among them are the
administration of justice and the National Police, both of which are in fragile
condition. The precarious situation of
these two institutions represents an important factor relating to the events of
December 17, 2001, and the reactions to those events.
The Commission received
the full cooperation of the representatives of the Government, the political
Opposition, representatives of the International Community, the media, cultural
and academic institutions, and the victims or members of their families, and
from Organized Civil Society.
All the evidence
received point to the fact that there was an armed attack on the National
Palace, seat of the Presidency of the Republic, on December 17, 2001. This fact is documented by the testimony
which the Commission received from many witnesses and victims of that event, as
well as from official sources. It is
worth mentioning that after the attack on the Police Academy and other police
stations on July 28, 2001, there were persistent rumors that the attackers
would return. Those rumors were
continuous and constantly announced an impending “coup d’etat.” In a manner consistent with psychological
warfare, the rumors stated that the “coup” would take place in August, then in
September and so on until December 17, 2001, arrived.
The evidence received
by the Commission points to the fact that around 1:30 to 2:00 a.m. on December
17, the attack on the National Palace was mounted by heavily armed individuals
dressed in camouflage uniforms who at that time were shooting from the northern
and from the western side of the Palace.
The group of attackers on the northern side climbed over the northern
fence of the National Palace whilst the western side was attacked by a group of
approximately 20 people in three pickup trucks. The guards withdrew from their posts. Both groups entered the grounds of the Palace, the assailants
took the principal building without resistance from the guards who were in
charge of the security of the Palace.
The penetration of the
National Palace was carried out because of the weak security measures that day
as well as complicity within the National Police by officers who passed on
information. The attackers knew of the
weakness of the situation of the guards in charge of security at the National
Palace.
The assailants occupied
the National Palace until 5:30 a.m. approximately. The total number of
assailants has been the subject of contradictory official declarations at
different moments during the events.
Nevertheless they were finally stated to have been around 20.
During the time that
they occupied the Palace, the assailants continuously fired with an M-50 machine
gun mounted on one of the vehicles, as well as with many other military weapons
such as Uzi, Galil and Fal. The
testimony of Mr. Claude Dieuveu indicated that around 4:45 a.m. he was passing
in front of the West Gate of the Palace and was injured by a bullet. The testimony of Mr. André Jean was that
when he was walking down Rue Légitime toward the West Gate of the Palace around
5:15 a.m. he received a bullet wound.
The declarations of both witnesses concerning their injuries are
supported by a letter of the Minister of Public Health and Population
concerning the admission of both to the University Hospital of the State of
Haiti in Port-au-Prince.
Whilst they occupied
the National Palace, the assailants caused damage which the Commission observed
on an inspection visit carried out April 19.
The damage suffered was in the reception area, the resting chamber of
the Unité de Sécurité Présidentielle
(USP), the office of the Steele Foundation which houses the Foreign Security
agents, the office of the First Lady, the Diplomatic Lounge, the offices of the
President of the Republic and the office of the President’s Private Secretary.
In the course of their
occupation of the Palace, the assailants used radio transmitters which they had
recovered from the Police to state that Jean Bertrand Aristide was no longer
President and that Guy Philippe was the new commander of the National Police of
Haiti. The new President, they claimed, would be “an ambassador.” This fact was corroborated by many witnesses
who are members of the police force.
No deaths or injuries
were reported amongst the members of the General Secretariat of the National
Palace (USGPN) or in the Intervention Corps for the Maintenance of Order
(CIMO); neither were any reported in the Intervention Group of the National
Police of Haiti (GIPNH) assigned to the Palace, usually called the Swat
Team. The dead and injured belonged to
Police or security units which were not assigned directly to the protection and
security of the National Palace, and to civilians who were shot at by the
attackers.
Of the attackers it has
been stated that Mr. Shavre Milot, supposedly joint commander of the
“puschists,” an ex-military officer and former member of the Security Unit of
the National Palace, was shot and killed.
Mr. Milot was employed in the USGPN when President Aristide was
re-elected. Milot had declared publicly
after the 1991 coup d’etat that if Aristide returned he would kill him himself.
According to the testimony of the authorities of the National Palace, around
5:00 to 5:30 a.m. when the assailants were about to leave the Palace, members
of the Palace Guard began to shoot at them and killed the attacker identified
above. Because of the nature of the
wounds suffered by this attacker, doubts were expressed as to whether Milot had
been killed in the circumstances described above, especially as the body had
been removed before the Coroner arrived on the scene.
At approximately 5:30
a.m., the assailants left the Palace through the West Gate in three
vehicles. During their escape from the
Palace grounds the attackers fired with their weapons, including the M-50
machine gun. They fired their weapons
as well at many points along their escape route, such as the crossing of rue
Pavée and Monseigneur Guilloux where, according to evidence received by the
Commission, there were several victims, including policeman Ednor
Morisset, who had blocked that street
sometime before. The assailants fired
at him and injured him. At Tabarre in Carrefour Fleuriot, close to the
President’s residence, Commissaire Anthony Nazaire, Assistant to the
Presidential Security Unit at the National Palace was injured. At La Tremblai, several civilian victims
were reported to have been injured.
Among them was Brevil Jean Roma, who was shot at 6:00 a.m. At Croix des Bouquets, Mme Marie Lourdes
Jacques was shot at and killed when the attackers passed through that area; and
Astrel Jean-Guy, who at around 6:30 a.m. saw the three pickup trucks with their
lights on passing by and shooting close to a barricade erected in Croix des
Bouquets, was himself wounded by a bullet.
The Swat Team followed
the assailants on their escape route with the assistance of a helicopter
assigned to the President of the Republic. It was piloted by Frantz Gabriel who
was in charge of coordinating ground and air security for the President. He was accompanied by three members of the
USP response force (CAT Team). The
escape route involved going through Tabarre, Croix des Bouquets, Ganthier, where
they abandoned the first vehicle, and Thomazeau, where there was an exchange of
fire between the Swat Team and the assailants and where they left the second
vehicle while a group of them dispersed in the area until they reached
Morne-à-Cabrit where they abandoned the third and last vehicle on which the
M-50 machine gun was mounted. The pursuers lost track of the other assailants
who had been transported in that vehicle.
When the pursuit ended the Swat Team found a deposit of arms in a cave
close to the site where the last vehicle was abandoned. By this time the helicopter had returned to
base. Shortly afterwards, former soldier Pierre Richardson was allegedly
captured in that area and is presently in prison, accused of participating in
the attack. In his testimony to the
Commission on its visit to the National Penitentiary, Mr. Richardson denied
having participated in the attack and accused members of the Police of having
tortured him and forced him to make a statement against his will. Judge Bernard St Vil stated, however, that
Mr. Richardson had formally admitted his complicity in the attack, in the
presence of his lawyer, and had also implicated Mr. Guy François, a former
military officer who allegedly was to provide back-up for the attackers. Mr. Guy François, who has been in prison
since December 18, 2001, denied having any involvement in the attack on the
National Palace and accused the authorities of detaining him illegally.
The Commission drove
along the same path which the attackers had taken on the morning of December 17
until it reached Morne-à-Cabrit, where the last vehicle was found and where the
attackers had left a cache of arms and ammunition. During this journey, the Commission was accompanied by police
officers Cabannes Pierre Lucien and Brutus Serge Fils of the Intervention Group
of the National Police (GIPNH), who were among other officers who had gone in
pursuit of the attackers. On this
occasion the Commission was told that the attackers were mainly all from
Thomazeau and that they had not remained in that village because, unexpectedly,
the Swat Team was after them in hot pursuit.
Mr. Frantz Gabriel was
interviewed by the Commission on June 14, 2002, during its final visit. He corroborated in every important
particular the evidence of the pursuit which had already been given by members
of the Swat Team. He stated that on
December 17 he was informed at approximately 4:00 a.m. that there were some
assailants inside the Palace grounds and that he was required to conduct air
reconnaissance. He lifted off at around
5:15 or 5:30 a.m. and first had eye contact with the assailants after they had
left Ganthier for Croix des Bouquets.
There were ground forces following them. The fugitives started with three vehicles in each of which there
were about 10 people. They abandoned
one vehicle on the dirt road between Ganthier and Thomazeau and the occupants
of that vehicle boarded the other two vehicles. At that stage the pursuing vehicles, which consisted of members
of the Swat Team and of the judiciary police and regular police, were not close
to the attackers.
Mr. Gabriel went back
to the airport for refueling and when he returned about 12 assailants were in
the blue vehicle on which an M-50 gun was mounted and were racing towards the
Morne-à-Cabrit area. It appeared to him
that they had left their second vehicle in Thomazeau. He saw them firing at the helicopter, and in fact one bullet hit
the main blade but caused no damage. He
followed them up to the top of Morne-à-Cabrit, keeping the Swat Team informed
of their movement. He noticed that the
vehicle was emitting black smoke. When
they got to a small village at the top of Morne-à-Cabrit, they parked the
vehicle on a back road and carried their guns (except the M-50) and ammunition
to a cavern about 200 meters away. When
they came out of the cavern he noticed that they had changed clothing and were
no longer wearing the olive green fatigues which they previously had on. They dispersed in small groups in different
directions, by which time the police officers had reached the road where the
vehicle had been parked. He then
returned to base.
On his way back up to
Morne-à-Cabrit by car he met the Swat Team returning to Port-au-Prince. He stopped them and they pointed to a man lying
at the back of one of the police vehicles.
He was told that the man’s name was Richardson and that the officers had
found a laissez-passer for the
Dominican Republic and some currency in his pocket. He said that he had heard that doubts were being expressed about
those events, but he had no doubts whatsoever as he had lived through them.
The Commission received
the opinion of the authorities, the political Opposition, Civil Society and
members of the media, concerning the objectives of the attack on the National
Palace on December 17, 2001.
The official version
from Government sources was that the attack at the National Palace on December
17, 2001, was an attempt to carry out a coup d’etat to remove President Jean
Bertrand Aristide from power. It was
pointed out that the perpetrators were former members of the Haitian armed
forces and that some of them had traveled to Haiti from the Dominican Republic.
The Opposition argued
that the attack on the National Palace was set up by the party in power in
order to have a pretext to weaken the Opposition by means of physical
retaliatory attacks against the leaders of Convergence
Démocratique, and also with the intention ransacking and destroying their
private residences, political headquarters and the cultural and academic
institutions which they administer, support or promote. The members of Civil Society tended to
support the Opposition’s point of view, whereas members of the media felt that
“something had taken place at the Palace that day.”
The political
Opposition in Haiti has not been accused of bearing any responsibility for the
attack on the National Palace. Nor has
it been accused by the Government, the Police, or any national authority or
political party of having conspired with the attackers. In his declaration before the Commission on
April 10, Mr. Jonas Petit, spokesman for the Fanmi Lavalas party, stated that “This coup d’etat would have been
the 33rd in 200 years, so I cannot say if it was the Convergence, it could have come from
anywhere.” The only persons who told
the Commission that the political Opposition had any responsibility for the
attack are Mr. Rene Civil and Mr. Paul Raymond, leaders of Popular
Organizations who are considered by many to be extremists.
The Unit of the General
Secretariat of the National Palace (USGPN), the Intervention Corps for
Maintenance of Order (CIMO) and the Group of Intervention of National Police
(GIPNH) acted in such a way that, even if their actions could be attributed to
incompetence, there are also suggestions that there may have been
complicity. It is relevant to quote the
conclusions of an official report on the facts of December 17, 2001, which
indicated that:
·
There is a deficiency in the high command and a marked lack of
leadership. This situation is caused by
a lack of unity, the non-coordination of decisions, and the manner in which the
forces of the Police are dispersed.
·
There was no resistance to impede the entry of the assailants into the
Palace. Moreover, other authorities
such as the Commissioner of the Western Department were not allowed to attempt
to enter the Palace to mount a counterattack;
·
Weakness in personnel, materials, arms and ammunition, both in quality
and quantity;
·
The non-existence of an intelligence service; and
·
Logistical difficulties such as the lack of communications.
The report also stated
that the main gate to the Palace was neither locked nor chained that night.
Mr. Harvel
Jean-Baptiste, Inspector General of the National Haitian Police, pointed out
the existence of a problem of motivation among the members of the Police. In his testimony, the Chief of the National
Haitian Police, Mr. Jean Nesly Lucien, declared that there had been a
recommendation to dismiss various police officers after the July 28 attack but
that this recommendation had not been implemented.
The Haitian Armed
Forces were dissolved during the second term of President Jean Bertrand
Aristide. According to reports, it was
a corrupt army which allowed many to pursue illegitimate and illegal
activities. According to the testimony
of the Inspector General of the National Haitian Police, many former military
officers do not accept the fact that the army has been dissolved. It is also alleged that many former military
personnel did not receive proper compensation when the army was dissolved.
On October 15, 1994,
upon the reinstallation of Jean Bertrand Aristide as President of Haiti, there
was an effort to strengthen the hold of civilian power over the military. In 1995 the Haitian Armed Forces were
disbanded. Nevertheless, from the
beginning the National Police has lacked the resources and the capacity to
carry out its functions, the foremost among them being the maintenance of order
in the country.
The abolition of the
armed forces and the absence of a National Police capable of keeping order,
allowed the known practice in Haiti of solving political differences by means
of irregular groups, armed in some cases, to acquire a new dimension. Popular Organizations which had hitherto
been heterogeneous mechanisms for community defense have undergone changes in
the last seven years. Initially they
represented the birth of civil society becoming involved in national political
objectives. This initial role assumed
by these Organizations to serve as civilian mechanisms for the preservation of
democracy now seems to have become a mechanism at the service of strong
political interests or of other illegitimate interests. The Commission received evidence that even
during its first visit some militant leaders of Popular Organizations were
heard to say that the events of December 17 were only a beginning, or “a towel
to place the heavy load on the head.”
The situation has
worsened with the availability of an undetermined number of weapons, many of
military use, under the control of leaders of certain Popular Organizations, which
are also circulated among members of those organizations. In some cases, these
leaders are known politicians or thugs who impose themselves on, or work with,
local authorities in their areas, and who act with impunity.
Acts of aggression and
intimidation took place on many occasions during the months following the May
21 elections. Violence carried out by Popular Organizations took place at the
demonstrations and meetings organized by the Opposition. As a result, there
were many deaths, such as the case of Saint-Marc in November 2001, where many
injuries and damage to property were reported in a publication “The Events of
December 17, 2001” compiled by the Ecumenical Center for Human Rights.
At the end of June
2001, the Government of Haiti began to make public calls to the population to
apply “zero tolerance” to delinquents found committing acts in flagrante.
This call has been interpreted as a call for summary justice. On November 18,
2001, the President of the Republic made a public reaffirmation for “zero
tolerance” against authors of kidnapping and other grave crimes.
Popular Organization
leaders Mr. Rene Civil, of Jeunesse
Pouvoir Populaire (JPP) and Mr. Paul Raymond, of the Small Church Community
(TKL), stated before the Commission that the accusations against them of making
public threats against leaders of the Opposition, has been done only to
satanize Popular Organizations. They
said that their mission was to change the world through peace. They accused Convergence Démocratique of trying to act through violence because
of the lack of leadership and the absence of alternative programs to put to the
country. They also accused Convergence Démocratique of having
planned the coup d’etat of December 17 from the Dominican Republic where they
had been attending a meeting in the days previous to the attempted coup
d’etat. They also added that the
members of Convergence Démocratique
had burned their own houses in order to place the responsibility on Popular
Organizations.*
The violent events of December
17, 2001, are considered by many as one of the most awful events in the recent
political history of Haiti.
The
Commission received testimony on the damage inflicted to the headquarters of
Opposition political parties by the leaders of
the Organisation du Peuple en
Lutte (OPL), which also houses the offices of Convergence Démocratique, the Konfederazion
Inite Demokratic (KID), the Congrès
National des Mouvements Démocratiques (KONAKOM), the Mobilisation pour le Developpement National (MDN), the Alliance pour l’Avancement et la Libération
d’Haiti (ALAH), and the Parti
Democratique Chrétien d’Haïti (PDCH).
Mr. Paul Denis,
member of the executive committee of OPL, denounced the attack on the
headquarters of that organization. He
provided details of the attack and mentioned that around 100 people, who
eventually received support in the form of a bulldozer from the National
Council of Equipment (CNE), managed to break down the wall and the metal doors
and enter the compound. At the same
time, the attackers were shooting with weapons, in the presence of the Police
who remained passive. He also stated
that later the attackers went to the Office
National d’Assurance Vieillesse to claim payment that had been offered for
committing those acts. The OPL
headquarters and the home of its leader Gerard Pierre-Charles were completed
destroyed by fire on December 17, 2001.
The Commission received
evidence from Victor Benoit, leader of KONAKOM, and from other members of the
party that on January 23, 2000, they presented legal claims to the Commissaire du Gouvernement. Mr. Micha Gaillard, Joint Secretary General
of the party and spokesman for Convergence
Démocratique, referred to and denied Mr. Rene Civil’s statement that the
planning of the alleged coup d’etat began at a meeting of the International
Socialist Congress in the Dominican Republic, and dismissed it with derision.
Many witnesses gave
accounts of the participation of militants of the Fanmi Lavalas party in the ransacking and burning of the
headquarters of the Opposition political parties. After they burned the headquarters of Convergence Démocratique, the group from Lavalas said: “Ok, now let’s go to KID.” The Commission was also told that the attackers knew exactly what
they wanted to accomplish and “it was not something that would happen just like
that.”
The Alliance pour l’Avancement et la Libération
d’Haiti (ALAH) also had its headquarters in Port-au-Prince. Its headquarters were located in a compound owned by
its leader Reynold Georges. There were
three houses in that compound. They
were all destroyed by fire on December 17, 2001. The first two houses were destroyed around noon and the third
house was burned to cinders at about 8:00 p.m.
Mr. George regarded as a case of retributive justice the fact that the
home of one of his neighbors who supports the Fanmi Lavalas was burnt accidentally as a result of the fire set to
his buildings.
The headquarters of KID
were burned down for the third time on December 17, 2001. The other occasions were in 1991 and on
April 8, 2000.
Many witnesses also
gave accounts of the passivity of the Police.
The Police were present in the course of the ransacking and burning but there
was no intervention on their part. By
way of exoneration for the failure of the Police to take action, the Director
General of the Police, Mr. Jean Nesly Lucien, declared that there were many
simultaneous attacks that day. When he
arrived at the Convergence Démocratique’s
headquarters it was already in flames.
