

**REPORT No. 188/22**

**PETITION 1407-13**

REPORT ON ADMISSIBILITY

HADI AFSHAR SAVOJBOLAGHI (AKA SAEID JAMALI)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

OEA/Ser.L/V/II

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**I. INFORMATION ABOUT THE PETITION**

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| **Petitioner:** | American University Intl. Human Rights Law Clinic |
| **Alleged victim:** | Hadi Afshar Savojbolaghi aka Saeid Jamali |
| **Respondent State:** | United States of America[[1]](#footnote-2) |
| **Rights invoked:** | Articles I (liberty and personal security), III, (religious freedom and worship) XVII (recognition of juridical personality and civil rights), XXIV (petition), and XXV (protection from arbitrary arrest) of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man[[2]](#footnote-3) |

**II. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE IACHR[[3]](#footnote-4)**

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| --- | --- |
| **Filing of the petition:** | August 30, 2013 |
| **Notification of the petition to the State:** | December 10, 2018 |
| **State’s first response:** | May 14, 2019 |
| **Additional observations from the petitioner:** | January 27, 2020, January 19, 2022 |

**III. COMPETENCE**

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| **Competence *Ratione personae:*** | Yes |
| **Competence *Ratione loci*:** | Yes |
| **Competence *Ratione temporis*:** | Yes |
| **Competence *Ratione materiae*:** | Yes, American Declaration (ratification of the OAS Charter on  June 19, 1951) |

**IV. DUPLICATION OF PROCEDURES AND INTERNATIONAL *RES JUDICATA*, COLORABLE CLAIM, EXHAUSTION OF DOMESTIC REMEDIES AND TIMELINESS OF THE PETITION**

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| **Duplication of procedures and International *res judicata*:** | No |
| **Rights declared admissible** | Articles I (liberty and personal security), XVII (recognition of juridical personality and civil rights), XXIV (petition), and XXV (protection from arbitrary arrest) of the American Declaration |
| **Exhaustion of domestic remedies or applicability of an exception to the rule:** | Yes, in terms of Section VI |
| **Timeliness of the petition:** | Yes, in terms of Section VI |

**V. ALLEGED FACTS**

1. This petition alleges custodial mistreatment (including torture) of the petitioner while he was in the custody of the United States military in Iraq between 2004 and 2007. According to the petition, the petitioner is a national of Iran, who was a member of the People's Mujahedin of Iran[[4]](#footnote-5) (“PMOI”). The petition further indicates that the PMOI was a political organization opposed to the government of the Shah of Iran. After the overthrow of the Shah in 1979, the PMOI eventually came to oppose the new Islamic government of Iran. Subsequently, the PMOI relocated to Camp Ashraf in Iraq, to continue its political opposition in exile. The petition indicates that the petitioner joined the PMOI in Iraq in 1986, where he remained until 1994. According to the petition, the petitioner became ideologically estranged from the PMOI, following which he left Iraq for the United Kingdom, where he was granted political asylum. The petition indicates that the petitioner returned to Camp Ashraf in 1998 to visit his daughter, but that the PMOI refused to allow him to leave. As a result, the petitioner was effectively a prisoner at Camp Ashraf from 1998 until 2003. The petition alleges that the petitioner was detained under harsh conditions at Camp Ashraf.
2. Following the invasion of Iraq by the U.S. (in 2003), the petition indicates that the U.S. military established a Temporary Internment Protection Facility (“TIPF”) near Camp Ashraf to house individuals who wanted assistance in leaving the PMOI. According to the petition, U.S. officials encouraged the petitioner to transfer to TIPF, saying he would be protected and given the opportunity to seek refugee status in the United States or Europe, and would perhaps even be able to leave Iraq within a few months. Based on these assurances, the petitioner agreed to enter U.S. custody and was admitted to the TIPF in mid-2004.
3. According to the petition, the petitioner remained under the custody and control of the TIPF until 2007, during which time he was allegedly subjected to a regime of substandard conditions of detention, physical abuse, and generally degrading treatment (by the U.S. military). According to the petition, the mistreatment meted out to the petitioner included: (a) limited or no access to sanitary facilities; (b) limited food and water; (c) multiple periods of solitary confinement or isolation; (d) limited or no access to communication with his family; (e) beatings by soldiers; (f) being tied to a chair for three to four hours in the extreme summer heat. The petition indicates that over the course of his detention, the petitioner made repeated verbal and written complaints to U.S. government officials about the conditions at the TIPF but received no response. The petitioner also participated in several non-violent protests including sit-ins and hunger strikes, which often resulted in further physical mistreatment by soldiers at the TIPF. The petition provides multiple examples of the mistreatment allegedly suffered by the petitioner, some of which are set out in the following paragraphs.
4. The petition alleges that generally, detainees did not have regular access to phones or the internet to communicate with their families. On one occasion, during 2005, the petitioner was placed in isolation where he was denied access to all means of communication and, therefore, could not communicate with his family. However, a new guard (who was unfamiliar with this restriction) allowed the petitioner to make a call to his brother. When other guards discovered this, they beat the petitioner. Generally, the petition alleges that the petitioner was routinely placed in isolation or solitary confinement during which he suffered physical violence, psychological abuse, and deprivation of basic needs. On one occasion while he was in solitary confinement, the petitioner asked to be allowed to go outside for at least one hour for exercise. He was then hauled from his cell by guards, who then threw him on a pile of rocks. The petitioner developed severe back pain as a result.
5. Sometime around October 2006, a Bulgarian reporter toured the TIPF, and the petitioner found an opportunity to tell her that TIPF detainees were being mistreated. Immediately after he spoke, soldiers beat him in front of the reporter. After this incident, the petitioner and other TIPF detainees staged a sit-in and hunger strike to protest the conditions at TIPF. The guards took various measures to pressure the detainees into breaking up the protest, including temporarily cutting off water and electricity as well as beatings, “tasering,” and confinement. In response to his hunger strike, the U.S. military transferred the petitioner to the hospital at the Abu Ghraib prison. Shortly after arrival at the hospital, the petitioner witnessed another detainee being physically and verbally abused by a guard. When the petitioner protested the treatment of this detainee, the guard picked up the petitioner by the neck and repeatedly slammed his head into the floor.
6. The petitioner was also detained in the Abu Ghraib prison itself, in a section called “Level 5”. During this time, the petitioner complains that he was subjected to various acts of mistreatment. In this regard, he mentions that (a) soldiers held his head down and repeatedly punched and kicked him; (b) he was physically coerced into stripping, following which guards examined his rectum. The petitioner also complains that soldiers confiscated his Koran and wrote “Ghost” on it, which was the name they called him throughout his detention at Abu Ghraib. The petitioner also states that he was detained in a small cell with a dirty mattress and received only one set of clothes and two filthy blankets during his time at the prison. With respect to sanitary facilities, the petitioner indicates that he had an 80 cm pipe in his cell that served as a urinal. When he needed to defecate, he had to request that a guard escort him to a toilet in the yard. However, guards routinely ignored his pleas to use the toilet and, as a result, he was forced to secretly defecate into his hands and dispose of the feces through the pipe in his cell several times. The petitioner further mentions that on two occasions, the guards flushed out a neighboring cell in which another detainee had defecated resulting in the petitioner’s cell being flooded with fecal matter. When he complained about this, the guards took him to a small room without windows or a roof and used a tarp to strap him to what the detainees called the “torture chair.” With the sun beating down on him, the petitioner was left tied to the chair for three to four hours in the extreme summer heat.