He said that the Police are not trained for combat.
The Commission visited
the shells of what were formerly the headquarters of OPL, KONAKOM, KID and
ALLAH and observed in situ the material damage that the installations
still showed despite the period of time that had elapsed.
On its visit to
Gonaïves on April 15, the Commission went to the headquarters of MOCHRENA and
was able to see the damage to the installations. The headquarters are located on a compound which also comprises
the residence of Pasteur Luc Mesadieu, President of MOCHRENA, and his family,
and where six other families lived. The
ransacking and the burning took place in all of the buildings. The accounts of witnesses pointed out that
in the early hours of the morning of December 17, around 200 young people met
in front of the Mayor’s residence located across the street from the police
station. The Committee received
evidence that the Mayor and his assistant distributed weapons to those
people. Several persons, some of whom
were from Port-au-Prince, led the group towards the residence of the President
and the Vice-President of MOCHRENA. On
that day, all the gas stations were closed except for the Mayor’s station where
the group received gasoline at no cost.
Pasteur Mesadieu’s assistant, Mr. Ramy Darand, was murdered by this
group – his body was then sprinkled with gasoline and burned with a tire around
his neck because he refused to reveal where Pasteur Mesadieu was hiding. The Commission saw the place where Mr.
Darand was killed. Mr. Julien Joseph
was identified as one of the participants in the murder of Ramy Darand. Mr. Amiot Metayer, (alias Cubain), was
identified as one of those who attacked
MOCHRENA’s installation searching for Pastor Mesadieu; Mr. Emmanuel
Meus, MOCHRENA’s general secretary, was also subjected to physical aggression
and death threats.
Some policemen tried to
establish order but they were isolated cases.
In general, the Police were perceived as being accomplices to the
events.
The Commission
interviewed Joany Caneus, Departmental Director of Police in Artibonite, who
excused the inaction of the Police indicating that because of the attack at the
National Palace in Port-au-Prince, the Police were fearful of an attack on the
police station. He added that the
Police were not trained to manage a situation like the one which occurred on
December 17 and that he did not have either the vehicles or the necessary
personnel to contain such a situation.
He also declared that the Police could not have provided security to all
the places that were attacked.
Nevertheless, the Departmental Director indicated that on other less
volatile occasions the Police had spent days and nights in front of MOCHRENA’s
headquarters to provide security. He
also stated that on another occasion the Police had stationed patrol cars in
front of Pasteur Mesadieu’s house and at the residences of Pasteur Revnel and
Pasteur Dieudonne, all from MOCHRENA.
He also mentioned that no protection had been requested by anyone during
the events of December 17. The
Commission requested a copy of the daily investigation bulletin which was
compiled for December 17, 2001. Mr.
Caneus replied that it was a confidential document and that he would need the
authorization of the Director General of Police. The Commission requested the document directly from the
Government in Port-au-Prince. As of the
date of this report, this document has not been received.
The Commission received
evidence from Pasteur Luc Mesadieu in Port-au-Prince. He confirmed all that was stated by the members of his party in
Gonaïves. He also added that two or
three weeks before December 17, representatives of the party in power had
publicly announced that they were going to attack the members of Convergence Démocratique house by house,
person by person, and that they were going to kill him.
The Commission
requested the Government’s cooperation to hear Mr. Amiot Metayer. In spite of these efforts, it was not
possible to obtain evidence from him.
In Port-au-Prince the
Commission also received evidence from Mr. Stephen Moise, Mayor of Gonaïves,
who denied any involvement or complicity in the ransacking and burning of
houses and in the distribution of arms or petrol.
This city represents
what could possibly become the worst-case scenario for the Republic of Haiti if
the State does not make serious attempts to protect citizens and their property
from invasion by members of the Popular Organizations. In that town support seems to be almost
evenly divided between the supporters of Convergence
Démocratique and those of Fanmi
Lavalas. The result is a never
ending source of attacks and counterattacks.
When the Commission
visited the town on April 20, 2001, it received evidence from both sides. It appears that when the news was released
that there was an attack on the Presidential Palace and that a coup d’etat had
taken place, the supporters of the Convergence
Démocratique began to celebrate and attacked and burned properties
belonging to the members of Fanmi Lavalas. Later in the day when it was revealed that
the President was safe and that the assailants had fled, supporters of Fanmi Lavalas in turn attacked and
destroyed the homes of members of Convergence
Démocratique. The details on the
damage to private properties are provided in the next chapter. There was no damage to the headquarters of
Opposition political parties in that town.
The Commission also heard
that there is a group which supports the Fanmi
Lavalas and goes by the name of “Domi
nan bwa,” which literally means sleeping in the woods. They do just that and attack when and where
it suits them.
On its visit to
Cap-Haïtien on May 17, 2002, the Commission received testimony from Clebert
Dorvil, who contested the election for the Chamber of Deputies in the May 21,
2000, elections and who resided in Grande Rivière du Nord, 20 km south of
Cap-Haïtien. He stated that the headquarters
of OPL was ransacked and all its documents and office equipment were
destroyed. The group, which was headed
by Dieudonne Martial, Nelton Chery and policeman Maxene Martial, attacked them
with firearms and tear gas. The headquarters of the Organisation Paysanne de la Grande Rivière du Nord (OPGN) was also
attacked. Concerning this event, Mr.
Trifene Phaete stated that he was inside the headquarters when the Mayor of
Grande Rivière du Nord arrived with some people. He escaped before the building was burned.
In the course of its
visit to Cap-Haïtien the Commission heard from Mr. Gael Menelas, Commissaire
Principal, who explained that for strategic reasons almost all out of the total
of 28 policemen who were stationed in Cap-Haïtien that day were protecting the
southern entrance to the city. When he
was informed that the home of a member of Convergence
Démocratique was under attack, he ordered some policemen to go to that
area. When they arrived, they found
some personal objects being burned in front of the house. He also mentioned that in another sector of
the city there was a confrontation between different groups, which the Police
had to disperse with tear gas. During
that confrontation a youngster, Junior Ismael, was wounded in the head with a harpoon. The Commission had the opportunity to speak
with Mr. Ismael. The Departmental
Delegate, Mr. Jean Mirtho Julien, referred to the spontaneity with which Lavalas militants controlled the streets
on the morning of December 17. He said
that he did not know of any burned houses or major damage. He admitted that there were isolated cases
of damage, which were not planned. He
added that the majority of the population supports the Government and for that
reason they took to the streets and attacked the Opposition. He said that “The force of the State is the
mobilization of the population due to the weakness of the Police.”
No damage was reported
to the headquarters of any of the Opposition political parties.
The destruction of
the home of Victor Benoit, leader of KONAKOM, represents the most blatant and
calculated destruction of property that day.
In the case, for example, of Gerard Pierre-Charles and the offices of
CRESFED, there was evidence that the assailants did not know exactly where to
go and sought information from passersby as to the situation of those
particular buildings.
Victor Benoit’s home is
situated in an area where one does not drive past by chance. Its destruction was clinically and
professionally carried out. The group
of six men, all masked, appeared at midday and were gone by 12:30 p.m. They
arrived in four vehicles heavily armed, one official white Nissan Patrol car,
license plate No. 0824, and three other vehicles without license plates. They set fire to the Benoits’ home room by
room in what can only be described as an act of targeted calculation. On April 17 the Commission heard testimony
by Mrs. Jessie Benoit concerning the details of the attack on their home. Their lawyer, Mrs. Dilia Lemaire, informed
the Commission that on December 18 they complained of the attack before the Commissaire du Gouvernement and drew his
attention to the license plate of one of the vehicles that transported the
attackers. As a result of an
investigation which was carried out she said that the vehicle was identified as
one that is assigned to the Chamber of Deputies. The President of the Chamber of Deputies had stated that the
vehicle had been in the possession of the Chamber all along. Mrs. Lemaire also pointed out that,
according to statements of witnesses in the neighborhood, that convoy of four
vehicles had left the Bon Repos police station. She filed a new legal action on March 14, 2002, against the Commissaire du Gouvernement but she had
yet to receive a reply.
Mrs. Suzy Castor, wife
of Mr. Gerard Pierre-Charles, leader of the OPL, informed the Commission on
April 10 that her residence in Morne Hercule in Pétion-Ville was attacked and ransacked
on December 17 around 9:30 in the morning.
She explained that a group of around 15 people were searching for her
house and when they found it they threw stones and gunshots were also heard.
Two trucks from the National Center for Equipment (CNE) full of armed bandits
began to attack her residence. They
broke the wall on the side of the house in order to go in. She added that Senator Prince Sonson Pierre
and the Mayor of Pétion-Ville together with his assistant were present during
the attack. The Commission received
testimony from Senator Prince Sonson Pierre who pointed out that he went there
when he heard over the radio that the house was being attacked. The purpose of his visit was to try to
prevent damage to Gerard Pierre-Charles’ family and his home. Mrs. Castor added that two vehicles were
burned while the Police stood by and only observed. In her testimony she mentioned that the Swat Team arrived and
opened the doors leaving the house vulnerable for the ransacking by the
attackers. She said that the people
went to her house to kill her because they were shouting that when the
Pierre-Charles left the house they were going to cut them to pieces. When they did not see them come out, the
attackers went to the neighborhood looking for them and caused damage to many
houses. She stated that the attackers
who arrived at her home came from Cité Soleil and that a police vehicle from
that area had accompanied them.
Mrs. Castor indicated
that after the attack two truckloads of stones were removed from the yard of
her house. Those stones obviously had
to have been transported by truck and distributed to the attackers, which
demonstrated that the destruction of her home was not a spontaneous act. The private residence of Mr. Reynold George,
the political leader of ALAH, was situated in a compound with two other houses,
one of which was the headquarters of the party. The circumstances surrounding its destruction have been given
earlier. Mr. George stated that people
from the neighborhood had called the fire brigade, but when they arrived they
said “This is the house of one of the political leaders, we are not going to
intervene, let it burn.”
The Commission visited
the private residences of Mr. and Mrs. Pierre-Charles and Mr. Reynold George on
April 11. The Commission also visited
the private residence of Mr. and Mrs. Benoit on May 22. On both occasions it observed the damage to
those properties.
Outside of the capital
city, in many cases the headquarters of the Opposition political parties and
the residences of the leaders of Convergence
Démocratique are in the same compound.
The case of the residences of the leaders of political parties in
Gonaïves has already been discussed above.
According to testimony
received by the Commission, a group of militants of Fanmi Lavalas met on December 17 in the home of former Magistrate
Boliere Semereste where weapons were distributed so they would go to attack the
residences of the members of the Opposition political parties. The result was the burning and ransacking of
16 homes. Mr. Mckensie Innocent, a
policeman from Petite Rivière de Nippes, Yves Joly, a member of the security of
Deputy Milford Dufort, Ti Yonyon and his wife Aline, among others, were
identified as participants in those acts.
Among the residences destroyed were the homes of Jean Jasmin, Jean
François and Hypollite Desgrange.
On its visit to that
town on April 20, leaders of Convergence
Démocratique told the Commission that policeman Manuel Pascal coordinated
the “chimè” (groups of violent people
generally associated with Lavalas) who burned many houses. It happened under the observation of the
Police and lasted between 8:30 a.m. and 5:30 p.m. There were six persons injured by gunfire that day. It was mentioned that supporters of Lavalas had publicly stated their
objective of destroying the Opposition and that they were going to ransack the
leaders’ homes. Jean Willis, a former
Director of Teleco, was quoted as saying “In Petit Goâve no Convergence Leaders will be left.”
The Commission visited
the home of Mrs. Marie Rose Covicou (which was totally destroyed) and also the
home of Mr. Jasmin and Mr. François, which were severely damaged.
The Commission also met
with Fanmi Lavalas representatives.
Pasteur Semereste Boliere, former Deputy Mayor, stated that people from the Convergence ransacked and burned
Emmanuel Antoine’s house. He said they
did the same to his mother’s house. He
said that Convergence Démocratique
had terrorized the population, that they take over the streets and that their
objective is the destabilization of the Government. The Commission visited two residences of Fanmi Lavalas supporters in Petit Goâve where extensive damage
could be seen. The tense situation
which exists in Petit-Goâve has already been described.
In the northern part of
the country, at the city of Borgne 35
km to the west of Cap-Haïtien, according to the testimony of the representative
of the Mobilization pour le Developpement
National (MDN) for the area, many have had to flee from that area. None of them belong to Fanmi Lavalas. Those who
could not escape were either killed or arrested. Mr. Marc Lamour, Mr. Etienne Lamour and Mrs. Marceline Joseph
have been accused of leading the movement against MDN with a group of heavily
armed men.
Cap-Haïtien was visited
by the Commission on May 17, 2002. It
received declarations from many leaders of political parties belonging to Convergence Démocratique who referred to
the violent acts against the members of that coalition. The house of Milton Chery, which the
Commission visited, suffered damage at the hands of approximately 50 armed
persons. The Mayor of Milot, the Port
Authority representative, Mrs. Mislene Azemar (alias Mme Toto) and Johnny
Tabarre were pointed out as members of the group which damaged Mr. Chery’s
house. The police station is only 15
meters away from Mr. Chery’s house yet no assistance was received from the
Police. Mr. Nixon, a member of Convergence Démocratique, gave an
account of the persecution to which he had been subjected and of the attempt on
December 17 to burn down his house (which was eventually burned on May 6,
2002). He also mentioned the continuous
threats to which he has been subjected since then. Mr. Elusca Charles, who was a previous candidate for Mayor,
referred to the attempt by 17 armed people headed by the city authorities to
attack his house. They took whatever
they wanted and the rest was burned. He
accused the Police of passivity. Mr.
Chery Pierre Bonnard from the town of Dondon, also south of Cap-Haïtien,
mentioned the ransacking of five houses by armed people who were roaming the
streets. The Commission received the
testimony of Rosemonde Martial and many others confirming the above statements.
The residence of Mr.
Trifene Phaete of Grande Rivière du Nord was attacked but no damage was
suffered because his supporters defended it.
Upon the receipt of the claim submitted by Mr. Martial for damage
suffered, the Commissaire told him that “juridically he could present it but
not politically.” Mr. Martial had to go
to a judge in another city to take an inventory of his losses.
On May 20 the
Commission visited Les Cayes in the Southern Department of Haiti. At the meeting with the leaders of Convergence Démocratique, Mr. Claude
Bernard of OPL referred to the public announcement which was reiterated on
December 17 by Deputy Serge Mettelus, that a vehicle coming from Petit Goâve
towards Les Cayes was full of armed people who spoke Spanish. This announcement motivated the members of Fanmi Lavalas to take to the
streets. They began to ransack and burn
houses and businesses of the Convergence
members, among them those of Mr. Jean Gabriel Fortune and many others. They then attacked the home of Mr. Faubert
Pierre-Louis, leader of MOCHRENA who lives in the town of Simon close to Les
Cayes. The group was headed by Fanmi Lavalas supporter “Ti Pistol” and
was armed with machine guns and other military weapons. The Commission received the list of the
names of the persons accused of participating in the attack. The Commission was told that the Police was
not there to protect the life of the leaders of the Opposition but to protect
the “chimè.”
In the town of
Saint-Louis du Sud, 25 km from Les Cayes, delegates of MDN reported that Mrs.
Christina Dorfeuille’s house was ransacked and burned by “Chimè Lavalas,” who arrived with the help of the Fanmi Lavalas Deputy Jean Candio. The Commission received the documents
listing the names of the persons who were murdered in that area on December
17. The Commission was also told that
former candidate for Deputy, Engineer Sonette Castor, member of Convergence Démocratique, was arrested
on March 17, 2002, and struck with sticks by the “Chimè Lavalas” in the presence of Judge Eberle Cadet inside his own
yard in Cavaillon.
According
to Fritz Luckner Jean, leader of the MDN, two days before the attack at the
National Palace the Lavalas Deputy
Barbot Villier entered the town of Lascahobas in a pickup truck full of
military weapons, which he distributed to approximately 50 activists in three
communities of Lascahobas.
During the events of
December 17, two cultural centers in Port-au-Prince were the object of attacks:
the Centre de Recherche et de Formation
Economique et Social pour le Development (CRESFED), and the Institut
Français.
CRESFED is a training,
research and documentation center, which was founded in 1986. The Director of
the Center is Professor Suzy Castor. This building, which contained an
irreplaceable source of materials on Haitian and Caribbean history and culture,
was attacked, looted and burned to the ground on December 17, 2001.
Mrs. Suzy Castor gave testimony
on April 10 on the ransacking and destruction of the Center. She pointed out
that around 14 people went through the neighborhood trying to find the Center,
until they reached it the third time around. Once they found it they began to
attack it. No one was inside. Another group led by the Police came by. They
were accompanied by the Delegate of the City for that section of Canapé Vert.
The persons arrived with the intention of destroying the place. They went
through the building room by room looting and destroying everything they found.
Some of the documents looted were later sold by the attackers. In fact, on the day following the attack,
scattered samples of CRESFED’s specialized collection of books were being sold
on the sidewalks of Port-au-Prince. The
Center was well known and recognized for the opportunities which it provided to
persons at all levels to share in its wealth of knowledge. Grassroot groups as well as University
graduates took part in the colloquia organized by CRESFED. The Center was a depository for books on
Haitian history, and it was the largest documentation center for materials on
Latin America and the Caribbean.
On April 20 the
Commission visited CRESFED and observed the damage.
The Institut
Français, or the Alliance Française,
is a facility, which is provided by the French Government in many countries. It
serves to acquaint the citizens of the host country with the French language
and culture, and classes are conducted for those who wish to become fluent in
French. A villa located behind the Institute, but on the same grounds, was
ransacked, and several articles stolen.
The villa is located at the back of the buildings which previously
housed the headquarters of the Convergence
Démocratique and the KONAKOM.
The Commission received
evidence of damage to only one academic center. The Manassé elementary school, which was situated in Biot at the
western entrance to the town of Gonaïves, was part of a campus which was sited
in Pasteur Sylvio Dieudonne’s compound.
It also contained a section for kindergarten students and a college
where high school students received additional instruction in carpentry and
welding. A total of five buildings,
which included the Pasteur’s house and Church were situated in the same
compound. They were all burned to the
ground. When the Commission visited
Gonaïves, it was heartrending to see those young children receiving instruction
in the remnants of buildings which had not yet been repaired.
Following the consistent protests mounted by
the Opposition political parties against the results of the elections held on
May 21, 2000, the OAS had embarked on a series of consultations with the
Government and the Opposition with a view to arriving at a satisfactory
political settlement of this protracted dispute. Discussions were well advanced, and they culminated in an initial
agreement, which was reached on July 15, 2001.
The expected hope of an early solution was however short-lived for, on
July 28, 2001, armed intervention featured again in the life of the country.
In the early hours of
Saturday, July 28, 2001, shots were heard outside the Pétion-Ville police
station. Shots were also heard from the
National Police Academy where three police officers were killed and fourteen
were reported injured. Later that day
the police stations at Mirebalais, Belladère, and Hinche were also attacked.
Evidence was received
from several individuals and police officers who were witnesses to the
events. The Commission also had the
benefit of a report, which was compiled by a delegation of Human Rights
Organizations comprising the National Coalition for Haitian Rights, the
Platform of Haitian Human Rights Organizations and the Committee of Lawyers for
the Respect of Individual Liberty in August 2001, shortly after the attacks
occurred. The evidence suggests that
the attacks on the Academy, the Pétion-Ville police station and the other
police stations at Mirebalais, Belladère, and Hinche were planned to take place
simultaneously.
Six armed men attacked
the Pétion-Ville police station early that day. They took over the police station and remained there for about
one hour and a half before they left, taking with them all the arms and
ammunition which they could lay their hands on. There was no counterattack by the officers at the station; in
fact, most of the officers fled upon the arrival of the commandos. No attempt seems to have been made by the
police high command to provide any protection or support to the officers who
were at the Pétion-Ville police station.
The attackers left the police station and drove to the Police Academy to
join another group, which had by then taken over the Academy.
The Commission received
testimony from Mr. Henry Claude Ménard, former Interior Minister, who indicated
that there had been rumors of a possible coup d’etat before July 28. He pointed out that there was information
that Ravix, a man who was connected to Guy Philippe and Michel François, was
organizing a coup.
Mr. Jean Nesly Lucien,
General Director of the Haitian National Police, told the Commission that the
July 28 attacks on the Police Academy and on the Pétion-Ville police station
had taken place with the purpose of intimidating the SWAT Team and to get hold
of arms.
The Commission received
the testimony of Mrs. Claudette Logan and of Mr. Martino Dorcil, who both spoke
of the situation of Martino Moles, a former soldier and now a security agent
for the COBRA Company, who was rendering his services at TELECO in the area of
Pont Morin on July 28, 2001. He was kidnapped
on September 10, 2001, by a group of heavily armed men with their faces
covered. He was taken to the
Pétion-Ville police station and was accused of participating in the events of
July 28. Nevertheless there was no
formal accusation against him. Because
he is a former soldier, his judicial file, like the ones of other former
soldiers, receives a particular treatment.
It gets lost.
Representatives of MDN
stated that on July 28, 2001, Fanmi
Lavalas members in Lascahobas took to the streets and assaulted all those
who did not support their movement.
They reported that Deputy Vinter Badeau, accompanied by Judge Lionel
Demesar and Fanmi Lavalas militants, was secretly looking for Luc
Mondesir and Luckner Jean to kill them, so they had to leave the country. The representatives of MDN also said that in
Hinche three members of their party had been thrown from a helicopter in
flight. This information was not
confirmed. A pregnant woman was beaten
resulting in a miscarriage in Savanette.
They identified the heads of armed gangs such as Amos Louis in
Thomassique, Jonas Vincent in Belladère and Fanfan Ti Bois in Mirebalais.
Mr. Renan Hedouville,
member of the Comité des Avocats pour le Respect et la Liberté Individuelle
(CARLI) pointed out to the Commission that an information “blackout” had been
placed concerning the events on that date.
Nevertheless, he indicated that CARLI carried out an investigation and
they confirmed that the Police had carried out a massacre against the
population in Belladère. Those who
condemned the massacre, according to Mr. Hédouville, have been murdered.
The Commission
requested a copy of the Report of the Investigation into the events of July
2001 carried out by the Inspector General of Police. The report was not provided.
The Commission has
concluded that all police efforts may have been concentrated in trying to
liberate the Academy, hence the fact that no attention seems to have been paid
to the police station at Pétion-Ville.
But the evidence also points to the inability or unwillingness of the
Police to coordinate a concentrated attack on the assailants at the Academy.
Having been joined by
their comrades who had successfully attacked the police station, the assailants
remained in the Academy for approximately five hours, when they were able to
leave without any difficulty. Every
available police officer seems to have been mobilized, yet the assailants left
without any officer who went to the Academy having engaged them. Most of the police officers who were
recruits in training at the Academy fled.
The Commission is of
the view that this state of affairs does not instill any confidence in persons
who have to depend on the Police for their protection, and more has been said
about this when we dealt with the events of December 17 at the National Palace. Suffice it to say that the Commission finds
it incomprehensible that a compound, which houses inter alia the special
Swat Team as well as the Search and Intervention Brigade could so easily have
been overpowered. The evidence
revealed that the following branches of the force were also housed at the
Academy, viz: the Unit for Research and Intervention; the Bureau of Criminal
Affairs; the Bureau of Judicial Investigations; the Bureau of Anti Drug
Trafficking; and the Officers and men of the Training School for recruits. Of even greater concern, however, is the
fact that, following these assaults, at least three other police stations in
other parts of the country would be similarly attacked and occupied; yet, the
first attempt at support for these outlying stations came at 6:00 p.m. at
Belladère.
Due to time
constraints, the Commission was unable to visit the towns of Belladère, Hinche
and Mirebalais; and it has depended mainly on the report of the Human Rights
Coalition for its account of the incidents which occurred in those places.
Commissioner Patrick
Guillaume, who was the Commissioner in charge of the Pétion-Ville police
station on July 28, 2001, told the Commission that on hearing heavy shelling
coming from the area of the Police Academy at about 3:00 a.m., he telephoned
the Academy. Someone told him that the
Academy had been taken over, that President Aristide was no longer President
and that if he saw persons in the street wearing army uniforms he should
cooperate with them. He then spoke to
the Chief of Police who ordered him to go to the Academy to verify what was
taking place there. On arrival near the
Academy he confirmed to the Chief that there was shooting at the Academy. The
Chief met him near the School for Magistrates, which is close to the Academy,
and they cordoned off the buildings.
On his way to the
Pétion-Ville police station, he saw a large white pickup truck with about six
or seven persons on board wearing camouflage uniforms, heavily armed and with
bullet belts around their waists. He
called the Chief and warned him to be careful.
He was told to try to stop them from reaching the Academy but he was
unable to do so. When he arrived at the
Pétion-Ville police station he found the building deserted. He saw bullet holes on the windows and
blinds of the Communication Bureau of the Station. The attackers had taken all the arms and ammunition stored at the
police station. There were 16 police
officers in the station that morning but none of them was wounded.
Mr. Jean Nesly Lucien,
the Director General of Police, stated that between 3:00 and 4:00 a.m. he was
told that the Academy was under attack.
He proceeded to the Academy but could not enter, and was shot at by the
attackers. He was waiting for backup at
a nearby church when another group arrived from Pétion-Ville to reinforce those
who were occupying the Academy. They
were about 15 in number and were dressed in camouflage uniforms.
Commissioner Hermionne
Leonard, the Director of Police in charge of the Western Department, told the
Commission that, early in the morning of July 28, some police officers came to
her home to report that the Academy was under attack. She drove to the Academy and got there about 3:00 a.m. The Director of the Academy asked her to
call for backup, which she did. As she
approached the Academy, she saw two heavily armed men with bullet belts
strapped around their bodies. She told
the Director that the men had stopped her and she could not join him. However, she found other means of getting
into the Academy and other members of her Unit joined her there. She was able to make her way into the
Academy although she was shot at in the process. Some of the officers were wounded. She described the situation in the Academy as having been a state
of complete chaos.
Commissioner Jean Yonel
Trécile was at the time Director of the Training Center at the Police
Academy. Between 5:00 and 5:30 a.m., he
received a message and tried the normal telephone to call the Academy but he
got no answer. He then called
Commissioner Jan Eddy Cantave on his cell phone, who confirmed that there was
shooting at the Academy and that it had been invaded by the army. He asked about the trainees and was told
that many were killed and several had fled.
Someone seems to have taken the cell phone from Commissioner Cantave and
spoke to him in Creole, inviting him to come to the Academy if he wished to
know what the situation was. He
proceeded to the Academy where he met Commissioner Leonard and the Director General
of Police.
There was a general
warning from the Police Central Communications Center about 6:30 to 7:00 a.m.
telling other police stations to be on the alert as the Academy was under
attack. There were, however, attacks on
other stations in the Central Plateau and on one close to the Dominican
Republic.
Armed assailants who arrived aboard a vehicle
attacked the Mirebalais police station about 8:00 a.m. One of the two police officers who were
present at the station escaped by jumping into a ravine, while the other
officer was shot and killed. The
attackers destroyed all means of communication and took all the guns and
ammunition which they could find.
A group of armed men appeared in the town of Belladère
around 9:00 a.m. They fired shots in
the air in all directions before completely taking over the town. During this incident one woman was shot in
the back. The attackers remained in
control of the town until late that evening.
Around 11:00 a.m., one of the attackers read a
message over the local radio station “Rotation
F.M.”. He invited former members of
the military to join them. The
operation, he said, was being carried out by former members of the military who
wanted to be restored to their former positions. Around 2:00 p.m., a helicopter circled above the town and left
without landing. At 6:00 p.m., two
other helicopters landed in a football field at the entrance to the town. Members of the SWAT Team disembarked from
the helicopters and made their way into the town. On arrival of the SWAT Team the attackers withdrew. There was no armed engagement between the
two sides.
The report prepared by the Human Rights
Coalition on the armed intervention that day was obtained solely from police
sources. According to the Police, a
group of attackers, which descended on Hinche around 12:30 p.m., was not able
to enter the town because four police officers had been stationed at the
entrance to the town. There was an
exchange of fire and three officers abandoned their weapons and
surrendered. The fourth officer, who
refused to surrender, was shot and killed.
There is no evidence as to the time when the
attackers left the town.
As
a consequence of the attacks on July 28, 2001, several persons were dead and
injured and many arrests were made, but there was minimal damage to property
reported.
Three persons were reported killed in
Port-au-Prince. They were all police
officers. Commissioner Cantave, the
Administrator of the Police Academy and two police recruits, Michel Milfleur
and Lourdes James Bazemar. Most of the
18 persons who were reported to have suffered injuries as a result of the
events of July 28, 2001, were police recruits at the Academy.
A number of police officers were arrested in
Port-au-Prince. They spent several days
in prison. Many of them had been
released although Divisional Commissioner Mario Andresol, whose immediate
release had been ordered by the Court on Friday, August 10, had not been
released by the following Monday afternoon.
One police officer at the Mirebalais police
station, Bruno Donaïs Celusca, was reported killed. There were no reports of injuries or arrests. It appears that the attack on the Mirebalais
police station was solely for the purpose of seizing weapons and ammunition.
There were no reports of deaths in
Belladère. One woman was injured and
several arrests were made. It has been
reported that repression began when the SWAT Team took control of
Belladère. They stopped and assaulted
persons who passed in front of the police station, and searched the homes of
certain members of the former armed forces and persons who were closely
affiliated to the Convergence Démocratique. It is alleged that the searches were carried out under the
direction of the locally elected leaders of the Fanmi Lavalas party, who
were in possession of a list containing the names of those who were to be
arrested.
The persons who were arrested in Belladère were
professionals, former electoral candidates, supporters of the Convergence
Démocratique, and former
military officers and members of their families.
Three persons were killed in Hinche on that
day: Zacharie Simon, a police officer;
Wilner Jean-Louis, a former member of the military forces and supporter of the Convergence
Démocratique; and one unidentified individual, whose body was found in the
Inquite River and who was buried on its shores. As in Belladère, the people who were arrested were professionals,
former electoral candidates, supporters of Convergence Démocratique, and former military officers and
certain members of their families.
Several legal irregularities are reported to
have occurred in Hinche. Many illegal
arrests were made although some of those persons were later released. The death of Wilner Jean-Louis was said by
the Police to have occurred as a result of a shootout with the Police. His home was searched but no incriminating
evidence was found. The Justice of the
Peace who was called to examine the body was not given sufficient time to
observe the scene and write his report on the ground that the Police were in a
hurry and had no time to lose.
The Police, accompanied by some judicial
authorities and two members of the ruling Fanmi Lavalas party, Amos
Mettelus and James Joseph, had in their possession a list of houses to be
searched. That list contained the names
of many professionals, former members of the armed forces, and supporters of
the Convergence Démocratique. As
a consequence several people were arrested, ill-treated and detained in the
local jail. In particular the Police
arrested Hebert Sériphin, the Coordinator of Espace de Concertation of Hinche, and Jean Yves Damus without
warrants and contrary to Article 24.2 of the Constitution.
The Centre
de Formation in which the legal aid office of the Mouvement Paysan Papaye (an Opposition party) was located was
completely destroyed by fire by a group of unidentified men.
Based on the response
of the Police to the attackers of July 28, 2001, several questions arise, the
most important of which is the failure of the Police to repel, or respond
meaningfully to, either of the attacks.
The Commission concedes that the towns of Mirebalais, Belladère, and
Hinche are very long distances away from Port-au-Prince and that these
undermanned police stations may be hard to reach with sufficient men and
ammunition in time to mount a counterattack.
But the Pétion-Ville police station is on the outskirts of
Port-au-Prince and on the night in question had 16 officers on duty; yet, there
was no response to the attack on the police station.
Even more incredible is
the case of the Police Academy. It is
within easy reach of Port-au-Prince. In
fact, several senior police officers had arrived on the scene by 5:00 a.m. and
the evidence is that both the Academy and the School for Magistrates, which is
situated next to the Academy, had been surrounded. Yet, the attackers were able to walk away from the Academy around
7:00 a.m. without being engaged.
The Commission was told
that the police force is neither trained nor equipped to deal with this type of
situation. But the short answer is that
it ought to be, given the fact that Haiti has no army. At the very least the Police should be able
to defend their own establishments, otherwise the security of the entire State
could be in jeopardy.
The Commission could
not find definite links between the events of July 28 and December 17,
2001. It has however observed some very
striking similarities between them.
While the stated object in both instances was to remove President
Aristide from power, the means by which this was attempted could not have
brought about the desired end. For
example, although the attack on the Police Academy on July 28 took place only a
few kilometers from the President’s country residence, there was no evidence
that the attackers ever attempted to reach it.
They seemed to be content to continue to occupy the Academy until they
got an opportunity to leave.
The occupation of the
police stations in Pétion-Ville, Mirebalais and Hinche was short. The purpose of attacking them, it would
seem, was to relieve them of all the arms and ammunitions which the attackers
could find. Even at Belladère where the
assailants were in control of that town for the entire day, they left as soon
as it was realized that the SWAT Team was absent to mount an attack to dislodge
them.
On December 17, the
attackers were in complete control of the National Palace. The evidence is, however, that it is widely
known that the President always leaves Port-au-Prince on Friday evenings for
his country residence and returns on Monday mornings, unless there are special
reasons for remaining in Port-au-Prince over the weekend. The attackers could not therefore have
expected to find him at the Palace.
Further, the evidence is that if the President had been at the National
Palace on December 17, the attackers would not have been able to penetrate the
Palace grounds with such ease, or at all, since it is generally perceived that
the President is very well guarded.
In a typical attempt to
stage a coup d’etat, the invading forces aim in the first instance at certain
strategic targets – the Head of State, the Head of Government, the High Command
of the Armed Forces and of the Police, radio and television stations, and the
air and sea ports. There was no attempt
to aim at any of those persons or places on either date. This has led those who do not support
President Aristide to say that there was no real attempted coup d’etat. The Commission remains strong in its
conclusion that the events which have been described in earlier parts of this
Report did in fact take place and that they caused an unsettling of the
population which led to violence, injury, destruction and death. One other consequence of those events is
that it has caused a greater degree of polarization in the political life of
the country which will not be easy to overcome as accusations and
counteraccusations are bandied about.
They have certainly made the attempts to bring about a settlement over
the disputed elections of May 2000 more difficult to achieve.
The other striking
similarity is that in both instances some of the alleged attackers seem to have
come from the Dominican Republic. No
one could state for certain where they came from, but the fact is that after
their incursions their escape route took them in the direction of that
country. One could reasonably infer,
therefore, that they may have indeed come from that country.
It would seem that the
intention of the attackers may have been to probe the defenses of the State and
to demonstrate how easy it is to occupy certain strategic places in the
country. However, the number of men,
arms and equipment which it is claimed that they had in their possession,
including what was stolen from the Palace and various police establishments,
would clearly have been insufficient to establish a firm foothold in the entire
country unless they expected to receive support from inside Haiti.
There is a fear that
these actions could be repeated with more dangerous consequences at some future
date. This fear should spur the
political combatants in Haiti to assist the OAS more meaningfully in its
unenviable and seemingly unending task of attempting to contribute to a
solution to the rapidly deteriorating situation in the country.
The assassination of
Journalist Jean Dominique on April 9, 2000, was an indication of the
seriousness of the threats that journalists had been receiving, according to
the testimony of Mr. Léontes Dorzilme.
He said that the independent media are accused of trying to destabilize
the “Power” (meaning the ruling party).
On the day of Jean Dominique’s funeral, Lavalas demonstrators went to Radio
Vision 2000 and threatened to burn it down, as well as other places such as
the headquarters of the Opposition. He
added that when journalists reported that the May 21, 2000, elections had been
challenged, the “Power” began to “have it against them.”
On August 9, 2001, two
journalists of Radio Rotation FM in
Belladère were arrested without a warrant and the radio station was searched
without the presence of the competent judicial authority, contrary to the
Constitution.
In
Saint-Marc on November 29, 2001, journalists from Radio Métropole, Radio Vision 2000 and Radio Caraïbes, amongst
others, were reporting on the event which the Opposition had organized to
criticize the Government’s performance. Those journalists were persecuted.