7. During the last year of the petitioner’s detention at TIPF, he was moved, along with four or five other detainees, to a newly constructed base called Athen (which was located above the TIFP). In this regard, the petitioner states that he was housed in a tent, where he had a television and television antenna. He indicates that soldiers came into his tent, held him down, and accused him of using his antenna to spy. Ultimately, the soldiers destroyed the television and spent an hour beating the petitioner outside of his tent. Subsequently, the petitioner was placed into isolation for a month. Generally, the petitioner indicates that he experienced numerous beatings and periods of isolation while at Athen.
8. The petition indicates that in late December 2007, the U.S. military released the petitioner from the TIPF without giving him any reason and gave him a travel permit issued by the Iraq government. After travelling through and being detained in various European countries including Turkey, Greece, France, and Italy, the petitioner eventually obtained asylum in Switzerland in 2008. The petitioner has resided in Switzerland since then. Following his release from the TIPF, the petition indicates that the petitioner made multiple attempts in Turkey and Switzerland to pursue a claim regarding his treatment at the TIPF. However, he was unable to afford the cost of hiring a lawyer (in either Turkey or Switzerland). The petitioner then approached several NGOs for assistance, and ultimately his case was taken up in 2012 by the International Human Rights Clinic at the Washington College of Law.
9. According to the petitioner, he remains physically and psychologically traumatized by his treatment at the TIFP. In this regard, he indicates that he suffers from chronic neck and back pain; and that he requires steroid injections to his spinal cord to be able to move. The petition mentions that the petitioner has also had to undergo neck surgery. Further, the petition states that the petitioner is under psychotherapeutic treatment to deal with the psychological trauma resulting from his detention and treatment at the TIPF.
10. The petition contends that the domestic legal system of the State prevents the petitioner from invoking or exhausting domestic remedies. The petition further asserts that the State’s court system invariably blocks any suit brought by a non-U.S. citizen against the federal government or its employees alleging human rights violations committed outside of the country’s borders and during military activities. On this basis, the petition submits that the petitioner qualifies for an exception to the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies. The petition generally contends that the traditional doctrine of sovereign immunity generally bars any lawsuit against the United States unless the government consents to being sued. The petition further submits that although the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) provides such consent for torts committed by the U.S. government, it provides an explicit exception for torts committed in a foreign country. The petition also argues that even though the United States had occupied Iraq and had exclusive control over TIPF at the time of the petitioner’s detention and abuse, domestic claims against the federal government concerning these human rights violations would remain blocked by sovereign immunity because they technically occurred in a foreign country outside of U.S. territorial jurisdiction.[[5]](#footnote-6)
11. The petition further submits that if the petitioner were to directly sue the military officials that abused him or authorized such abuse, the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (the “Westfall Act”) would operate to convert his lawsuit into one against the United States itself, thus again he would be blocked by the sovereign immunity doctrine. The petition indicates that the Westfall Act, provides certain exceptions to its general grant of immunity to the actions of government officials. The petition further indicates that one exception is “a civil action against an employee of the Government . . . brought for a violation of a statute of the United States under which such action against an individual is otherwise authorized.” However, the petition states that under this provision, the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) is the only federal statutes which the petitioner could plausibly use to sue federal officials (under this exception). The petition indicates that the U.S. Supreme Court (in the case of *Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain[[6]](#footnote-7)*) specifically held that the ATS was merely a “jurisdictional statute” and did not create any substantive rights. Accordingly, the petitioner would be barred from procuring any remedy (for the alleged violation of his rights) pursuant to the ATS.
12. The petition further mentions that that Westfall Act also contains provides for an exception (to its general grant of immunity to the actions of government officials) with respect to civil actions “…against an employee of the Government . . . which is brought for a violation of the Constitution of the United States”. However, the petition indicates that any claim brought by the petitioner would fail because federal courts generally do not recognize constitutional protections for non-U.S. citizens regarding actions undertaken outside of the United States.[[7]](#footnote-8)
13. Ultimately, the petition contends that the petitioner is entitled to an exception to the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies, because the United States legal system immunizes both the federal government and its officials from any domestic suit that petitioner could bring against them to remedy the alleged human rights violations suffered at the TIPF. The petitioner submits that the petition has been submitted to the IACHR within a reasonable time having regard for the circumstances of the petitioner’s situation. In this regard the petition highlights some of the difficulties encountered by the petitioner in seeking redress. Some of these difficulties include: (a) the petitioner’s unsuccessful attempts to hire lawyers to represent him; (b) the period taken to obtain assistance from NGOs; (c) the petitioner’s ill-health – following his release from TIPF. Given these circumstances, the petitioner submits that the filing of the petition on August 30, 2013, was done within a reasonable time.
14. In considering the alleged violations of the American Declaration, the petition notes that the Commission is entitled to look to other sources of international human rights law, norms, standards, as well as other sources of international law (such as international humanitarian law). In this respect, the petition refers to instruments such as the four Geneva Conventions (1949), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
15. The petitioner rejects the State’s position, contending that the petition meets all the criteria for admissibility. The petitioner emphasizes, that he has no reasonable chance of successfully obtaining appropriate redress and thus, is exempted from the exhaustion requirement. The petitioner submits that the Commission has previously held that administrative actions do not provide adequate means to address the consequences of human rights violations in cases that are not limited to damages or disciplinary actions.[[8]](#footnote-9) In this instance, the petitioner submits that he is seeking to hold the State accountable for the violation of his rights. The petitioner further submits that the State has never publicly investigated the treatment that the petitioner endured at TIPF or provided redress for the abuses that he suffered there.