According to the
document “Haiti – Human Rights”, Journalist Brignol Lindor, Information
Director of Radio Echo 2000, was
murdered on December 3, 2001, by machete cuts in Petit-Goâve by a group of
members of the Popular Organization “Domi
nan bwa” (sleeping in the woods) identified with the Fanmi Lavalas
party. The report points out that three
days earlier, on November 28, 2001, the Deputy Mayor of Petit-Goâve, Mr. Dumas
Bony, member of the Lavalas Party had
made a public call to the local population to constitute themselves into “vigilance
brigades” and apply “zero tolerance” to around six “terrorists” whose names he
announced and among which was Brignol Lindor’s. The term “terrorist” applies under the circumstance to alleged
members of Convergence Démocratique.
Mr. Brignol Lindor’s family has denied that he would be implicated in
any way with Convergence Démocratique.
During the ransacking
and burning of the headquarters of Convergence Démocratique, OPL and
KONAKOM on December 17, the assailants openly assaulted many journalists,
telling them that they did not need their presence, and that if any journalists
from Radio Caraïbes and Radio Vision 2000 attended, they would
set fire to them. The assailants went
to Radio Vision 2000, threatened to
burn it down and compelled the journalists to shout, “Long live Aristide!” The trauma for some journalists was such
that they left Haiti. The same occurred
with Radio Caraïbes and Radio Signal FM.
Fanmi Lavalas militants assaulted
many journalists on that day. They
pounded on vehicles belonging to Radio
Métropole, Signal FM and other
radio stations. Some members of Lavalas were exclaiming that day: “Oh!
You are from Radio Métropole? You are
from Radio Caraïbes? You are in the Opposition.
We will show you!”
In addition to the
verbal aggression against the journalists and the pounding on the vehicles,
there were also cases of physical aggression.
That day, Fanmi Lavalas militants, with handguns pointing at
least three journalists, made them publicly cry out: “Long Live Aristide, Long
Live Lavalas!”
At 11:00 a.m. no
independent radio station was transmitting the event, said Denis Racicot to the
Commission. In the past, the
“puschists” controlled the media during a similar attempt. This time Fanmi Lavalas controlled
it.
Many journalists left
for Miami, Boston, New York and France.
It was also pointed out that political polarization in Haiti had created
adverse conditions for journalists. An objective
report is seen either as favoring the Government or the Opposition. There is no neutrality. There is a denial of justice for journalists
who are perceived as favoring the Opposition.
If these journalists are assaulted by Fanmi Lavalas militants,
the authorities never deny that there was an authorization to that effect, and
neither do they take any action against those militants.
Mr. Joseph Guyler Delva
presented to the Commission details of the threats that he has received. He was specific about the death threats by
leaders of Popular Organizations identified with Fanmi Lavalas, such as
the case of the public threat by Mr. Rene Civil, accusing him of working for
“white colonizers.” On January 11,
2002, he had to escape from Le Plaza Hotel in Port-au-Prince where he was holding
a conference on “Freedom of the Press in Haiti” together with Robert Menard
from “Journalistes sans Frontières.”
Both he and Mr. Ménard had to flee because Mr. René Civil and Paul
Raymond, accompanied by members of their groups, were demonstrating in front of
the hotel and later entered to assault them.
The leaders of the Popular Organizations mentioned above argued that
those types of conferences discredited the Government. Mr. Delva said that Paul Raymond has accused
him of being an agent of Mr. Menard, that he and Mr. Menard have distributed
arms throughout the country to destabilize the Government. He has been accused of all of these things
in order to justify what they want to do to him. Mr. Delva also referred to the public threats made by Figaro
Désir, Head of “Bale Wouze” (wet before swiping), a Popular Organization in
Saint-Marc, saying that if he puts one foot in that city they will burn him
alive. Despite the fact that this
threat was made publicly, the Saint-Marc authorities have not taken any action
against Mr. Désir. Mr. Delva added that
threats written on small notes have been left in his vehicle, indicating that
he will pay for what he has done. He
said that his friends are afraid to ride with him in his car and that he goes
to his house secretly so that his neighbors do not find themselves in the
position of reporting his presence.
Concerning the legal case he brought against Rene Civil, he said that
the file has been lost.
Mr. Léontes Dorzilme,
Director of Information at Radio Vision
2000, said that because of the intimidation that he was subjected to, he
had to order his reporters to stop broadcasting the events of December 17. He
confirmed that Lavalas militants were
forcing the journalists in the street to shout out: “Long live Aristide, long
live Lavalas!”
Mr. Michael Norton
expressed to the Commission that it is too dangerous for journalists to search
for the truth because it is the Government’s policy that people should be
confused in order to govern. He said
there is no Power, only “force”; there is no national institutionalism but
everything is connected to a “force.”
These declarations were repeated by many, such as Mr. Volcy Assad from Radio Solidarité and Mr. Renan
Hédouville from CARLI. Mr. Hédouville
also said that if a journalist is not a member of the Lavalas Party, he comes up against a wall when he tries to obtain
information from a Government source.
He also referred to the impunity with which leaders of Popular
Organizations assaulted journalists. In
this context, he mentioned the indifference of the police during acts of
aggression against journalists. He
referred to the polarization of the country in the sense that if a person is
not “Lavalassien,” he is considered an enemy of the “Power.”
Senator Prince Sonson
Pierre explained to the Commission that the reference that has been made to his
presence at Radio Caraïbes on
December 17 was due to his interest in preventing damage to their
installations.
In connection with
threats or acts of intimidation to owners of the media, the Commission did not
receive any testimony whatsoever which would indicate that threats or acts of
intimidation took place against them. Many
owners of the media were invited to share their points of view on this issue
but none of them appeared before the Commission. Mr. Joseph Gyler Delva explained that owners of the media are not
generally known in that capacity by the general public, in contrast to radio
stations and to journalists who provide the news and who are well known.
As a result of the
deliberations based on its investigation, the Commission has arrived at the
following conclusions:
A. The armed attack on
the National Palace in Port-au-Prince during the early hours of Monday,
December 17, 2001
1.
There was an armed attack on the National Palace during the early hours
of the morning of December 17, 2001.
2.
The attack was carried out by persons experienced in the use of heavy
military weapons.
3.
The political Opposition did not participate in the planning or in the
execution of the attack on the National Palace.
4.
The resistance of the Haitian National Police was pitiful and its
counterattack, insignificant.
Nevertheless, the SWAT Team did play an important role in the pursuit of
the attackers.
5.
The attack on the National Palace could not have taken place without the
complicity of some police officers from different units.
6.
The objective of the attack on the National Palace does not correspond
with the objective of producing a coup d’etat.
7.
The call for “peaceful mobilization” of the
population was one of the contributing factors to the turmoil which followed
the events of December 17.
B. The ransacking and
burning of the Headquarters of the Political Parties of the Opposition, the
private residences of the leaders of the Convergence
Démocratique and of cultural and academic centers, national or foreign, in
Port-au-Prince and in other cities and localities
1.
The attackers on the headquarters of the Opposition political parties
and the residences of the leaders of Convergence
Démocratique acted with impunity.
They continue to enjoy immunity from the judicial and investigative
institutions of Haiti.
2.
The ransacking and burning of houses was premeditated. Arms were distributed by some Government and
party officials. The attackers were
transported in official vehicles and threatened to kill leaders of the
political Opposition parties, all with the participation of members of Popular
Organizations.
3.
The National Haitian Police remained passive and complacent to the acts
of violence, in flagrant violation of the Constitution and national laws of
Haiti during those attacks.
4.
In many instances, police officers and locally elected officials were
accomplices to those attacks.
5.
Popular Organizations have demonstrated their strength and influence
vis-à-vis an unprofessional and incapable police force.
6.
The policy of “zero tolerance” has been interpreted in a distorted
manner that has generated violence and injustice.
7.
The administration of justice is heavily influenced by the authorities
and the Popular Organizations that work with them.
8.
There is a clear denial of justice for those who do not support the
ruling party.
C.
Possible links
between the incidents mentioned in A and B above and the acts of violence of
July 28, 2001, in Port-au-Prince and in other places in Haiti
1. None of the attacks was directly and physically aimed at the President of
the Republic.
2. None of the attacks was conducive to a confrontation with the security unit
directly assigned to the President of the Republic.
3. Both attacks were perpetrated by uniformed persons employing military
techniques.
4. In both cases the passivity of the authorities was evident and in many
instances there seems to have been complicity.
5. The attacks made evident the weaknesses of Haiti’s National Police, which
is the only legitimately armed authority in the country.
6. In both cases, damage was inflicted on the Opposition political parties,
both to their headquarters and to the residences of the leaders of Convergence Démocratique.
7. In both cases, the impunity of the attackers has become evident.
D. The attacks, intimidation and threats against Members
of the Press and owners of the media on December 17, 2001, and the following
days
1. Members of the press were attacked, threatened and intimidated on
December 17 and the following days.
2. The attacks, threats and acts of intimidation occurred with the tolerance
of the Government.
3. The persons responsible for those acts continue to enjoy immunity from prosecution
by the investigative and judicial institutions of Haiti.
4. As a result of the attacks, threats and acts of intimidation, many
journalists have left the country.
5. Because of these attacks, Freedom of Expression, the fundamental basis of
democracy, has been seriously undermined.
1. The Commission
concludes from the considerable evidence received that there is in Haiti a lack
of responsive government, a politicized judicial system and a lack of respect
for human and civil rights and the Rule of Law.
2.
The Commission
was particularly struck by the weakness in the system of Governance in
Haiti. There appear to be little
conformity with the Rule of Law, no respect for an independent Judiciary, and
little regard for a competent law-enforcement system. These are natural expectations in the rest of the region.
3.
There has been a heightened level of tension following the attacks of
July 28 and December 17. Those events
have created a climate of distrust among Haitians, and particularly between
supporters of Fanmi Lavalas, on the
one hand, and supporters of the Opposition political parties, on the
other. This climate has not been helped
by the decision taken by the Convergence
to “elect” or choose its own “President of the Republic.” This distrust has also led to attacks and
reprisals resulting in injuries, destruction, death and heightened
suspicion.
4. The impartiality of
the judiciary is not always maintained.
This could result in deterioration in respect of the holders of this
high office, especially if Judges are not seen as being able to punish unlawful
acts committed by members of the Popular Organizations. This has been recognized even in the highest
quarters. “CARLI INFO” (the Journal of the Committee of Lawyers for the Respect
of Individual Liberty, in its issue Number 17 of January 2002, on page 4)
quotes the President of the Republic, Mr. Jean Bertrand Aristide, in the course
of a speech delivered during the opening session of the 47th
Legislature for the Year 2002, criticizing the state of the Haitian Judiciary
and denouncing the impunity which has pervaded the country. He said “Our
judicial system is sick, very sick, surrounded by impunity and corruption. Often, it has been said, that the system
does not render justice where justice is due …”
5. The Judiciary is an
independent arm of the State, which however requires the assistance of the
Executive to enforce its decisions.
Failure to enforce judicial decisions in a timely manner, or at all,
could threaten a fragile democracy and is certainly not conducive to its
enhancement.
6.
Equally as important as the enforcement of judicial decisions is the
determination to prosecute all offenders who violate the provisions of the
law. In particular, there seems to be a
distinct lack of will in investigating and/or prosecuting members of Popular
Organizations.
7. Press freedom and the
independence of the media are areas which need to be addressed urgently.
8. The media acknowledge
that press freedom exists only in so far as they are able to operate, but that
their independence is threatened by both Government aggression and their heavy
dependence on advertising revenue from the private sector whose members are
mainly supporters of “Convergence”.
9. A number of issues
relating to security in the country were raised before the Commission. These include the uncontrolled operation of
the Popular Organizations, the failure of the Government to respect and enforce
the findings and judgments of the courts, and arbitrary and politically-motivated
arrests and detention. The Commission
fears that if these matters are not addressed seriously they could complicate
the search for a solution to the ongoing political crisis.
10. The strident
criticisms of the Police Force which were received from all sections of Haitian
Society, including some of the high-ranking officers of the Police led the
Commission to the inevitable conclusion that not only is the force undermanned
and under-equipped but also that it lacks the motivation and determination to
discharge its duties in a situation of crisis.
To these must be added a lack of direction and control, and excessive
political interference in the management of the force.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The conditions under
which the Commission was established have been described above. Because of the political, economic and
social context of Haiti, and of the international support efforts underway, the
Commission recommends that the ruling Party and the Opposition political
parties put aside attitudes of mutual disrespect, and engage in confidence-building
measures with support of third parties to oversee the implementation of
agreements that may be reached for the benefit of their country.
Because democracy should provide solutions to
human development conditions, Haiti should benefit from important international
resources to continue its democratic process and advance in its economic and
social development. The Commission is
convinced that if the political forces in Haiti unite behind State objectives
and adopt measures for the prevalence of the Rule of Law, the international
community would assist in a timely manner to provide assistance that would lead
to the well-being and prosperity of the People of Haiti.
In pursuit of those high objectives and in
order to overcome the impasse brought on by the attack on the National Palace
and the attack on the headquarters and leaders of Opposition political parties,
the Commission recommends that:
1. The
Government of Haiti take immediate steps to strengthen its democratic
institutions, particularly in regard to the independence of the Judiciary, the
professionalism of the Police, and the maintenance of the Rule of Law
generally. Special provisions should be
made to enhance the capability of the legal, judicial and penal institutions,
in order to ensure that those pillars of justice are not further undermined.
2. Suitable
persons be recruited and trained for the positions in the Judiciary and be
provided with the necessary support for the execution of their decisions. This would lead to an efficient, effective
and impartial judiciary. The OAS should
assist the Government in appealing to the International Community to refocus
its efforts and make special provisions of technical assistance available for
training the Police and the Judiciary, and in strengthening the judicial system
generally.
3. The OAS and CARICOM explore with Haiti
possible areas of technical assistance in the short and long term in an effort
to strengthen Haiti’s democratic institutions, particularly in regard to the
independence of the Judiciary; the professionalism of the Police; and the Rule
of Law generally.
4. In order to provide
greater security for its citizens, the Government of Haiti endeavor to provide
and maintain an independent and impartial justice system free from political
control which could be overseen by civilian authorities, as obtains in other
member countries of CARICOM in the form of Judicial and Legal Service
Commissions.
5. The
Government of Haiti take a serious look at the composition and strength of the
Police force in order to ensure that its manpower level is consistent with the
security needs of the country. The
criteria for recruitment need to be reviewed to enhance the professionalism of
the force. All measures should be taken
to ensure that the Police perform their functions in an impartial, neutral and
just manner.
6. Matters relating to
recruitment, promotions, transfers and discipline of the Police be vested in a
civilian authority, as obtains in other countries of CARICOM; and there should
be no interference in this procedure by the Executive branch of Government.
Prosecution
7. All
persons found to be implicated in the violence of December 17, 2001, and
subsequent days be prosecuted without delay.
8. The Government order the
immediate release of all citizens who have benefited by a decision of the
courts, or whose cases have not been investigated within the time limit set
by the law.
Reparations
9. Prompt and adequate
payment of reparations be made to all organizations and individuals who
suffered damage and/or injury as a direct result of the violence of December
17, 2001. Several persons have filed
civil and criminal complaints and no action has been taken. In many instances the files are “lost.” Cases arising out of the events of December
17, 2001, should be brought to a speedy conclusion.
10. The OAS and CARICOM
continue to play an active role in encouraging the Government of Haiti to
ensure that human rights are respected in that country in the same manner as
they are respected in the other countries of CARICOM. To this end the capacity of local institutions should be
strengthened in order to protect, promote and defend human rights in Haiti; and
also to ensure that law enforcement authorities abide by international human
rights standards.
11. The
OAS Special Mission for Strengthening Democracy in Haiti in addition to its
normal programs develop, in partnership with the Government, programs for
schools and young persons.
12. The
capacity of local institutions such as law enforcement, penal, the office of
the Ombudsman, Civil Society, and Human Rights NGOs be strengthened in order to
protect, promote and defend human rights in Haiti. The Ombudsman should be appointed by an independent body.
13. The Government of Haiti
cultivate in its public officials respect for the principles of the Rule of Law
and for human rights and fundamental freedoms and ensure that they are
followed.
14. The Government of Haiti
should take active steps to ensure that members of the Press are able to
operate in an atmosphere of complete freedom.
The OAS and CARICOM could play a role.
All assaults and/or threats to members of the press should be openly
condemned, swiftly investigated and effectively punished.
15. The
Government of Haiti make a concerted effort to establish a climate conducive to
the restoration of a relationship of confidence in the country. It is hoped that the increased
predictability and confidence flowing from this relationship will redound to the
benefit of the Haitian people.
16. CARICOM
and the OAS continue their efforts to assist the Government in creating a state
of normalcy in Haiti.
17. The
International Community keep on supporting the efforts of the OAS by means of
financial contributions in order that it may continue its work in Haiti.
18. The authorities in
Haiti, both Government and Opposition, should make genuine efforts to attain an
effective democracy that seeks to be inclusive and which recognizes not only
the right of the majority to govern but also the right of the minority to
dissent.
19. All acts of intimidation
or violence committed in the name of political parties should be openly and
firmly condemned.
20. The base of support
called “Les Organisations Populaires” be closely watched and systematically
disarmed. They do not see themselves as
being under the absolute control of any political leadership, and for the most
part function independently of it.
Popular Organizations and other groups which are organized as some kind
of vigilante group are incompatible with the Rule of Law. They can become a threat to the Government
itself.
21. The donor community
recommenced its grant and loan programmes, pari
passu, with the implementation of the political agreements reached in
Haiti.
22. The
donor community assigned additional funds to finance the economic, social and
institutional strengthening programs for Haiti.
APPENDICES
TO THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY
INTO
THE EVENTS OF DECEMBER 17, 2001
APPENDICE I
LISTE
DES PERSONNES ET DES ORGANISATIONS QUI ONT APPORTE DES TEMOIGNAGES ORAUX
SOCIETE CIVILE
M. Patrick Numas, Secrétaire Général
OGITH
M. Charles Henri Baker, Association des
Industries d’Haïti (ADIH
M. Edouard Paultre, Fédération Protestante
d’Haïti
M. Gervais Charles, Barreau de
Port-au-Prince
M. Leopold Berlanger, CIP/FNH
M. Fritz de Catalogne, Président Association
des Assureurs d’Haïti (AAH)
M. Maurice Lafortune, Président de la
Chambre de Commerce
M. André Apaid, Fondation Nouvelle Haïti (FNH)
M. Rosny Desroches, Directeur Exécutif ISC
CONVERGENCE
M. Evans Paul, Dirigeant, KID/Espace de Concertation
M. Victor Benoit, Coordonnateur,
KONAKOM/Membre Espace de Concertation
M. Rosemond Pradel, Secrétaire Général
KONAKOM
M. Paul Denis, Comité Exécutif OPL
M. Luc Mésadieu, Président MOCHRENA
M. Hubert Deronceray, Président MDN
Me Osner Févry, Président PDCH
Me. Reynold Georges, Leader
ALAH/MPSN/Convergence
M. Gérard Pierre-Charles, Leader OPL/Convergence
Me Yves Gustinvil, Avocat et Secrétaire
Général MOCHRENA
M. José Jacques Nicolas, Coordonnateur MOCHRENA
PNUD
Mme Diene Keita, Représentant résident a.i.
Me. Grâce D’Almeida, Conseiller Technique
principal PNUD /MJSP
M. Thierry Fagart, Haut Commissariat des
Nations Unies aux Droits de l’Homme
M. Denis Racicot, Conseiller Technique
PNUD/Office du Protecteur du Citoyen
CRESFED
Mme Suzy Castor, Directrice du CRESFED
FANMI LAVALAS
M. Jonas Petit, Porte parole et membre de la Commission de
Négociation de Fanmi Lavalas
M. Gérard Gilles, Sénateur de la
Grand’Anse et membre de la Commission de Négociation de Fanmi Lavalas
COMMISSAIRE DU
GOUVERNEMENT
Me. Josué Pierre-Louis, Commissaire du
Gouvernement près le Tribunal Première Instance de Port-au-Prince
JUGE D’INSTRUCTION
Me Bernard Saint-Vil, Juge
d’Instruction au Tribunal de Première Instance de Port-au-Prince
FAMILLE ROLLE
M. Frantz Rolle, victime du 17
décembre 2001
M. Jean-Marie Maxime
Rolle, victime du 17 décembre 2001
MOCHRENA – GONAIVES
Belfong Aristide Jean-Jacques Oswald Nerlande Beauséjour Darand Hélène Mésadieu Emmanuel Méus Cajuste Barette Jean Jacques Dieudonné Me. Sadrac Dieudonné Americ Darand |
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DIRECTION DEPARTEMENtALE
DE L’ARTIBONITE DE LA POLICE NATIONALE - Gonaives
Joany Canéus, Directeur départemental de l’Artibonite
FAMILLE GUY FRANCOIS
Mme Marie-Alice François, épouse de l’ex-colonel
Guy François incarcéré
Melle Valérie Alice François, fille de l’ex-colonel
Guy François incarcéré
PARTI NATIONAL POUR LA
DEFENSE DES TRAVAILLEURS
Pasteur Arnold Dumas, Président du Parti
National pour la Défense des Travailleurs
ASSOCIATION DES JOURNALISTES HAITIENS
M. Joseph Guyler C. Delva, Secrétaire Général de
l’Association des Journalistes Haïtiens (AJH)
M. Geffrard Bien-Aimé, Secrétaire
Administratif de l’AJH
PARENTS DE MARTINO MOLES
Mme Claudette Logan, épouse de Martino
Moles accusé de participation aux évènements du
28 juillet
M. Martino Dorcil
KONAKOM
M. Victor Benoit, Coordonnateur du
KONAKOM
M. Rosemond Pradel, Secrétaire Général du
KONAKOM
M. Micha Gaillard, Secrétaire Adjoint
Mme. Jessie Benoit
Me. Dilia Lemaire, Avocat du KONAKOM et de la Famille Benoit
Me. Hannibal Koffi, Avocat du KONAKOM et de la Famille Benoit
PARTI DEMOCRATE CHRETIEN
HAITIEN
Me. Osner Fevry, Parti
Démocrate Chrétien Haïtien
MOBILISATION POUR LE
DEVELOPPEMENT NATIONAL (MDN)
M. Hubert de Ronceray, Président du
MDN
M. Lucien Pierre, MDN du Borgne
M. Fritz Luckner Jean, MDN de
Lascahobas
M. Saidel Marseille, MDN de
Saint-Louis du Sud
M. Yves Lindor, Cousin du
journaliste assassiné Brignol Lindor
Me. Stanley Gaston, Avocat de Jean
Max Louis et Préval Enéus emprisonnés en relation avec le 17/12
Me. Patrick Wooley, Avocat de Jean
Max Louis et Préval Enéus emprisonnés en relation avec le 17/12
INSPECTION GENERALE DE
LA POLICE NATIONALE D’HAITI
M. Harvel Jean-Baptiste, Inspecteur
Général en Chef de la Police Nationale d’Haiti
CABINET DUPLAN
Me. Rigaud Duplan, Avocat de
l’ex-colonel Guy François
Me. Gervais Charles, Avocat de
l’ex-colonel Guy François
ASSOCIATION DES VICTIMES
Jean Millien
Hebert Celestin Moise
PLATEFORME DES
ORGANISATIONS POPULAIRES
M. Maxime Rony, Cooronnateur Plateforme des Organisations
haïtiennes des droits de l’homme
M. Elifaite Pierre, Secrétaire Général
M. Jean Simon Saint
Hubert
MOCHRENA
Dr. Luc Mésadieu, Président du MOCHRENA
Me. Yves Gustinvil
Dr. Jose Nicolas
Rev. Hébert Pélissier
OPL
M. Gérard Pierre-Charles, leader de l’OPL
M. Paul Denis, comité exécutif
M. Elusca Charles, OPL Cap-Haitien
M. Laguerre Borromée
Me. Gladys Legros, Avocat de l’OPL et de
la Famille Pierre-Charles
PALAIS NATIONAL
Commissaire Patrick Tisselin – USGPN
Commissaire Wilson Casséus - USGPN
Commissaire Bleck Henrice, Commandant CIMO
Commissaire Pierre Lucien Chavannes, Commandant
SWAT
Commissaire Phébé Marc Arthur, Agent 4 CAT
PENITENCIER NATIONAL
M. René Jean
David, Directeur Pénitencier National
M. Pierre
Richardson, Inculpé dans l’attaque du 17 décembre 2001
VICTIMES DU 17 DECEMBRE
2001 PRESENTES PAR L’ETAT
A.- Police Nationale
M. Jacques Antony Nazaire
M. Bel Chrisnor
M. Jack
Uhl Duc
M. Moricette Ednor
M. Jean Dieugrand représenté par son
épouse Mémé Jacqueline
M. Jean François Théogène décédé, représenté par
sa mère Mme Alice Douyon
B.- Population Civile
M. Olice Séguy
M. Claude Dieuvert
M. Brévil Jean Roma
M. Celestin Frendy Moise, fils de Marie Lourdes
Jacques tuée le 17 Dec. 2001
M.
Gérard Valmé
M.. Astel Jean Guy, CASEC
M.
Jean Fritz Magny
APENA – PETION-VILLE
M. Clifford Larose, Directeur Général Administration
Pénitentiaire Nationale (APENA
M. Guy François, ex-colonel FADH arrêté en relation avec le l7
décembre
PETIT GOAVE
A.- Victimes – Convergence
Démocratique
M. Meus Jean Milien
M. Déus Jean François
M. Jean
Garcia
M. Roger
Ballosqui
M. Jean
Limongé
Mme
Marie Rose Coicou
B.- Victimes – Fanmi Lavalas
M. Henry Claude Leconte
M.
Semereste Bolière
C.- PNH Locale
REPRESENTANTS DES MEDIAS
M. Léontes Dorzilmé, Radio Vision 2000
M. Michael Norton, Associated Press
M. Volay Assad, Radio Solidarité
ORGANISMES DE DEFENSE DES DROITS HUMAINS
Me. Renan Hédouville, CARLI (Comité des
Avocats pour le Respect des Libertés Individuelles)
M. Jean Claude Bajeux, Directeur du Centre
Œcuménique des droits de l’homme
Me. Jean Joseph Exumé, Conseiller juridique
Me. Gesner Jean-Philippe
Dr. Jean Casimir, ancien ambassadeur
d’Haiti auprès de l’OEA
MEMBRES DE LA POLICE NATIONALE D’HAITI
M. Patrick Guillaume, Commissaire municipal
M. Jean Yonel Trécil, ex-Commissaire
divisionnaire
Mme Hermione Léonard, Directrice
départementale de l’Ouest de la PNH
M. Jean Nesly Lucien, Directeur Général de
la Police
REPRESENTANTS DE L’ETAT
Me. Max Morpeau, Ministère de la Justice
Me. Price Cyprien, Ministère de la Justice
M. Henry Claude Ménard, Ancien Ministre de l’Intérieur
M. Stephen Moise, Maire des Gonaïves
CAP-HAITIEN
A.- Autorités locales
Dr. Jean Myrtho Julien,
Délégué départemental du Nord
Mr. Wilma Innocent,
maire du Cap-Haitien
M. Fritz Jean,
Directeur départemental de la PNH pour le Nord
M. Gael Ménélas,
Commissaire principal
B.- Victimes de la Convergence
Démocratique
Rev. Milton Chéry
M.
Elusca Charles
Nixon
Tanis
M.
Jacques Etienne
L’OPL siège central
dans le Nord
M. Etermon Timon
Burau de l’OPL et OPLN,
Grande Rivière du Nord
M. Clébert Dorvil
M.
Tripliene Fayette
M.
Rosemond Martial
C.- Victimes, Fanmi Lavalas
Junior Ismael, militant
Fanmi Lavalas
LES CAYES
A.- Autorités locales
M. Jude Perrin,
Directeur Départemental du Sud de la PNH
B.- Victimes de la Convergence
Démocratique
M. Joseph Robert Jeune
M.
Faubert Pierre-Louis
M. Paul
Sonac
M.
Jean-Gabriel Fortuné
M.
Cyrion Anthony
ORGANISATIONS POPULAIRES
M. René Civil, Jeunesse Pouvoir Populaire
M. Paul Raymond, Ti Komité Legliz
APPENDICE II
PERSONNES ET
ORGANISATIONS AYANT SOUMIS DES DOCUMENTS
# du document |
Nom du document -(Personne ayant déposé le document) |
Date de réception du document |
Doc. 1 |
Vidéo cassette
Saint-Marc 29 novembre 2001 |
8-4-01 |
Doc. 2 |
Haïti “Je n’ai
d’autre arme que mon métier de journaliste” l’enquête Jean Dominique et les
droits humains - Amnesty
International |
6-01 |
Doc. 3 |
Rapport autour
de la situation de la presse haïtienne - Fédération de
la Presse Haïtienne |
6-01 |
Doc. 4 |
Rapport
intitulé: “Les évènements du 17 décembre 2002” préparé par le Centre
Œcuménique des Droits de l’Homme - Initiative
Société Civile |
9-4-02 |
Doc. 5 |
Version
anglaise du document susmentionné - Initiative
Société Civile |
9-4-02 |
Doc. 6 |
Document de
présentation de l’Initiative de la Société Civile - Initiative
Société Civile |
9-4-02 |
Doc. 7 |
Dossier du
Parti Konvansyon Inite Demokratik (KID) concernant l’arrestation illégale de
ses militants - KID
/Convergence Démocratique |
9-4-02 |
Doc. 8 |
Dossier du KID
concernant l’incendie de son siège - KID /
Convergence Démocratique |
9-4-02 |
Doc. 9 |
Dossier du
MOCHRENA (Mouvement Chrétien pour une Nouvelle Haïti) - MOCHRENA /
Convergence Démocratique |
9-4-02 |
Doc. 10 |
Rapport spécial - Ministère des
Affaires Etrangères |
10-4-02 |
Doc. 11 |
Rapport Police
Nationale d’Haïti sur les évènements du 17-12-01 - Ministère des
Affaires Etrangères |
10-4-02 |
Doc. 11-1 |
Rapport spécial
UNOHCHR sur assassinat Brignol Lindor - UNDP |
10-4-02 |
Doc. 12 |
Rapport no. 2
de décembre 2001 sur les Droits de l’Homme et la situation politique en Haïti - UNDP |
10-4-02 |
Doc. 13 |
Rapport spécial
UNOHCHR sur la tentative de coup d’état du 17 décembre 2001 - UNDP |
10-4-02 |
Doc. 13-1 |
Consolidation of the
rule of Law in Haiti in the context of the post-MICAH transition phase –
Program Proposal - UNDP |
12-4-02 |
Doc. 13-2 |
Rule of Law and conflict :
an analysis and lessons learned of Rule of law technical assistance in Haiti - UNDP |
12-4-02 |
Doc. 14 |
Vidéo cassette - Suzy Castor |
10-4-02 |
Doc. 15 |
Vidéo cassette - Suzy Castor |
10-4-02 |
Doc. 16 |
Avis de
transport sur les lieux - Bernard
Saint-Vil, Juge d’Instruction |
12-4-02 |
Doc. 17 |
Dossier saccage
et incendie résidence Rolle - Frantz Rolle |
12-4-02 |
Doc. 17-1 |
Dossier
MOCHRENA / Gonaïves - Sadrac
Dieudonné |
15-4-02 |
Doc. 18 |
Dossier Guy
François - Marie Alice
François |
16-4-02 |
Doc. 19 |
Dossier Rév. Jean Arnold Dumas - Arnold Dumas |
16-4-02 |
Doc. 20 |
Dossier de
presse sur le 17-12-01 - Guyler C.
Delva + AHP |
16-4-02 |
Doc. 21 |
Cassette audio
Interview de blessés du 17-12-01 - Guyler C.
Delva + AHP |
16-4-02 |
Doc. 22 |
Dossier Moles
Vincent - Claudette
Logan |
16-4-02 |
Doc. 23 |
Dossier déposé
par devant la justice haïtienne pour le KONAKOM - Victor Benoit |
17-4-02 |
Doc. 23-1 |
Cassette audio
interview King Kino - Micha
Gaillard, KONAKOM |
17-4-02 |
Doc. 24 |
Dossier déposé
devant la justice haïtienne pour la famille Benoît - Jessie Ewald
Benoît |
17-4-02 |
Doc. 25 |
Dossier Osner
Févry - Osner Févry |
17-4-02 |
Doc. 26 |
Dossier
Association des Victimes du 17-12-01 - Merius Jean
Milien |
17-4-02 |
Doc. 27 |
Dossier Jean
Max Louis et Préval Enéus - Me. Stanley
Gaston, Cabinet Colimon |
17-4-02 |
Doc. 28 |
Dossier du MDN
pour les départements du Sud, de l’Ouest, du Centre et du Nord - Hubert de
Ronceray |
17-4-02 |
Doc. 29 |
Dossier Guy
François - Me. Rigaud
Duplan |
18-4-02 |
Doc. 30 |
Liste des
victimes du coup d’Etat du 17-12-01 - Secrétairie
d’Etat à la Sécurité Publique |
18-4-02 |
Doc. 31 |
Procès-verbaux
d’interrogatoire de la PNH autour des évènements du 17-12-01 - Ministère de
la Justice |
18-4-02 |
Doc. 32 |
Dossier
Plateforme des Droits de l’Homme - Plateforme
des Droits de l’Homme |
18-4-02 |
Doc. 33 |
Dossier PADEM - Carline
Etienne |
18-4-02 |
Doc. 34 |
Loi portant sur
la création de la Police Nationale d’Haïti - Organisation
du Peuple en Lutte (OPL) |
18-4-02 |
Doc. 35 |
Dossier
Convergence Démocratique Sud d’Haïti - Jean Gabriel
Fortuné |
18-4-02 |
Doc. 36 |
Dossier de justice
du CRESFED - Me. Gladys
Legros |
18-4-02 |
Doc. 37 |
Dossier de
justice des époux Gérard Pierre-Charles et Suzy Castor - Gérard
Pierre-Charles |
18-4-02 |
Doc. 38 |
Dossier de
justice de l’OPL - Paul Denis |
18-4-02 |
Doc. 39 |
Dossier Rév.
Milton Chéry - Elusca Charles (voir Doc. 77) |
18-4-02 |
Doc. 40 |
Dossier Nixon
Tanis - Elusca
Charles (voir Doc. 81) |
18-4-02 |
Doc. 41 |
Dossier Elusca
Charles - Elusca
Charles (voir Doc. 85) |
18-4-02 |
Doc. 42 |
Documents
photographiques (album montrant locaux de l’OPL, du KID et du CRESFED) - Suzy Castor |
18-4-02 |
Doc. 43 |
Documents
photographiques montrant les dégats au Palais National - Oriel Jean,
Chef de l’Unité de Sécurité Présidentielle |
19-4-02 |
Doc. 44 |
Casette vidéo
des événements du 17-12-01 – Images des dégats - Oriel Jean,
Chef de l’USP |
19-4-02 |
Doc. 45 |
Documents
photographiques montrant les blessures de M. Anthony Nazaire - Anthony
Nazaire |
19-4-02 |
Doc. 46 |
Documents
photographiques montrant les blessures de Bell Chrisnor - Bell Chrisnor |
19-4-02 |
Doc 47 |
Documents
photographiques montrant les blessures de Ednor Moricette - Ednor Moricette |
19-4-02 |
Doc. 48 |
Lettre de
Brévil Jean Roma amputé du bras droit. Brévil Jean
Roma/Association des Victimes du 17 décembre 2001 - (AVIDID) |
19-4-02 |
Doc.49 |
Lettre de
Astrel Jean Guy blessé à l’épaule droite Astrel Jean
Guy/Association des victimes du 17 décembre 2001 - (AVIDID) |
19-4-02 |
Doc. 50 |
Document
présenté par Me. Antoine O. Vilaire, avocat de Richardson Pierre - Antoine O.