16. The State contends that the petition is inadmissible on several grounds. Firstly, the State submits that the claims are beyond the competence of the Commission *ratione materiae*. Secondly, the State argues that the petition fails to state facts that tend to establish violations of the American Declaration; and that it also contains claims that are manifestly groundless. Thirdly, the State submits that the petitioner failed to exhaust domestic remedies, and that the petition was filed in an untimely manner.
17. By way of background, the State indicates that it did establish the TIFP in 2004 for the benefit and protection of persons who wished to leave the PMOI. The State indicates that in mid-2004, the petitioner voluntarily chose to leave the PMOI and reside at the TIPF; and that he did so, while seeking refugee status and relocation to a third State because he apparently did not feel it was safe to return to Iran. The State emphasizes that while living at the TIPF, the petitioner was protected, not detained, by the United States; and that accordingly, the petitioner was free at any time to leave the camp and return to Iran.
18. Regarding the issue of competence *ratione materiae*, the State contends that the American Declaration is non-binding on the State, and that accordingly, the Commission lacks competence to issue a binding decision vis-à-vis the United States, including on matters arising under the American Declaration. The State also argues that even if the Commission considered the American Declaration to be binding on the United States, it could not apply it to the petitioner’s claims because during situations of armed conflict, the controlling body of law (*lex specialis*) is the law of war. In this regard, the State further submits that the Commission has no competence *ratione materiae* under its Statute and Rules to consider matters arising under the law of war and may not incorporate the law of war into principles of the American Declaration. The State also submits that the Commission has no competence to interpret or apply international human rights law, international humanitarian law, customary international law via the American Declaration.
19. The State also contends that the petition fails to state facts that tend to establish violations of Petitioner’s rights under Article 34(a) of the Commission’s Rules of Procedure and contains claims that are manifestly groundless under Article 34(b) of the Commission’s Rules of Procedure. In this regard, the State contends, for example, that the petitioner’s allegations about the conditions of the TIPF camp, and the allegations about mistreatment fail to evidence violations of the American Declaration. In relation to the petitioner’s claims centered on alleged arbitrary deprivation of liberty, the State contends that these claims are manifestly groundless. In this respect, the State emphasizes that: (a) the petitioner voluntarily sought residence at the TIPF after being held against his will by the PMOI; (b) the petitioner was free to leave the TIPF at any time. Accordingly, the State concludes that the petitioner was not arbitrarily deprived of his liberty. Regarding the petitioner’s claims regarding the right to juridical personality and the right to petition (Articles XVII and XXIV of the American Declaration), the State also dismisses these claims as manifestly groundless. In this regard, the State argues that the petitioner has failed to substantiate his claim that his juridical personality has not been recognized. Further the State contends that the petitioner has voluntarily declined to pursue remedies. Accordingly, the State submits that the petitioner’s voluntary decision not to pursue his remedies with U.S. authorities cannot be construed as a denial of his right to submit respectful petitions, much less a denial of recognition of his juridical personality.
20. On the matter of exhaustion of domestic remedies, the State rejects the petitioner’s claim that he had no access to domestic remedies. The State concedes that the petitioner would not having legal standing to file a constitutional claim against the State (Bivens claim) or a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). However, contends that it was open to the petitioner to pursue personal liability claims premised upon a violation of state tort law, either against the United States for torts occurring within the scope of federal employment or against the individual federal employee for torts occurring outside of the scope of employment. The State further argues that the petitioner could also have pursued domestic remedies against federal employees under the Alien Tort Statute (for certain international law violations). In addition to suing federal officials for either injunctive relief or money damages, the State submits that the petitioner may also have sought non-judicial relief from the government such as by filing an administrative claim for compensation under the Foreign Claims Act (“FCA”) or petitioning Congress for a private bill of redress. Ultimately, the State rejects the petitioner’s assertion that he would probably not succeed in obtaining redress is not only speculative but also insufficient to bypass his obligation to exhaust domestic remedies before pressing his claims before the Commission.
21. Regarding the timeliness of the present petition, the State argues that the petitioner has failed to comply with Article 32 of the Commission’s Rules of Procedure. The State indicates that even if even if the Commission finds that the petitioner is exempted from the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies, the petitioner is still required to present the petition within a reasonable period in accordance with Article 32 (2) of the Commission’s Rules of Procedure. According to the State, the petition cannot be construed as being presented in a reasonable period given that the petition was presented more than more than six years after the last alleged violation. The State also contends that the circumstances of the petitioner following his departure from TIPF do not ultimately justify the time that elapsed before the petition was filed. In this regard, the State notes that more than five years elapsed between the grant of asylum to the petitioner in Switzerland in June 2008 and lodging of the petition in August 2013. The State contends that this delay remains unexplained; and is not justified by the petitioner’s claimed difficulties in identifying lawyers to assist him or the time that elapsed before his matter was taken up by the International Human Rights Clinic.