Vilaire |
19-4-02 |
Doc. 51 |
Document
photographique montrant des impacts de balles sur le camion de André Jean - André Jean |
19-4-02 |
Doc. 51-1 |
Dépêches de la
journée du 18 décembre 2001 - Radio
Métropole |
19-4-02 |
Doc. 51-2 |
Cassette-audio REPORTAGES/RADIO
METROPOLE Journées du
16,17,18,19 décembre 2001 - Radio
Métropole |
20-4-02 |
Doc. 52 |
Dossier de
Ricardo Nelson blessé par balle à la jambe droite - Ireta
Dossou (reçu à Petit-Goâve) |
20-4-02 |
Doc. 53 |
Lettre de
plainte de Limerné Césaire - Limerné
Césaire (reçu à Petit-Goâve) |
20-4-02 |
Doc. 54 |
Rapport sur les
évènements du 17 décembre 2001 à Petit-Goâve - Convergence
Démocratique – Petit Goâve |
20-4-02 |
Doc. 54-1 |
Documents
photographiques montrant des maisons détruites le 17 décembre 2001 à
Petit-Goâve - Reçu à Petit
Goâve |
20-4-02 |
Doc. 55 |
Dossier de Jean
M. Jasmin - Jean M. Jasmin (reçu à Petit-Goâve) |
20-4-02 |
Doc. 56 |
Dossier de
Marie Rose Coicou - Marie Rose
Coicou (reçu à Petit-Goâve) |
20-4-02 |
Doc. 57 |
Dossier de
Denise Ossias |
20-4-02 |
Doc. 58 |
Procès-verbal
de constat requis par Jonathas Hector - Reçu à Petit
Goâve |
20-4-02 |
Doc. 59 |
Dossier de
Michel Ange Poulard - Michel Ange
Poulard (reçu à Petit-Goâve) |
20-4-02 |
Doc. 60 |
Dossier de
Homère Sainton - Homère
Sainton (reçu à Petit-Goâve) |
20-4-01 |
Doc. 61 |
Dossier de
Charles Dieucibon - Charles
Dieucibon (reçu à Petit-Goâve) |
20-4-02 |
Doc. 62 |
Procès-verbal
de constat requis par Desrosiers Marc Henry pour Mme Elizène Desrosiers - Desrosiers
Marc Henry (reçu à Petit-Goâve) |
20-4-02 |
Doc. 63 |
Procès-verbal
de constat pris par Desrosiers Marc Henry - Desrosiers
Marc Henry (reçu à Petit-Goâve) |
20-4-02 |
Doc. 64 |
Dossier de Sony
Noel - Sony
Noel (reçu à Petit-Goâve) |
20-4-02 |
Doc. 65 |
Dossier de
Génise Jean, Antoine Duréus, Louisimène Jean, Joseph Frantz, Mme Jean Marie
Jean Georges née Viviane Antoine, Emmanuel Antoine - Lavalas |
20-4-02 |
Doc. 66 |
Bilan des actes
de banditisme perpétrés dans la commune du 14 novembre 2001 au mois
d’avril 2002 - Bolière
Semereste (Lavalas) (reçu à Petit
Goâve) |
20-4-02 |
Doc. 67 |
Document
photographique montrant le corps de Brunel Cadet assassiné lors des
évènements du 17 au 18 décembre 2001 |
20-4-02 |
Doc. 68 |
Dossier de la
FENATAPA (Federasyon Nasyonal Travayè Agrikol Peyizan Ayisyen) - CTH
(Confédération des Travailleurs Haitiens) |
19-4-02 |
Doc. 69 |
Rapport sur la
situation des droits humains en Haiti suite aux évènements du 28 juillet 2001 - CARLI (Comité
des Avocats pour le Respect des Libertés Individuelles |
|
Doc. 70 |
Version en
anglais du document susmentionné - CARLI |
17-5-02 |
Doc. 71 |
Lettre de
plainte de Azhomme Jean - Rosemond
Martial (reçu au Cap-Haïtien) |
17-5-02 |
Doc. 72 |
Déclaration
notariée de Deluc Delnatus - Rosemond
Martial (reçu au Cap-Haïtien) |
17-5-02 |
Doc. 73 |
Déclaration
notariée de Reynold Joseph - Reynold Joseph (reçu au Cap-Haïtien) |
17-5-02 |
Doc. 74 |
Lettre de
plainte de Benjamin Joseph dit Julliot - Rosemond
Martial (reçu au Cap-Haïtien) |
17-5-02 |
Doc. 75 |
Lettre de
plainte de Rosemond Martial - Rosemond
Martial (reçu au Cap-Haïtien) |
17-5-02 |
Doc. 76 |
Dossier de
l’OGPN (Organisation des Paysans de la Grance Rivière du Nord) représentée
par Alfred Jean - Phaète
Trifène (reçu au Cap-Haïtien) |
17-5-02 |
Doc. 77 |
Dossier du
Révérend Milton Chéry - Milton
Chéry (Voir Doc 39) (reçu au Cap-Haïtien) |
17-5-02 |
Doc. 78 |
Dossier de Max
Toussaint - Max
Toussaint (reçu au Cap-Haïtien) |
17-5-02 |
Doc. 79 |
Dossier du
bureau de l’OPL à la Grande-Rivière du Nord - Clébert
Dorvil (reçu au Cap-Haïtien) |
17-5-02 |
Doc. 80 |
Rapport de
Steve Louis - Steve
Louis (reçu au Cap-Haïtien) |
17-5-02 |
Doc. 81 |
Dossier de
Nixone et Fritz A. Tanis - Nixone
Tanis (Voir Doc 40) (reçu au Cap-Haïtien) |
17-5-02 |
Doc. 82 |
Cassette vidéo
de Nixone Tanis - Nixone
Tanis (reçu au Cap-Haïtien) |
17-5-02 |
Doc. 83 |
Dossier de
Jacques Etienne - Jacques
Etienne (reçu au Cap-Haïtien) |
17-5-02 |
Doc. 84 |
Cassette vidéo
Famille Jacques Etienne - Jacques
Etienne (reçu au Cap-Haïtien) |
17-5-02 |
Doc. 85 |
Dossier de
Elusca Charles - Elusca
Charles (Voir Doc 41) (reçu au Cap-Haïtien) |
17-5-02 |
Doc. 86 |
Rapport sur les
actes de vandalisme du parti politique Fanmi Lavalas sur l’opposition et
certaines personnes de la population - Milton
Chéry (reçu au Cap-Haïtien) |
17-5-02 |
Doc. 87 |
Dossier de
Junior Ismael - Junior
Ismael (reçu au Cap-Haïtien) |
17-5-02 |
Doc. 88 |
Procès-verbal
de constat requis par le sieur Jean Delor Damus - Jean-Delor
Damus (reçu au Cap-Haïtien) |
17-5-02 |
Doc. 89 |
Rapport sur la
journée du 17 décembre 2001 du Commissaire Jude perrin de la Direction
Départementale du Sud de la PNH - Jude Perrin
transmis par Fax (reçu aux Cayes) |
22-5-02 |
Doc. 90 |
Dossier de
Baptiste Pierre Wilfrid - Convergence
Cayes (reçu aux Cayes) |
20-5-02 |
Doc. 91 |
Dossier de
Christma Dorfeuille - Convergence
Cayes (reçu aux Cayes) |
20-5-02 |
Doc. 92 |
Procès-verbal
de constat requis par Pierre Elie Exelorme - Pierre Elie
Exelorme (reçu aux Cayes) |
20-5-02 |
Doc. 93 |
Dossier de
Joseph Robert Jeune - Joseph Robert
Jeune (reçu aux Cayes) |
20-5-02 |
Doc. 94 |
Cassette vidéo
de Joseph Robert Jeune - Joseph Robert
Jeune (reçu aux Cayes) |
20-5-02 |
Doc. 95 |
Document
photographique montrant la maison de Pierre Richard Cornet - Pierre
Richard Cornet (reçu aux Cayes) |
20-5-02 |
Doc. 96 |
Dossier
collectif de Orélien Rémy – Petit Frère André – Saint Léger Jean Sony (ou
Sergent Sony) – Etienne Jean Loucène (ou Micène) – Cadet Sorel (ou Saurel) –
Pierrot Lyndor – Sylius Jude Ketler – Léon Moise – Corneil Pierre Richard –
Paul Sonac - Jean Robert
Taccyl, avocat (reçu aux Cayes) |
20-5-02 |
Doc. 97 |
Document
photographique de Duréus Pierre Brénus - Duréus Pierre
Brénus (reçu aux Cayes) |
20-5-02 |
Doc. 98 |
Lettre de
plainte de Jean Nansky Casamajor - Jean Nansky
Casamajor |
21-5-02 |
Doc. 99 |
Note de Pasteur
Anoreste Difficile - Anoreste
Difficile |
21-5-02 |
Doc. 100 |
Dossier de
Rigaud Charles - Centre
Oeucuménique des droits de l’Homme |
24-5-02 |
APPENDICE III
AUTRES DOCUMENTS REMIS A LA
COMMISSION
A-1 Enquête de l’Association des Journalistes
Haïtiens (AJH) sur l’assassinat du Journaliste Brignol Lindor - AJH
A-2 Le “Coup d’Etat” du 17 décembre et les
Nouvelles Formes Aristidiennes de Répression
- Convergence Démocratique
A-3 Rapport partiel relatif aux retombées de
la journée noire du 17 décembre 2001 – Convergence Démocratique du Sud
A-4 February 7, 2001 – February 7, 2002: The
Degradation of the General Human Rights Situation – National Coalition for
Haitian Rights (NCHR)
A-5 Rapport de la visite effectuée au
Pénitencier National suite aux évènements du 15 novembre 2001.
CARLI Comité des Avocats
pour le Respect des Libertés Individuelles
POHDH Plateforme des
Organisations Haïtiennes des Droits Humains
NCHR Coalition Nationale
pour les Droits des Haïtiens
A-6 CARLI Info #17 janvier 2002
A-7 CARLI Info #18 Février-mars 2002
A-8 Note de Presse: “Préoccupation du CARLI
suite aux déclarations du Juge Henri Kesner Noel” - Affaire Prosper Avril 1er
mai 2002
A-9 Dossier de presse
A-10 Dossier de Jean Arnold Dumas aux membres de
la CEI
A-11 Dossier du Général Prosper Avril remis à la
CEI par le Cabinet Reynold Georges et Associés
A-12 Dossier de Patrice Gousse assassiné le 17
septembre 2000
A-13 Dossier de M. Guy J. J. Joseph
A-14 Note et photo pour différentes victimes de
l’année 2000
A-15 Correspondance de l’AVIDID (Association des victimes du dix-sept décembre)
APPENDICE IV
LISTE DES REPRESENTANTS DIPLOMATIQUES ET AUTRES PERSONNALITES RENCONTRES
PAR LA COMMISSION
1.- Amis
d’Haïti:
- M.
Fernando Novillo Saravia, Ambassadeur d’Argentina
- M. Franklin O’Brien Rolle, Ambassadeur des Bahamas
- M. Ismael Llona Mouat, Ambassadeur du Chili
- M. Kenneth Cook, Ambassadeur du Canada
- M. Yves Gaudeuil, Ambassadeur de France
- M. Victor Koyoc, Chef de Chancellerie, Ambassade du
Mexique
- M. Rafael Matos Gonzales de Careaga, Ambassadeur d’Espagne
- M. Brian Dean
Curran, Ambassadeur des États-Unis d’Amérique
- M. Marco A. Requena Rotundo, Ambassadeur du Venezuela
- M. Alberto E. Despradel Cabral, Ambassadeur de la
République dominicaine
2.- Représentants
d’Organisations Internationales
a. OEA
Amb. Sergio Romero, Représentant Spécial du
Secrétaire Général et Directeur de l’OEA
b. PNUD
- Mme. Diene Keita,
Représentant résident a.i.
- Me. Grâce D’Almeida,
Conseiller Technique Principal – PNUD/MJSP
- M. Thierry Fagart, Haut Commissariat des
Nations-Unies aux droits de l’homme
- Mr. Denis Racicot, Conseiller Technique PNUD,
Office du Protecteur du Citoyen
3.- Nonciature Apostolique
- Mgr. Luigi Bonazzi, Nonce Apostolique
- Mgr. Hubert Constant,
Evêque de Fort-Liberté, Président de la Conférence Episcopale
-
Mgr. Serge Miot, Archevêque Coadjuteur de Port-au-Prince
- Mgr. Brian Udaigne, Premier Secrétaire de la
Nonciature Apostolique
4.- Ambassade de France
- S.E.
Monsieur Yves Gaudeuil, Ambassadeur de France
- Commissaire Gonzales
- Commandant Jean Paul Roy
- Magistrat Duchemin
- M. Jean
François Charpentier, Premier Conseiller
- M. Patrick
Pautonnier, Directeur de l’Institut Français
APPENDICE V
QUELQUES ARTICLES IMPORTANTS DE LA CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE
D’HAITI (1987)
FIRST ARTICLE :
Haiti is an indivisible, sovereign, independent, cooperatist, free, democratic
and social republic.
Haïti est une République, indivisible, souveraine,
indépendante, coopératiste, libre, démocratique et sociale.
ARTICLE 4
The national motto is : Liberty, Equality,
Fraternity.
La devise nationale est: Liberté – Egalité –
Fraternité
ARTICLE 16:
Citizenship entails both civil and political
rights.
La réunion des Droits Civils et Politiques
constitue la qualité du citoyen.
ARTICLE 16- :
The enjoyment, exercise, suspension and loss of
these rights are regulated by law.
La jouissance, l’exercice, la suspension et la
perte de ses droits sont réglés par la loi.
ARTICLE 19:
The State has the absolute obligation to
guarantee the right to life, health, and respect of the human person for all
citizens without distinction, in conformity with the Universal Declaration of
the Right of Man.
L’Etat a l’impérieuse obligation de garantir le
Droit à la Vie, à la Santé, au Respect de la Personne Humaine, à tous les
Citoyens sans distinction, conformément à la Déclaration Universelle des Droits
de l’Homme.
ARTICLE 24:
Individual liberty is guaranteed and protected
by the State.
La liberté individuelle est garantie et protégée
par l’Etat.
ARTICLE 24-1:
No one may be prosecuted, arrested or detained
except in the cases determined by law and in the manner it prescribes.
Nul ne peut-être poursuivi, arrêté ou détenu que
dans les cas déterminés par la Loi et selon les formes qu’elle prescrit.
ARTICLE 24-2:
Except where the perpetrator of a crime is
caught in the act, no one may be arrested or detained other than by written
order of a legally competent official.
L’arrestation et la détention, sauf en cas de
flagrant délit, n’auront lieu que sur un mandat écrit d’un fonctionnaire
légalement compétent.
ARTICLE 24-3:
For such an order to be carried out, the
following requirements must be met:
a. It
must
formally state the reason in Creole and in French for the arrest or detention
and the provision of the law that provides for punishment of the act charged.
b. Legal
notice must be given and a copy of the order must be left with the accused at
the time of its execution;
c. The
accused must be notified of his right to be assisted by counsel at all phases
of the investigation of the case up to the final judgment;
d. Except
where the perpetrator of a crime is caught in the act, no arrest by warrant and
no search may take place between six (6) p.m. and six (6) a.m..
e. Responsibility for an offense is personal, and no one may be
arrested in the place of another.
Pour que ce mandat puisse être exécuté, il faut:
a. Qu’il exprime formellement en créole et
en français le ou les motifs de l’arrestation ou de la détention et la
disposition de Loi qui punit le fait imputé;
b. Qu’il soit notifié et qu’il en soit
laissé copie au moment de l’exécution à la personne prévenue;
c. Qu’il soit notifié au prévenu de son
droit de se faire assister d’un avocat à toutes les phases de l’instruction de
l’affaire jusqu’au jugement définitif;
d. Sauf le cas de flagrant délit, aucune
arrestation sur mandat, aucune perquisition ne peut se faire entre six(6)
heures du soir et 6 heures du matin;
e. La responsabilité est personnelle. Nul ne peut être arrêté à la place d’un
autre.
ARTICLE 25:
Any unnecessary force or restraint in the
apprehension of a person or in keeping him under arrest, or any psychological
pressure or physical brutality, especially during interrogation, is forbidden.
Toute rigueur ou contrainte qui n’est pas
nécessaire pour appréhender une personne ou la maintenir en détention, toute
pression morale ou brutalité physique notamment pendant l’interrogation sont
interdites.
ARTICLE 25-1:
No one may be interrogated without his attorney
or a witness of his choice being present.
Nul ne peut être interrogé en abscence de son
avocat ou d’un témoin de son choix.
ARTICLE 26:
No one may be kept under arrest more than
forty-eight (48) hours unless he has appeared before a judge asked to rule on
the legality of the arrest and the judge has confirmed the arrest by a
well-founded decision.
Nul ne peut être maintenu en détention s’il n’a
comparu dans les quarante huit (48) heures qui suivent son arrestation, par
devant un juge appelé à statuer sur la légalité de l’arrestation et si ce Juge
n’a confirmé la détention par décision motivée.
In the case of a
petty violation, the accused shall be referred to a justice of the peace, who
shall then hand down a final decision.
In the case of more
serious offenses or crimes, an appeal may be filed, without prior permission,
simply by addressing a petition to the presiding judge of the competent civil
court, who, on the basis of the oral statement of the prosecutor, shall rule on
the legality of the arrest and detention, in a special session of the court,
without postponement or rotation of judges, all other cases being suspended.
En cas de Contravention,
l’inculpé est déféré par devant le Juge de Paix qui statue définitivement.
En cas de délit ou de
crime, le prévenu peut, sans permission préalable et sur simple mémoire, se
pourvoir devant le Doyen du Tribunal de Première Instance du ressort qui, sur
les conclusions du Ministère Public, statue à l’extraordinaire, audience
tenante, sans remise ni tour de rôle, toutes affaires cessantes sur la légalité
de l’arrestation et de la
détention.
ARTICLE 26-2:
If the arrest is judged to be illegal, the
judge shall order the immediate release of the arrested
person and that order shall be enforceable immediately, regardless of any
appeal to a higher court or the supreme court for an order forbidding
enforcement of the judgment.
Si l’arrestation est jugée illégale, le Juge
ordonne la libération immédiate du détenu et cette décision exécutoire sur
minute nonobstant appel, pourvoi en
Cassation ou défense d’exécuter.
ARTICLE 27:
Any violation of the
provisions on individual liberty are arbitrary acts. Injured parties may,
without prior authorization, appeal to the competent courts, to bring suit
against the authors and perpetrators of these arbitrary acts, regardless of
their rank or the body to which they belong.
Toutes violations des dispositions relatives à la
liberté individuelle sont des actes arbitraires. Les personnes lésées peuvent, sans autorisation préalable, se
référer aux Tribunaux Compétents pour poursuivre les auteurs et les exécuteurs
de ces actes arbitraires quelles que soient leurs qualités et à quelque Corps
qu’ils appartiennent.
ARTICLE 27-1:
Government officials and employees are directly
liable under civil and administrative criminal law for acts carried out in
violation of rights. In such cases, civil liability extends to the State as
well.
Les fonctionnaires et les employés de l’Etat sont
directement responsables selon les Lois Pénales, Civiles et Administratives des
actes accomplis en violation de droits.
Dans ces cas, la responsabilité civile s’étend aussi à l’Etat.
Every Haitian has the right to express his
opinions freely on any matter by any means he chooses.
Tout haïtien ou toute haïtienne a le droit d’exprimer
librement ses opinions, en toute matière par la voie qu’il choisit.
Journalists shall freely exercise their
profession within the framework of the law. Such exercise may not be subject to
any authorization or censorship, except in the case of war.
Le journaliste exerce librement sa profession dans
le cadre de la Loi. Cet exercice ne
peut être soumis à aucune autorisation, ni censure sauf en cas de guerre.
Journalists may not be compelled to reveal
their sources. However, it is their duty to verify the authenticity and
accuracy of information. It is also their obligation to respect the ethics of
their profession.
Le journaliste ne peut être forcé de révéler ses
sources. Il a toutefois pour devoir d’en vérifier l’authenticité et
l’exactitude des informations. Il est
également tenu de respecter l’éthique.
Freedom of unarmed assembly and association for
political, economic, social, cultural or any other peaceful purposes is
guaranteed.
La Liberté d’Association et de
Réunion sans armes à des fins politiques, économiques, sociales culturelles ou
toutes autres.
Political parties and groups shall compete with
each other in the exercise of suffrage. They may be established and may carry
out their activities freely. They must respect the principles of national and
democratic sovereignty. The law determines the conditions for their recognition
and operation, and the advantages and privileges reserved to them.
Les parties et Groupements Politiques concourent à
l’expression du suffrage. Ils se
forment et exercent leur activité librement.
Ils doivent respecter les principes de la Souveraineté Nationale et de la
Démocratie. La Loi détermine leurs
conditions de reconnaisssance et de fonctionnement, les avantages et privilèges
qui leur sont réservés.
Private property is recognized and guaranteed. The law specifies the manner of acquiring and enjoying it, and the limits placed upon it.
La propriété privée est reconnue et garantie. La loi en détermine les modalités d’acquisition, de jouissance
ainsi que les limites.
No citizen, whether civilian or military, may
be denied access to the courts open to him under the Constitution and the laws.
Aucun citoyen, civil ou militaire ne peut être
distrait des Juges que la Constitution et les Lois lui assignent.
Citizenship entails civic duties. Every right
is counterbalanced by a corresponding duty.
A la qualité de citoyen se rattache le devoir
civique. Tout droit est contrebalancé
par le devoir correspondant.
Civic duties are the citizen's moral,
political, social and economic obligations as a whole to the State and the
country. These obligations are:
a. To
respect the Constitution and the national emblem;
b. To
respect the law;
c. To
vote in elections without constraint;
d. To pay
his taxes;
e. To
serve on a jury;
f. To
defend the country in the event of war;
g. To
educate and improve himself;
h. To
respect and protect the environment;
i. To respect scrupulously the revenues
and properties of the State;
j. To
respect the property of others;
k. To
work to maintain peace;
l. To
provide assistance to persons in danger;
m. To
respect the rights and freedom of others.
Le devoir civique est l’ensemble des obligations
du citoyen dans l’ordre moral, politique, social et économique vis-à-vis de
l’Etat et de la Patrie. Ces obigations
sont:
a. Respecter
la Constitution et l’Emblème National;
b. Respecter
les Lois;
c. Voter
aux élections sans contrainte;
d. Payer
ses taxes;
e. Servir
de juré;
f. Défendre
le pays en cas de guerre;
g. S’instruire
et se perfectionner;
h. Respecter
et protéger l’environnement;
i. Respecter scrupuleusement les deniers
et biens de l’Etat;
j. Respecter
le bien d’autrui;
k. Œuvrer
pour le maintien de la Paix;
l. Fournir
assistance aux personnes en danger;
m. Respecter
les droits et la liberté d’autrui;
Failure to abide by
these provisions shall be punishable by law.
La dérogation à ces prescriptions est sanctionnée par la
Loi.
ARTICLE 58:
National sovereignty
is vested in all citizens.
Citizens directly exercise the
prerogatives of sovereignty by:
a. Electing
the President of the Republic;
b. Electing
members of the Legislature;
c. Electing members of all other bodies or
all assemblies provided for by the Constitution and by law.
La Souveraineté Nationale réside dans
l’Universalité des citoyens.
Les citoyens exercent directement les prérogatives
de la Souveeraineté par:
a. l’Election
du Président de la République;
b. l’Election
des Membres du Pouvoir Législatif;
c. l’Election des Membres de tous autres
Corps ou de toutes Assemblées prévues par la constitution et par la Loi.
ARTICLE 173:
The Judicial Power shall be vested in the Supreme Court [Cour de
Cassation], the Courts of Appeal, Courts of First Instance, Courts of Peace
and special courts, whose number, composition, organization, operation and
jurisdiction are set by law.
Le Pouvoir Judiciaire est exercé par une Cour de
Cassation, les Cours d’Appel, les Tribunaux de Première Instance, les Tribunaux
de Paix et les Tribunaux Spéciaux dont le nombre, la composition,
l’organisation, le fonctionnement et la Juridiction sont fixés par la loi.
Judges of the Supreme Court and the Courts of
Appeal are appointed for ten (10) years. Judges of the Courts of First Instance
are appointed for seven (7) years. Their term begins at the time they take
their oath of office.
Les Juges de la Cour de Cassation et des cours
d’Appel sont nommés pour dix (10) ans.
Ceux des Tribunaux de Première Instance le sont pour sept (7) ans. Leur mandat commence à courir à compter de
leur prestation de serment.
The law regulates the conditions required for
serving as a judge at any level. A School of the Magistrature shall be
established.
La loi règle les conditions exigibles pour ête
Juge à tous les degrés.
Judges of the Supreme Court, the Courts of
Appeal and the Courts of First Instance are appointed for life. They may be
removed from office only because of a legally determined abuse of authority or
be suspended following an indictment leveled against them. They may not be reassigned,
without their consent, even in the case of a promotion. Their service may be
terminated during their term of office only in the event of a duly determined
permanent physical or mental incapacity.
Les juges de la Cour de Cassation, ceux des Cours
d’Appel et des Tribunaux de Première Instance sont inamovibles. Ils ne peuvent
être l’objet d’affectation nouvelle, sans leur consentement, même en cas de
promotion. Il ne peut être mis fin à
leur service durant leur mandat qu’en cas d’incapacité physique ou mentale
permanente dûment constatée.
Court proceedings are public. However, they may
take place in closed session in the interest of public order and good morals,
at the decision of the Court.
Les Audiences des Tribunaux sont publiques. Toutefois, elles peuvent être tenues à huis
clos dans l’intérêt de l’ordre public et des bonnes mœurs, sur décision du
Tribunal.
Sentences may not be delivered in closed
session in cases of political offenses or offenses involving the press.
En matière de délit politique et de délit de
presse, les huis clos ne peut être prononcé.
All orders or judgments shall state the grounds
for the decision and shall be handed down in a public hearing.
Tout Arrêt ou Jugement est motivé et prononcé en
audience publique.
Orders or judgments
are delivered and executed in the name of the Republic. They shall include
writs of execution to officers of the Public Prosecutor's Office and agencies
of the police and armed forces. Acts of notaries shall be put in the same form
when their compulsory execution is involved.
Les Arrêts ou Jugements
sont rendus et exécutés au nom de a République. Ils portent le mandement exécutoire aux Officiers du Ministère
Public et aux Agents de la Force Publique.
Les actes de Notaires susceptibles d’exécution forcée sont mis dans la
même forme.
The law determines the jurisdiction of the courts and tribunals, and regulates the manner of proceedings before them.
La Loi determine les compétences des Cours et
Tribunaux, rêgle la façon de procéder devant eux.
The law also provides for disciplinary penalties to be taken against judges and officers of the Public Prosecutor's Office, except for Supreme Court justices, who are under the jurisdiction of the High Court of Justice for abuse of authority.
Elle prévoit également les sanctions
disciplinaires à prendre contre les Juges et les Officiers du Ministère Public,
à l’exception des Juges de la Cour de Cassation qui sont justiciables de la
Haute Cour de Justice pour forfaiture.
The Police Force is an armed body.
It
operates under the Ministry of Justice.
La Police est un
Corps Armé.
Son
fonctionnement relève du Ministère de la Justice.
It is established to ensure law and order and
protect the life and property of citizens.
Its organization and mode of operation are
regulated by law.
Elle est créée pour la garantie de l’Ordre public
et la protection de la vie et des biens des citoyens
An Academy and a Police School have been
established, their organization and operations are set by law.
Il est créée une (1) Académie et une (1) Ecole de
Police dont l’organisation et le fonctionnement sont fixés par la Loi.
The police, as an auxiliary of the Justice
System, investigate violations, offenses and crimes committed, in order to
discover and arrest the perpetrators of them.
La Police en tant qu’auxiliaire de la Justice,
recherche les contraventions, les délits et crimes commis en vue de la
découverte et de l’arrestation de leurs auteurs.
In the exercise of their duties, members of the
"Public Forces" are subject to civil and penal liability in the
manner and under the conditions stipulated by the Constitution and by law.
Les Agents de la Force Publique dans l’exercice de
leurs fonctions sont soumis à la responsabilité civile et pénale dans les
formes et conditions prévues par la Constitution et par la Loi.
APPENDICE VI
LISTE DES PROPRIÉTÉS
ENDOMMAGÉES SELON LES PREUVES SOUMISES A LA COMMISSION D’ENQUETE (sont inclus
des propriétés qui n’ont pas été visitées par la CEI)
Port-au-Prince
1.- Le siège de l’OPL (Organisation du
Peuple en Lutte) et le Quartier général de la Convergence Démocratique
2.- Le siège du KONAKOM (Comité National du Congrès des
Mouvements Démocratiques) – Pont Morin
3.- Le
siège de la KID (Confédération Unité Démocratique) – Bourdon
4.- Le siège de l’ALAH (Alliance pour la Libération et l’Avancement
d’Haïti) et du Cabinet d’avocat de Me. Reynold Georges -
Turgeau
5.- La Villa abritant les services administratifs de l’Institut
Français d’Haïti - Pont Morin
6.- La maison privée se trouvant entre les locaux du KONAKOM et
de l’OPL/CONVERGENCE
7.- La
résidence de M. Frantz Rolle (voisine du local de l’OPL) - Pont Morin
8.- La villa logeant le CRESFED (Centre de Recherche et de
Formation Economique et Social pour le Développement - Canapé Vert
Pétion-Ville
1.- La résidence privée de M.
Gérard Pierre-Charles et Mme Suzy Castor
Croix-des-Bouquets
1.- La résidence de Victor et
Jessie Benoit - Lilavois
Cap-Haïtien
1.- La résidence du Pasteur
Milton Chery, membre de la coordination de l’OPL dans le Nord
2.- La résidence de Eluscat Charles,
porte-parole OPL dans le Nord
3.- La maison voisine de celle
de Eluscat Charles
4.- La maison des frères Tanis,
de la Convergence
5.- La maison de Jacques
Etienne, critique connu de Fanmi Lavalas
6.- Le siège central de l’OPL
dans le Nord
Les Cayes
1.- L’entreprise de construction que dirige
Gabriel Fortuné, ex-député, porte-parole départemental de la Convergence y compris 2 camions bascules incendiés
2.- La résidence de Jean Robert Jeune,
membre du comité de coordination départemental de l’OPL
3.- La maison de Wilfred Jean-Baptiste,
membre du comité de coordination départemental de l’OPL
4.- La résidence de Kessel
Cillius, membre de la Convergence
5.- La résidence de Pierre
Richard, membre de la Convergence
Gonaïves
1.- La résidence du Pasteur Luc Mésadieu,
président du MOCHRENA et membre du directoire de la Convergence Démocratique
2.- Le complexe éducatif
Manassé comprenant:
2.1. La résidence du Pasteur Sylvio Dieudonné,
vice-président du MOCHRENA
2.2. La résidence de Me. Sadrac Dieudonné,
frère du pasteur et membre du MOCHRENA
2.3 Le Bâtiment logeant la Section pré-scolaire
2.4 Le
Bâtiment logeant le Collège Mixte Manassé et l’Eglise Evangélique de
Jésus-Christ
2.5 Un bâtiment logeant cinq (5) familles
Grande Rivière du Nord
1.- Le local de l’OPL
Jacmel
1.- La résidence Milot Gousse,
porte-parole de la Convergence Démocratique dans le Sud-Est
Jérémie
1.- Le local de la CATH
(Centrale des travailleurs Haïtiens)
Petit Goâve
1.- La maison de Jean Jasmin,
membre de la coordination locale de l’OPL
2.- La maison de Déus
Jean-François, MDN, ex-député, membre de la Convergence
3.- La résidence de Yvon Jean
4.- La résidence de René
Jean-Michel
5.- La résidence de Eligène
Desrosiers
6.- La résidence de Jean Willio
Manéus
7.- La résidence de Dieusibon
Jean
8.- La résidence de Yves Rigaud
9.- La résidence de Denise
Osias
10.- La résidence de Inès Coicou
11.- La résidence de Genise Jean
12.- La résidence de Diréus
Antoine
13.- La résidence de Prosper
Jeanty
14.- La résidence de Montigène
Sincère
15.- La résidence de Serge
Bouzile
16.- La résidence de Wilbert
Pierre
17.- La résidence de Brévil Jean
Roma, ex-maire Lavalas de Petit-Goâve
APPENDICE VII
LISTE
DES PROPRIÉTÉS VISITÉES PAR LA CEI
PETION-VILLE
1.- RESIDENCE
DE M. GERARD PIERRE-CHARLES ET DE MME SUZY CASTOR
Visite guidée par M. Daniel Pierre-Charles – 11
avril 2002
PORT-AU-PRINCE
1.- VILLA
LOGEANT LE CRESFED (Centre de Recherche et de Formation Economique et Sociale
pour le Développement) – Canapé Vert
Visite guidée par Mme Suzy Castor, Directrice - 11 avril 2002
2.- VILLA
LOGEANT LES SERVICES ADMINISTRATIFS DE L’INSTITUT FRANÇAIS D’HAITI –
Pont Morin
Visite guidée par M.Patrick Pantonnier, Directeur de
l’Institut Français et M. Jean-François Charpentier, Premier Conseiller à
l’Ambassade de France à Port-au-Prince – 11 avril 2002
3.- LE
SIEGE DE L’OPL (Organisation du Peuple en Lutte) servant aussi de Quartier
Général de la CONVERGENCE/OPL - Pont Morin
Visite guidée
par M. Paul Eddy, Administrateur et M. Francul Toussaint, gardien
11 avril 2002
4.- LE
SIEGE DU KONAKOM (Comité National du Congrès des Mouvements Démocratiques) - Pont Morin
Visite guidée par M.
Evilson Singère, ardien
- 11 avril 2002
5.- LE SIEGE DE LA KID (Confédération Unité
Démocratique) – Bourdon
Visite guidée par M. Franisco Alcide, responsable
politique et M. Florestal Josué, militant – 11 avril 2002
Autres personnes présentes: Silvers
François(Gardien), Dieudonné Frantz (Sécurité), Jean Latouche Mondésir,Wiguns Petit
Homme, Jean Bernard Jecroisil, Jean Renaldy Pierre, David Jean Baptiste, Emile
Bonrlo,Bekenson Jean, Jean Robert
Duplan, Joseph Clenord Jerard, Lesly Jean Baptiste, Jean Simon Jhonny, Josue
Vixama, Petiny Jean Pharins, Leveque Fednorlo, Frantz Dorsainvil, Joseph Jean
François, Sainjuste Kesnel, Espérance Jean Louis, Sainte Rose Marais, Josué
Forestal, Guercy Hilaire, Saurel Selon, Daniel Casseus
6.- LE
SIEGE DE L’ALAH (Alliance pour la Libération et l’Avancement d’Haïti) et du cabinet d’avocat de Me. Reynold
Georges – Turgeau
Visite guidée par M.
Reynold Georges et M. Duclaise Joseph, Gardien 11
avril 2002
CROIX-DES-BOUQUETS
1.- Résidence de Victor et
Jessie Benoit – Lilavois 27
visite guidée par Mme Jessie Benoit – 22 mai 2002
GONAIVES
1.- Résidence de Luc et Hélène
Mésadieu
visite
guidée par Sadrac Dieudonné – 15 avril 2002
2.- Complexe Educatif Manassé
visite guidée par Sadrac
Dieudonné – 15 avril 2002
3.- Résidence de Pasteur Sylvio
Dieudonné
visite guidée par Sadrac
Dieudonné –15 avril 2002
4.- Résidence de M. Sadrac
Dieudonné
visite guidée par Sadrac Dieudonné – 15 avril 2002
PETIT GOAVE
1.- Résidence de Rose Marie
Coicou, membre de la Convergence Démocratique
visite guidée par Rose
Marie Coicou - 20 avril 2002
2.- Résidence de M. Jean Jasmin
3.- Résidence de M. Deus Jean
François
4.- Résidence de Viviane Antoine, sœur du
Maire Emmanuel Antoine,membre de Fanmi Lavalas
visite guidée par Viviane
Antoine - 20 avril 2002
CAP-HAITIEN
1.- Résidence du Pasteur Milton
Chéry Rue 27-28 B
Visite guidée par Milton
Chéry – 17 mai 2002
2.- Résidence de Nixone et
Fritz Tanis Rue 14 G-H
visite guidée par Nixone
Tanis - 17 mai 2002
LES CAYES
1.- Résidence de Joseph Robert
Jeune
Rue Chateaudin – Derrière
Fort
Visite guidée par Joseph
Robert Jeune - 20 mai 2002
2.- Entreprise COMPA
Construction S.A. de M. Gabriel Fortuné – Quartier Vernet Dexia
Visite guidée par Gabriel Fortuné - 20
mai 2002
APPENDICE VIII
CHARTE
DEMOCRATIQUE INTERAMERICAINE
ARTICLE 4:
La transparence des
activités gouvernementales, la probité, une gestion responsable des affaires
publiques par les gouvernements, le respect des droits sociaux, la liberté
d’expression et la liberté de la presse constituent des composantes
fondamentales de la démocratie.