**VI. ANALYSIS OF EXHAUSTION OF DOMESTIC REMEDIES AND TIMELINESS OF THE PETITION**

1. On the issue of domestic remedies, the State argues that the petitioner has neither invoked nor exhausted available domestic remedies. On the other hand, the petitioner submits that he was effectively deprived of access to domestic remedies, and accordingly, should be granted and exception to the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies.
2. The Commission notes that the petition alleges custodial mistreatment including torture. The Commission reiterates that under international standards applicable to cases like this one, where serious human rights violations such as physical abuse and torture are alleged, the appropriate and effective remedy is precisely the filing and the undertaking of an effective criminal investigation aimed at the clarification of the facts and, if necessary, individualize the persons responsible and attribute the corresponding responsibilities. According to the information available, it appears that the petitioner complained about the treatment he received while at the TIFP, but it does not appear that the authorities undertook the necessary investigations; or any other relevant action aimed at preventing the occurrence of further aggression against the petitioner or impose any sanction on the perpetrators.
3. Moreover, the Commission notes that the State acknowledges that the petitioner would not have had legal standing to file a constitutional claim (Bivens claim) or a claim under the FTCA. In the Commission’s estimation, it can safely be inferred that the petitioner was effectively prevented from pursuing these remedies. While the State argues that it was still open to the petitioner to pursue claims against federal employee for torts occurring outside of the scope of employment (as well as other remedies including administrative claims for compensation), the Commission notes that whenever a State alleges that a petitioner has not exhausted domestic remedies, it has the burden of identifying the remedies to be exhausted and demonstrating that the remedies that have not been exhausted are “appropriate” for redressing the alleged violation, in other words, that the function of those remedies within the national legal system is suitable for protecting the legal right infringed[[9]](#footnote-10). Based on the record, the Commission considers that the State has not indicated how these remedies would effectively redress the petitioner's claims. Accordingly, the petitioner is not required to exhaust these remedies.
4. The Commission observes that the alleged acts at issue occurred between 2004 and 2007 and its effects concerning the alleged lack of investigation and punishment of said acts to the alleged victim continue to this date. As a result, considering the context and the characteristics of this case, the Commission concludes that it has sufficient elements to believe that the exception set forth in Article 31 (2) (b) of the IACHR Rules of Procedure is applicable in this case, and that the petition was filed in a reasonable time, under the terms of Article 32 (2) of the IACHR Rules of Procedure.