La subordination
constitutionnelle de toutes les institutions de l’Etat aux autorités civiles
légalement constituées et le respect de l’Etat de droit par toutes les
institutions et tous les secteurs de la société revêtent également une
importance fondamentale pour la démocratie.
Transparency in
government activities, probity, responsible public administration on the art of
governments, respect for social rights, and freedom f expression and of the
press are essential components of the exercise of democracy.
The constitutional
subordination of all state institutions to the legally constituted civilian
authority and respect for the rule of law on the part of all institutions and
sectors of society are equally essential to democracy.
ARTICLE 16:
L’éducation demeure un facteur clé pour le renforcement des
institutions démocratiques, la promotion du développement du potentiel humain,
la réduction de la pauvreté et l’encouragement d’une meilleure compréhension entre
nos peuples. Pour réaliser ces objectifs,
il est essentiel qu’un enseignement de qualité soit accessible à tous,
notamment aux jeunes filles et aux femmes, aux habitants des régions rurales et
aux personnes appartenant aux populations minoritaires.
Education is key to
strengthening democratic institutions, promoting the development of human
potential, and alleviating poverty and
fostering greater understanding among our peoples. To achieve these ends, it is essential that
a quality education be available to all, including girls and women, rural
inhabitants, and minorities
ARTICLE 26:
L’OEA continue de mener
des programmes et activités visant à encourager les principes et pratiques
démocratiques dans le Continent américain, considérant que la démocratie est un
système fondé sur la liberté et l’amélioration des conditions économiques,
sociales et culturelles des peuples.
L’OEA maintiendra des consultations et une coopération continue avec les
Etats membres, en tenant compte des apports des organisations de la société
civile qui oeuvrent dans ces domaines.
The OAS will continue
to carry out programs and activities designed to promote democratic principles
and practices and strengthen a democratic culture in the Hemisphere, bearing in
mind that democracy is a way of life based on liberty and enhancement of
economic, social, and cultural conditions for the peoples of the Americas. The OAS will consult and cooperate on an
ongoing basis with member states and take into account the contributions of civil
society organizations working in those fields.
ARTICLE 27:
Les programmes et
activités ont pour but d’encourager la bonne gouvernance, une gestion saine,
des valeurs démocratiques et le renforcement des institutions politiques et de
celles de la société civile. Une
attention particulière sera prêtée à la mise en œuvre de programmes et
activités visant l’éduation des enfants et de la jeunesse, comme moyen
d’assurer la permanence des valeurs démocratiques, notamment la liberté et la
justice sociale.
The objectives of the
programs and activities will be to promote good governance, sound
administration, democratic values, and the strengthening of political
institutions and civil society organizations.
Special attention shall be given to the development of programs and
activities for the education of children and youth as a means of ensuring the
continuance of democratic values, including liberty and social justice.
APPENDICE IX
LISTE DES AUTORITES HAITIENNES RENCONTREES PAR LA COMMISSION
1.- S.E. Monsieur Jean Bertrand
Aristide Président d’Haïti
2.- M. Yvon Neptune Premier
Ministre
3.- M. Antonio Joseph Ministre
de Affaires Etrangères
4.- Me. Jean Baptiste Brown Ministre de la
Justice et de la Sécurité Publique
5.- M. Harry Clinton Ministre
des Travaux Publics, Transports et
Communications
6.- M. Jean Gérard Dubreuil Secrétaire
d’Etat à la Sécurité Publique
7.- M. Marc L.Bazin Ministre Sans
Portefeuille, chargé d’aménager le cadre procice à la poursuite des
négociations avec l’opposition
8.- M. Hermogème Durand Chef du
Cabinet du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères
9.- Me. Josué Pierre-Louis Commissaire
du Gouvernement près le Tribunal de Première Instance de Port-au-Prince
10.- Me.
Bernard Saint-Vil Juge
d’Instruction au Tribunal de Première
Instance de Port-au-Prince
11.- M. Fritzner Gaspard Directeur des Affaires
Juridiques au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères
12.- M. Harvel Jean-Baptiste Inspecteur
Général en Chef de la Police
Nationale
d’Haïti
13.- M. Oriel Jean Responsable
de la Sécurité du Président de la
République
et du Palais National
14.- Dr Gessy Coicou Commissaire
Principale, Directrice de la Police Scientifique Académique de la Police
15.- M. Patrick Tisselin Commissaire
de Police à l’Unité de Sécurité
Générale
du Palais National (USGPN)
16.- M. Wilson Casséus Commissaire
de Police à l’USGPN
17.- M. Bleck Henrice Responsable
CIMO (Compagnie
d’Intervention
et de Maintien de l’Ordre)
18.- M. Pierre Lucien Chavannes Responsable de la
SWAT Team (Groupe
d’Intervention de la Police Nationale d’Haiti)
GIPNH
19.- M. Phébé Marc Arthur Responsable
de la CAT Team
20.- M. Jacques Anthony Nazaire Commissaire à
l’USP(Unité de Sécurité
Présidentielle) -
Victime
21.- M. Jean Dieugrand paralysé,
représenté
par son épouse
Jacqueline Ménié Policier -
Victime
22.- M. Jack Uhl Duc Policier -
Victime
23.- M. Bel Chrisnor Policier -
Victime
24.- M. Edner Moricette Policier -
Victime
25.- M. Joany Canéus Directeur départemental
de l’Artibonite pour la PNH (Gonaïves)
26.- Mme Kenaze Jean Baptiste
Saint Pierre Déléguée
départementale de l’Artibonite
(Gonaïves)
27. Dr. Myrtho Julien Délégué
départemental du Nord (Cap-Haïtien)
28.- M. Wilma Innocent Maire
du Cap-Haitien
29. M. Fritz Jean Commissaire
divisionnaire, Directeur départemental du Nord pour la PNH (Cap-Haïtien)
30.- M. Gael Ménélas Commissaire
Principal (Cap-Haïtien)
31.- M. Jacques Mathelier Délégué
départemental du Sud (Cayes)
32. M. Jude Perrin Directeur
départemental du Sud pour la PNH
(Cayes)
33. M. Patrick Guillaume Ex-Commissaire
Municipal de Pétion-Ville
34. M. Jean Yonel Trécil Ex-Commissaire
Divisionnaire
35. Mme Hermione Léonard Directrice
départementale de l’Ouest
(Port-au-Prince)
36. M. Jean Nesly Lucien Directeur
Général de la Police
37. M.Stéphen Moise Maire
des Gonaïves
38.- M. Henry Claude Ménard Ancien
Ministre de l’Intérieur
39.- M. Prince Pierre Sonson Sénateur
du Sud Est
40. Mme Florence Elie Protecteur
du Citoyen a.i.
41. M. Brutus Serge Fils Groupe
d’Intervention de la Police Nationale
(SWAT/GIPNH)
42. M. Azor René Groupe
d’Intervention de la Police Nationale (SWAT/GIPNH)
43. M. Jean Luxène Estimé Groupe
d’Intervention de la Police Nationale (SWAT/GIPNH)
44. Me. Max Morpeau Consultant
– Ministère de la Justice
45. Me. Price Cyprien Consultant
– Ministère de la Justice
46. M. PNH
– Petit Goâve
47. M. Frantz Gabriel Pilote
de l’hélicoptère présidentiel
APPENDICE X
LISTE DES PERSONNES
PRESENTÉES COMME VICTIMES A LA CEI
Port-au-Prince
A.- Membres de la PNH:
1. **[1]/Nazaire
Jacques Anthony - Doc. 45[2]/
2.
*[3]/
Jean Dieugrand représenté par son épouse Jacqueline Mémé
3. **Bel Chrisnord - Doc 46
4. * Jack Uhl Duc
5. **Moricette Ednor – Doc 47
6. * Théogène
Jean François décédé, représenté par Pierre Ferdinand Théogène et par sa nièce
Alice Douyon
B.- Population civile
7. * Olys Séguy
8. * Valmé Gérard
9. ** Astrel Jean-Guy, Casec - Doc 49
10.*
Meus Jean Milien
11.* Deslourdes (ou Marie Lourdes) Jacques
décédée,- représentée par son fils Celestin Frendy Moise
12. * Brévil Jean Roma –
bras droit amputé
13. ** AndréJean - Doc 51
14. ** Emmanuel
Antoine - Doc 65
15. *
Guy François
16. ** Marie Alice François, représentant Guy
François Doc 18
17.
** Valérie Alice François,
‘’ ‘’ ‘’ ‘’
18.
** Jean Max Louis, représenté par le Cabinet Colimon Doc 27
19. ** Préval Enéus, ‘’ ‘’ ‘’ ‘’
‘’
20. ** Frantz et Maxime Rolle maison saccagée
au Pont Morin Doc 17
C.- Organisations politiques et
autres institutions
21. ** L’OPL (Organisation du Peuple en Lutte) son
siège et le Quartier général de la Convergence Démocratique Pont Morin –
Représenté par M. Gérard Pierre-
Charles – Doc 38, 14, 15, 42
22.
** Le KONAKOM (Comité National du Congrès des
Mouvements Démocratiques) – Pont Morin – Représenté par M. Victor Benoit Doc
23, 42
23.
** KID (Confédération Unité Démocratique) – Bourdon – son siège représenté par
M. Evans Paul Doc 8
24.
** L’ALAH (Alliance pour la Libération et l’Avancement d’Haïti) son siège et le
Cabinet d’avocat de Me. Reynold Georges
- Turgeau – représenté par M.
Reynold Georges Doc 8
25.
* L’Institut Français d’Haïti – Pont Morin – son local – représenté par M.
Patrick Pautonnier
26. ** Le CRESFED (Centre de Recherche et de
Formation Economique et Social pour le Développement) - Canapé Vert - représenté par Mme Suzy Castor - Doc 36, 42
Noms de victimes transmis par
le Ministère de la Justice et de la Sécurité Publique :
27.
Romain Jean Eustache décédé représenté par son épouse Lorna Romain – Doc 30
28.Claude
Dieuvert-Doc 30
29.
Techelet Elien - Doc 30
30.
Marie Rose Céline - Doc 30
31. Gympon Célestin - Doc 30
32. Fatima Paul - Doc 30
33. Sanon Séverin
décédé - Doc 30
34. Jean Germanie - Doc 30
35. Stéphen Loretes - Doc
30
36. Marius François - Doc 30
37. Demosthène Paul - Doc 30
38. Marcellus Pouchon - Doc 30
39. Pierre
Maricia - Doc 30
Pétion-Ville
1.- ** M. Gérard Pierre-Charles et Mme Suzy Castor, résidence
privée pillée et incendiée - Doc 14,15,37
Croix-des-Bouquets
1.- ** M. Victor et Mme.
Jessie Benoit - Lilavois – résidence privée pillée et
incendiée - Doc 24
Cap-Haïtien
1.- ** Pasteur Milton Chéry, membre de la coordination de l’OPL
dans le Nord -
maison -
Doc 39, 77, 86
2.- ** M.
Eluscat Charles, porte-parole OPL dans le Nord –maison -Doc 41, 85
3.- ** Nixon et Fritz Tanis de la Convergence - Ddoc 81, 82, 40
4.- ** M. Jacques Etienne, critique connu de Fanmi
Lavalas - Doc 83, 84
5.- ** M. Max Toussaint - Doc 78
6.- ** Junior Ismael, militant Fanmi Lavalas - Doc 87
7.- * M. Jean Philona Thébaud, Membre de la
Coordination du Nord, OPL
8.- * M. Charles (Toro) Antoine OPM (Milot) – OPL
9.- *M.
Walkens Joseph, Convergence – maison- (Limbé)
10.- **OPL – son local, Représenté par Clébert Dorvil Doc 79 -
Grande Rivière du Nord
11.- **M.
Rosemond Martial – Doc 75 – Grande Rivière du Nord
12.- **M.
Reynold Joseph - Doc. 73 - Grande Rivière du Nord
13.- **L’OPGN Organisation Paysanne de la Grande Rivière du Nord –
son local , Représenté par Phaète Trifène
Doc 76
14.- **M.
Jean Delor Damus - Doc 88 - Grande Rivière du Nord
15.- *M.
Pier Borar Chéry, Convergence – maison
(Dondon)
Autres Dossiers transmis par la Convergence du
Cap-Haitien
16.- M.
Benjamin Joseph Doc 74
17.- M.
Deluc Delnatus - Doc 72
18.- M.
Azhomme Jean - Doc 71
Les Cayes
1.- **Gabriel Fortuné, ex-député, porte-parole départemental de
la Convergence
Doc
35
2.- **M. Jean Robert Jeune, membre du comité de coordination
départemental de l’OPL Doc 93, 94
3.- **M.
Paul Sonac - Doc 96
4.- *Cyrion
Anthony - Quartier Simon, Cayes
5.- *Jean
Faubert Pierre-Louis - Quartier Simon,
Cayes
6.- **Duréus
Pierre Brénus - Doc 97 -
Quartier Simon, Cayes
Dossiers transmis par la Convergence des Cayes
7.- M.
Ketler Jude Sylius, membre de la Convergence
- Doc 96
8.- M.
Pierre Richard Cornet (ou Corneil) Doc
95, 96
9.- M.
Orélien Remy - Doc 96
10.- M.
Petit Frère André - Doc 96
11.- M.
Sergent Sony - Doc 96
12.- M.
Etienne Jean Loucène - Doc 96
13.- M.
Cadet Sorel - Doc 96
14.- M.
Pierrot Lindor - Doc 96
15.- M. Léon
Moise - Doc 96
16.- M.
Chrisma Dorfeuille - Doc 91
17.- M.
Pierre Elie Exelorme - Doc 92
18.- Les
plantations de Jean-Baptiste Pierre Wilfrid
- Doc 90
Gonaïves
1.- **Luc et Hélène Mésadieu, président du MOCHRENA et membre du
directoire de la Convergence Démocratique
- Doc 9
2.- **Le complexe éducatif Manassé comprenant :
2.1.
*Le Bâtiment
logeant la Section pré-scolaire - Doc
17-1
2.2.
*Le Bâtiment
logeant le Collège Mixte Manassé et l’Eglise Evangélique de Jésus-Christ - Doc 17-1
2.3.
*Un bâtiment
logeant cinq (5) familles - Doc 17-1
3.- **Nerlande
Beauséjour Darand épouse de Ramy Darand tué le 17 décembre 2001
Doc 9
4.- **Emmanuel Méus – Doc 17-1
5.- **Sadrac
Dieudonné - Doc 9
Dossiers transmis par la Convergence des Gonaïves
6.- Anoreste
Difficile - Doc 99
7.- Sylvio
Dieudonné - Doc 17-1, 9
8.- René
Dalien - Doc 17-1
9.- Normilus
Chéry - Doc 17-1
10.- Réginald
Tilus - Doc 17-1
11.- Imathieu
Gélin - Doc 17-1
12.- Armand
Jean-Baptiste - Doc 17-1
13.- Dorcely
Augustin - Doc 17-1
Jérémie
1.- Jean
Nansky Cassamajor – Doc 98
2.-
Micheline Etienne - Doc 33
3.- Mme
Nimcy Simon Jean-Félix - Doc 33
4.- Me.
Willy Jean-Felix - Doc 33
Petit-Goâve
1.- **Marie
Rose Coicou – Doc 56
2.- **Déus
Jean-François, MDN, ex-député, membre de la Convergence - Doc 54
Noms transmis par Fanmi Lavalas
3.- Louisémène Jean - Doc 65
4.- Joseph Frantz – doc 65
5.- Genise Jean - Doc 65
6.- Diréus Antoine - doc 65
Noms transmis par la Convergence de Petit-Goâve
7.- Brunel Cadet décédé - Doc 54
8.- Rigaud Paul - Doc 54
9.- Constael Adrien - Doc 54
10.- Joseph Edner Cossogu - Doc
54
11.- Mme Clairsirus Sincère- Doc
54
12.- Nacius Joseph - Doc 54
13.- Hyppolite Borange - Doc 54
14.- Jean Osman Telamour alias Ti
Coleman - Doc 54
15.- Beauzil Dorvilas - Doc 54
16.- Jean Chéry - Doc 54
17.- Joel Jean François - Doc 54
18.- Marc Adolphe - Doc 54
19.- Reed Cossogu - Doc 54
20.- Ronald Charles - Doc 54
21.- Famille Marianne - Doc 54
22.- Famille Antoine - Doc 54
23.- Jean Claude Brignolle - Doc 54
24.- Lessoit Inery - Doc 54
25.- Ti Papy Terenciel - Doc 54
26.- Lenet ainsi connu - Doc 54
27.- Mme Lenet - Doc 54
28.- Zo ainsi connu - Doc 54
29.- Blanc ainsi connu - Doc 54
30.- Smith Duroseau - Doc 54
31.- Ti Lepè ainsi connu - Doc 54
32.- Fedner Jean-Baptiste - Doc 54
33.- Jean Willio Manéus - Doc 54
Dossiers transmis par la
Convergence de Petit-Goâve
34.- Elizène Desrosiers Doc 62
35.- Ricardo Nelson - Doc 52
36.- Jean Jasmin, membre de la
coordination locale de l’OPL - Doc 55
Autres documents reçus à Petit-Goâve
37.- Dieusibon Jean (ou
Charles) - Doc 61
38.- Denise Osias - Doc 57
CP10027E01
39.- Limené Césaire – Doc 53
40.- Jonathan Hector – Doc 58
41.- Michel Ange Poulard - Doc 59
42.- Homère Sainton - Doc 60
43.- Desrosiers Marc Henry - Doc 63
44.- Sony Noel - Doc 64
Dossier transmis par le
Centre Œcuménique des Droits Humains
1.- Rigaud Charles -
Doc 100
Document transmis par le MDN
1.- Bossico Pierre-Louis - Doc 28
* All the
Appendices are contained in a separate document.
* All these
accusations were vehemently denied by members of Convergence Démocratique.
[1]. **Personnes entendues par la CEI ayant
déposé un document.
[2]. Ces
chiffres renvoient aux documents reçus par la CEI et qui sont annexés à la
présente. Vous trouverez également un
rapport établi par le Centre Oeucuménique des Droits Humains. Doc 4.
[3] .*
Personnes entendues par la CEI.