**VII. ANALYSIS OF COLORABLE CLAIM**

1. In the present case, the petitioners alleges that the State is responsible for the violation of Articles I, III, XVII, XXIV, XXV of the American Declaration, based on acts of custodial mistreatment (including torture) that the alleged victim allegedly suffered (while in detention by the State) and for the lack of access to adequate and effective judicial remedies with respect to these alleged violations. The State has claimed that (a) the American Declaration does not create legally binding obligations and that the Commission lacks competence to determine violations of the American Declaration (against the State); and (b) that the appropriate legal basis to consider the petitioner’s claims is the international law of war (*lex specialis*); and that the Commission has no competence or authority to interpret and apply the *lex specialis*) with respect to the claims of the petitioner; (c) the Commission also has no competence to interpret or apply international human rights law, international humanitarian law, customary international law via the American Declaration. Ultimately, for these reasons the State contends that the claims of the petitioner are outside of the competence of the Commission *ratione materiae*.
2. According to the long-standing practice and jurisprudence of the Inter-American human rights system, the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man is a source of international obligations for the United States and for the other member states of the OAS that are not parties to the American Convention on Human Rights. It is understood that these obligations derive from the commitments assumed by the member states in the area of human rights in the OAS Charter, that the member states agreed to be contained and defined in the American Declaration, and from the customary legal nature of the rights protected in the basic provisions of the Declaration, for which the Commission is empowered by Articles 18 and 20 of its Statute to receive and evaluate allegations of noncompliance with these commitments by the States. Therefore, it is pertinent to characterize the non-compliance by a member State of the guarantees of the rights enshrined in the American Declaration as a violation of the obligations imposed on it by international human rights law. Accordingly, the Commission rejects the State's assertion that the American Declaration does not create legal obligations for the OAS member States.
3. In terms of the law applicable to the present case, the petitioner invoked the provisions of the American Declaration with respect to his claims. The State argued that the claims of the petitioner are governed wholly by the law of war (*lex specialis*), a body of law which the Commission lacks the jurisdiction or interpretative power to apply. In accordance with the normative framework of the system, when examining individual cases concerning non-parties to the American Convention, the Commission looks to the American Declaration as the primary source of international obligation and applicable law. This does not mean, that the Commission may not refer to other sources of law in effectuating its mandate, including the law of war. The Commission is mandated by its Statute to examine claims alleging the violation of a right protected under the American Declaration, the fact that the resolution of such a claim may require reference to other sources of law or international jurisprudence is no bar to jurisdiction (*ratione materiae*).
4. Given the foregoing, the Commission considers that the claims of the petitioner are within the competence of the Commission *ratione materiae*.
5. In view of these considerations and after examining the elements of fact and law presented by the parties, the Commission considers that the claims of the petitioner are not manifestly unfounded and require a substantive study on the merits as the alleged facts, to be corroborated as certain could characterize violations of articles XXX.
6. The Commission concludes that if the allegations made are true, then the petition is neither “manifestly groundless” nor “obviously out of order”. Based on the foregoing, the Commission considers that, if proved, the facts alleged could establish possible violations of the rights protected by Articles I (liberty and personal security), XVII (recognition of juridical personality and civil rights), XXIV (right of petition) and XXV (protection from arbitrary arrest) of the American Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man.

**VIII. DECISION**

1. To find the instant petition admissible in relation to Articles I, XVII, XXIV, and XXV of the American Declaration; and
2. To notify the parties of this decision; to continue with the analysis on the merits; and to publish this decision and include it in its Annual Report to the General Assembly of the Organization of American States.

Approved by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on the 3rd day of the month of August, 2022. (Signed:) Julissa Mantilla Falcón, President; Margarette May Macaulay, Second Vice President; Joel Hernández, and Roberta Clarke, Commissioners.

1. Hereinafter “the United States”, “the U.S.” or “the State.” [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. Hereinafter “Declaration” or “American Declaration. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. The observations submitted by each party were duly transmitted to the opposing party. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. Also known (in Farsi) as the *Mujaheddin-e Khalq*. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. The petition submits that U.S. Federal courts have consistently held that the foreign country exception applies even when the U.S. has exclusive control or de facto sovereignty, as opposed to legal sovereignty, over a territory located outside of its borders. In this regard, the petition cites several judicial decisions including the U.S. Supreme Court decision of United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217, 219 (1949). [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. 542 U.S. 692 (2004). [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
7. In support of this claim, the petition cites various decisions of U.S. courts including the U.S. Supreme Court decision of *Johnson v. Eisentrager* 339 U.S. 763, 784-85 (1950). [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
8. In this regard, the petitioner cites IACHR, Report No. 36/14, Petition 913-06. Admissibility. Slaughter in Albania. Colombia. May 8, 2014, para. 56. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
9. IACHR, Report No. 26/16, Petition 932-03. Inadmissibility. Rómulo Jonás Ponce Santamaría. Peru. April 15, 2016, para. 25] [↑](#footnote-ref-10)